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WITH  THE ABANDONMENT of fixed dollar  exchange rates in March 1973, 
the world's industrialized  countries adopted temporarily  a system of 
floating  exchange rates that many  economists had advocated  to permit 
individual  nations to reconcile the often conflicting requirements  of 
internal  and  external  balance.  In spite of a surprising  short-run  volatility 
in exchange markets  under the interim system, the consensus among 
policymakers  at the end of 1975 was that floating rates had worked 
reasonably  well. This  consensus  found  expression  in  thejoint  declaration 
following the November 1975 Rambouillet  economic summit, which 
committed participating  monetary authorities to "counter disorderly 
market  conditions,  or erratic  fluctuations,  in exchange  rates," but  made 
no provision  for a return  to fixed parities. Agreements  at Rambouillet 
led directly to the formalization  of the floating rate system through 
amendment  of the Articles  of Agreement  of the International  Monetary 
Fund (IMF) at Kingston, Jamaica,  in January  1976. A new Article IV 
dealing  with exchange  rate arrangements  implicitly  sanctioned  floating, 
subject  only to broad  prohibitions  against  actions  detrimental  to "finan- 
cial and  economic stability.  "  I 
The sharp  real depreciation  of the dollar  between 1976  and 1979  and 
the even larger  real appreciation  between 1979  and 1985  have led many 
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1. These events are described  in greater  detail  in Robert  Solomon, The  International 
Monetary System,  1945-1981 (Harper and Row,  1982). 
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to modify  whatever  sanguine  views of the floating  rate system they may 
have held in the mid-1970s. Labeled misalignments, these massive 
medium-term  swings  in floating  rates  are  increasingly  viewed as a source 
of resource misallocation,  a spur  to protectionism,  and an impediment 
to prompt  current  account adjustment.  Some contend that the drastic 
real exchange rate movements of recent years have resulted from 
speculative  pressures  related  only tangentially,  if at all, to the course of 
monetary  policies or to developments  on the real sides of the industrial- 
ized economies. 
Proposals to reform  the present international  payments system are 
receiving renewed attention in government  and academic circles. Re- 
cently, at a meeting in Tokyo, representatives  of the IMF's Group  of 
Ten rejected  greater  fixity of exchange  rates and affirmed  that "the key 
elements  of the current  international  monetary  system require  no major 
institutional  change."2  Later, in September  of this year, officials  from 
the Group  of Ten agreed  to a policy of concerted intervention  to lower 
the exchange  value  of the dollar.  The  debate  over  floating  exchange  rates 
is certain  to continue. 
This paper  reviews the performance  of floating  rates over the decade 
since the Jamaica  revision of the IMF Articles of Agreement  and asks 
whether a less flexible exchange rate system could have done better.3 
My discussion of alternatives  to the present system concentrates on 
fixed  exchange  rates,  but  an  extension  of the arguments  to hybrid  systems 
involving  flexible target  zones is straightforward.  The main issues that 
arise in comparing  fixed and flexible rates and the main conclusions I 
draw  on these issues are as follows. 
2. See "Report of the Deputies: The Functioning  of the International  Monetary 
System,"  IMF  Survey,  Supplement  on the Group  of Ten  Deputies'  Report  (July  1985),  pp. 
2-14. 
3. For complementary  assessments of the floating  rate experience, see Jacques  R. 
Artus and John H. Young, "Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates: A Renewal of the 
Debate,"  International Monetary Fund Staff Papers,  vol.  26 (December  1979), pp. 654- 
98; Richard  N. Cooper, "Flexible Exchange Rates, 1973-1980:  How Bad Have They 
Really  Been?"  in Richard  N. Cooper  and  others,  eds., The  International  Monetary  System 
under Flexible Exchange Rates: Global, Regional,  and National  (Ballinger, 1982), pp. 3- 
16;  Morris  Goldstein,  "The Exchange  Rate System:  Lessons of the Past  and Options  for 
the Future," Occasional  Paper  30 (International  Monetary  Fund, July 1984);  and John 
Williamson,  The  Exchange  Rate System, Policy Analyses in International  Economics  5 
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EXCHANGE  RATE  TARGETS  AND  MONETARY  CONTROL 
Proposals  to limit  nominal  exchange  rate  flexibility  would in practice 
tie national  monetary  policies to the task of exchange  rate stabilization. 
The  room  for  domestic  monetary  maneuver  that  remained  would  depend 
on the stringency of the new exchange rate commitments, while the 
international  distribution  of control  over the world  money supply  would 
depend on the mechanism  in place for official settlement of payments 
imbalances. In the absence of capital controls, a resurrection  of the 
system that broke down in 1973 would substantially  deprive central 
banks other than the reserve-currency  issuer of monetary  autonomy. 
No central  bank  in any nation  except the United States would have the 
ability to  influence domestic monetary conditions through unaided 
monetary  policy. Only through  recurring  parity changes would other 
countries  be able to avoid accepting  the trend  world  inflation  rate set by 
the reserve center. 
EXCHANGE  RATE  REGIMES  AS  AUTOMATIC  STABILIZERS 
The exchange rate regime  affects the variability  of output  and price 
levels in response to disturbances that policymakers are unable to 
observe directly. A potentially stabilizing  role of the exchange rate is 
another  reason  why a loss of monetary  autonomy  through  exchange  rate 
targeting  might  have costly macroeconomic  consequences  for individual 
countries.  Fixed exchange  rates can be better  automatic  stabilizers  than 
are  floating  rates  when most shocks originate  in asset markets;  but  when 
goods-market  shifts drive macroeconomic  fluctuations,  floating rates 
generally  have  an  advantage.  And  the evidence  is that  many  disturbances 
of the early 1980s  originated  in goods markets.  The stability  advantages 
of floating  rates in these circumstances, however, will be distributed 
unevenly among  the economy's sectors. This misallocation  is the root 
of the misalignment  problem. 
EXCHANGE  RATE  REGIMES  AND  AUTOMATIC  DISCIPLINE 
No international  monetary  system likely to be put into place seems 
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it imposes  in discouraging  one country  from  embarking  on policy courses 
harmful  to others. A regime  of fixed  exchange  rates probably  would not 
have prevented  the recent U.S. fiscal surge that is at the center of the 
current  international  adjustment  problem.  Nor, given U.S. fiscal  policy, 
would fixed rates have prevented  a substantial  real dollar  appreciation 
from  emerging  over a longer  period. 
THE  VOLATILITY  OF  FLOATING  RATES  AND  THE  CREDIBILITY 
OF  FIXED  RATES 
Exchange rate volatility in the short term is widely viewed as a 
drawback  of floating  rates. Fixed rates, however, are also subject to 
change without notice, and when parity  changes offer immediate  mac- 
roeconomic benefits, authorities will be tempted to alter rates. An 
evaluation of the relative merits of exchange rate regimes, therefore, 
must recognize that the only realistic fixed rate regime  is one in which 
the exchange rate is not always credibly fixed. There is little direct 
evidence that short-term  exchange rate volatility has been harmful. 
Capital  account volatility under unconvincingly  fixed rates, however, 
might  entail serious costs. Further,  the possibility  of surprise  exchange 
rate  changes  negates  most of the "disciplinary"  advantages  of a credibly 
fixed  rate  or zone. 
The conclusion  I reach  is broadly  similar  to that  reached  by the Group 
of Ten deputies. Despite flaws  in the present  system, it would  be neither 
feasible nor clearly desirable  for the European  Currency  Unit and the 
Japanese  yen to be pegged to the dollar. Cycles in real exchange rates 
have proved to be one of the most costly aspects of floating  rates, but 
they have at times been a symptom of inappropriate  national  policies 
rather  than an independent  cause of distress. In particular,  I argue  that 
the most recent episode of U.S. dollar  misalignment  is in large  part  due 
to macroeconomic  policies, both-in  the United States and  abroad,  that  a 
fixed  rate  regime  would  have been unable  to prevent  and  possibly  unable 
to survive  without  the imposition  of costly capital  controls. 
PLAN  OF  THE  PAPER 
The balance  of the paper  is divided  into six sections and  a conclusion. 
The first section, a review of recent macroeconomic  developments  in Maurice Obstfeld  373 
the major industrial  countries, emphasizes the uneven nature of the 
world  recovery from the 1980-82  recession. It also notes differences  in 
the connection  between the real  exchange  rate  and  the level of manufac- 
turing  employment  in different  countries  and periods. The next section 
develops a model of the international  transmission  of macroeconomic 
disturbances  under floating  and fixed exchange rates. The model is a 
useful framework  for the review, in the third section, of the theory of 
optimum  currency  areas. The theory, which observes that  there  may be 
costs as well as benefits  in expanding  the size of regions  where  exchange 
rates are fixed, is a useful starting  point  for evaluating  floating  and fixed 
rates. 
The fourth section examines the policy shifts, both in the United 
States and abroad,  underlying  the large swings in the U.S. dollar's  real 
exchange rate since 1976. It also investigates the role that shocks to 
goods markets  have played in exchange rate determination.  In light of 
the evidence presented in this section on the sources of disturbances, 
the next section looks into the question of whether a regime of fixed 
rates would have been preferable  since 1976. The final section of the 
paper  weighs  the  problem  of the short-term  volatility  of floating  exchange 
rates against the problems that may arise when the exchange rate is 
unconvincingly  fixed. 
Exchange Rate Experience and the Current Adjustment Problem 
The recent appreciation  of the dollar, both in real and in nominal 
terms, is the latest and most dramatic  movement in a series of ups and 
downs initiated by the exchange rate realignments  of  1971-73. This 
section reviews the medium-term  swings in the dollar's real external 
value since the closing years of the fixed rate system. These persistent 
medium-term  swings  in real  exchange  rates  are  often  identified  as a major 
cost of the current  floating  rate system. 
Because such swings in real exchange rates may alter the allocation 
of resources between sectors of the economy producing  tradable  and 
nontradable  goods, I also examine the evolution of employment  during 
this period  in the manufacturing  sectors of the United States, Germany, 
and  Japan.  While  manufactures  compose only a subset of tradables,  the 
evidence presented illustrates possible correlations  between real ex- 374  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
change rate movements and the economy's output mix. The data also 
reflect  important  trends  in the industrial  structure  of the United States.4 
I will argue  in a later section that the current  alignment  of industrial- 
ized country  exchange rates is in part  a consequence of differing  fiscal 
stances and the uneven nature of the recovery from the worldwide 
recession of  1980-82. The section concludes with a review of the 
international  pattern  of demand  growth since 1982  and the associated 
current  account  positions. 
THE  DOLLAR  S  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE  IN  HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Figure  1  shows the evolution  since 1967  of two measures  of the dollar's 
real value in terms  of foreign  currencies.  The first  of these, the Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund's measure  of cyclically normalized  relative unit 
labor  costs in manufacturing,  is the IMF's preferred  indicator  of inter- 
national  competitiveness.  The second  measure  shown  in  figure  1  is based 
on wholesale prices. U.S.  prices appear in the numerator  of each 
measure, while the denominator  is a trade-weighted  average  of foreign 
prices multiplied  by nominal  dollar  exchange rates. A rise in either of 
these indexes of the dollar's  real external  value-a  real appreciation- 
represents  an increase  in U.S. prices relative  to an average  of the dollar 
prices of foreign  labor  or manufactures.5 
Both measures show a steep real depreciation  of the dollar  between 
1969  and 1975,  relatively  little change between 1973  and 1976, another 
real depreciation  between 1976  and 1979,  and, finally,  the massive real 
appreciation  that continued  without prolonged  interruption  from 1979 
until early 1985. (Since February 1985, the dollar has depreciated 
sharply.)  The annual  data  plotted  in figure  1 illustrate  a real  appreciation 
between 1979  and 1984  on the order  of 40 percent.  The magnitude  of this 
change  is unprecedented  since the abandonment  of fixed  parities,  and it 
4.  For a detailed discussion of these trends, see Robert Z. Lawrence, "Is Trade 
Deindustrializing  America?  A Medium-Term  Perspective,"  BPEA,  1:1983,  pp. 129-61. 
5. For an evaluation  of the alternative  measures,  see Jacques  Artus  and Malcolm  D. 
Knight, "Issues in the Assessment of the Exchange Rates of Industrial  Countries," 
Occasional  Paper  29 (International  Monetary  Fund,  July 1984).  The IMF  assigns  weights 
to foreign  prices  according  to a foreign  country's  importance  as a trading  partner  and its 
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Figure 1.  Measures of the Dollar's Real Effective Foreign Exchange Value, 1967-85a 
Index, 1980 = 100 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, Internzational  Financial  Statistics. 
a.  Annual data for 1967-84; first quarter data for 1985. Real exchange  rates are U.S.  wholesale  prices or cyclically 
normalized unit labor costs,  divided by the U.S.  dollar equivalents of foreign wholesale  prices or labor costs.  A rise in 
either index is a real appreciation of the U.S.  dollar against foreign currencies. 
has naturally  sparked concern about the performance  of the current 
exchange  rate system. 
Bilateral  comparisons  of U.S. wholesale  prices against  exchange  rate 
adjusted  wholesale prices in Germany  and Japan  are shown in figure  2. 
These bilateral  measures  are broadly  in line with the multilateral  mea- 
sures graphed  in figure 1, but there are differences in the timing and 
magnitudes  of changes. The increase in the dollar's  real value in terms 
of the deutsche mark  between 1979  and 1984  is roughly  60 percent. The 
corresponding  figure  for the yen is only 20 percent, a reflection  of the 
yen's relatively greater strength against the dollar in recent years. 
Considerable  variance  in the evolution of U.S. competitiveness vis-'a- 
vis individual  trading  partners  underlies  the average  measures  shown in 
the first  figure. 
One immediate  implication  of the evidence is that nominal  exchange 
rates have not conformed  well to the purchasing  power parity (PPP) 
theory over the floating  rate period.6  The failure  of PPP is particularly 
6. This  fact  is documented  for  a number  of bilateral  exchange  rates  in  Jacob  A. Frenkel, 
"The Collapse of Purchasing  Power Parities  during  the 1970s," European  Economic 
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Figure 2.  Bilateral Real Exchange Rates between the United States and Germany and 
between the United States and Japan, 1970-85a 
Index, 1980 =  100 
Source:  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,  Main Economic lIndicators. 
a.  Data for  1985 are the  March values.  The  values  plotted  between  1970 and  1984 are year averages  of  monthly 
bilateral real exchange  rates,  calculated  as the U.S.  wholesale  price index divided  by the dollar value of the foreign 
wholesale price index. A rise in either bilateral rate is a real appreciation of the U.S.  dollar against the other currency. 
striking  when one notes the large swings in the measures based on 
wholesale  price  indexes, which  are  dominated  by tradable  manufactures 
that  are rather  similar  across countries. Strict  forms of the PPP  doctrine 
predict  that the exchange rate will exactly offset intercountry  differen- 
tials in consumer  price inflation  or even wage inflation.  Weaker  forms 
assert  that  exchange  rates adjust  to offset inflation  differentials  between 
countries' tradable  goods sectors. No version of PPP appears  to be a 
good characterization  of the data shown above. It is true  that  the dollar- Maurice Obstfeld  377 
yen real  exchange  rate,  measured  on the basis of wholesale  price  indexes 
(WPIs), stood at the same level in 1984  as in 1972. But in view of the 
large and persistent fluctuations  in between, this fact can hardly be 
regarded  as more  than  a coincidence.7 
An important  empirical  regularity  related  to this failure  of PPP is the 
close correlation  between changes  in real  exchange  rates  and  changes  in 
nominal  exchange rates. Strict purchasing  power parity  theory implies 
that  changes  in nominal  exchange  rates are not associated  with changes 
in real exchange rates. But as figure  3 illustrates,  from  January  1976  to 
April 1985,  the correlation  between monthly  percentage  changes in the 
real  and  nominal  effective dollar  exchange  rate  indexes (as measured  by 
Morgan  Guaranty  Trust Company  of New York) is 0.95.8 The corre- 
sponding correlation  coefficients for the Morgan deutsche mark and 
yen indexes are 0.96 and 0.98, respectively. Several possible theoreti- 
cal explanations  for these high correlations  are discussed in the next 
section. 
It is noteworthy  that the floating  rate era was ushered in by a real 
depreciation  of the dollar comparable  in magnitude  to the latest real 
appreciation.  As figure 1 shows, that real depreciation  began in 1969. 
Steep when measured  in terms of wholesale prices, it is even steeper 
when the measure  is based on labor  costs. The reason  for the difference 
is the well-documented  acceleration  of real wage growth  abroad  at the 
end of the 1960s. 
The events leading to this real depreciation  are worth recalling, as 
they provide a useful counterpoint to  recent charges that floating 
exchange rates foster persistent exchange rate misalignment.  In May 
1971, weakness in the U.S.  trade balance and balance of payments 
7.  For  accounts  of  the  purchasing  power  parity  doctrine,  see  Jacob  A.  Frenkel, 
"Purchasing Power Parity: Doctrinal Perspectives  and Evidence from the 1920s," Journal 
of International Economics,  vol.  6 (May 1978), pp. 169-91; Irving B. Kravis and Robert 
E.  Lipsey,  "Toward  an Explanation  of  National  Price  Levels,"  Princeton  Studies  in 
International Finance 52 (Princeton University,  International Finance Section,  November 
1983);  and RudigerDornbusch,  "Purchasing Power Parity," Working Paper 1591 (National 
Bureau of Economic Research,  March 1985). 
8.  Once again, a rise in one of these measures is a real or nominal effective appreciation 
of the dollar, while a fall is a depreciation.  The Morgan Guaranty Trust nominal effective 
exchange  rate indexes  use  1980 bilateral trade weights for trade in manufactures among 
fifteen industrial countries.  The real effective  exchange  rate indexes  adjust the nominal 
indexes for differential U.S.-foreign  inflation in the wholesale  prices of nonfood manufac- 
tures. 378  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
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helped  initiate  a protracted  speculative  attack  on the dollar.  The Decem- 
ber 1971  Smithsonian  realignment,  which formally  devalued the dollar 
relative  to the currencies  of most major  industrial  countries, entailed  a 
substantial  real  depreciation  of the dollar,  albeit  a smaller  one than  U.S. 
authorities  had desired. But by the end of the year it was also clear that 
the United States had registered  its first postwar annual  merchandise 
trade deficit, a development  apparently  taken by the market  as confir- 
mation  that  further  real  depreciation  would  be required  in  the near  future. 
Without  a discrete revaluation  of foreign  currencies  against  the dollar, 
the transition  to a real exchange rate consistent with a balanced U.S. 
current  account would have called for a period of stagnating  economic 
activity in the United States and a further  rise in relative foreign price 
levels-a  process neither  the Nixon administration  nor foreign  govern- 
ments seemed willing  to tolerate. This realization  led to further  specu- 
lative runs on the dollar, further  dollar devaluation, and, finally, the 
abandonment  of fixed rates in 1973.  On the basis of relative wholesale 
prices, the dollar's  real value in terms of foreign  currencies  fell by 18.6 
percent  between 1969  and 1973;  its real  depreciation  on the basis of unit 
labor  costs was 28.4 percent  over that  period.  Not until 1982  did  the U.S. 
real exchange rate again approach  the level from which it had been 
devalued  by the Smithsonian  agreement. 
THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  MANUFACTURING  EMPLOYMENT 
The effect of exchange  rate movements  on the manufacturing  sector 
has been at the center  of the discussion  of the dollar's  real  appreciation. 
By lowering  the prices of imports  relative  to those of domestic exports 
and import-competing  goods, a real appreciation  tends to lower the 
demand for a country's tradable goods. This, in turn, contracts the 
manufacturing  sector, where  the production  of nonagricultural  tradables 
is concentrated. 
Figure 4  shows the ratio of  manufacturing  employment to  total 
nonagricultural  employment  in the United States, Germany,  and Japan 
since 1960.  After 1970,  all three countries  show a declining  trend  in the 
manufacturing  employment  ratio,  but  the trend  is most pronounced,  and 
begins  earliest,  in the United  States. Because measured  labor  productiv- 
ity grows more quickly in manufacturing  than in other sectors of the 
economy, such a trend  is natural  for an advanced  economy and  need not 380  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Figure 4.  Share of Manufacturing Employment in Total Nonagricultural Employment, 
1960_84a 
Percent 
Source:  U.S.  Department of Commerce, International Economic Indicators. 
a.  Annual data, except  quarterly in 1984 for Germany and Japan. Data not available for 1961-65. 
imply  a shift in the composition  of national  output  away from manufac- 
turing.  However, labor  productivity  has grown somewhat  more slowly 
in the United States than in Germany, and much more slowly in the 
United States than  in Japan. 
A striking  feature  of the experience  in the United States is the role of 
recessions in accelerating  the secular  exodus of labor  from  manufactur- 
ing. Apparently,  recessions put some marginal  firms  out of business and 
force other such firms to shed excess labor permanently.  The figure 
shows particularly  sharp  reductions  in the U.S. manufacturing  employ- Maurice Obstfeld  381 
ment ratio in 1969-71, 1973-75, and 1979-82, all periods of recession. 
The sharp  contraction  of U.S. manufacturing  employment  over 1979-83 
has suggested to many observers a linkage  between the real exchange 
rate  and the size of the U.S. manufacturing  sector. However, the 1969- 
71 contraction  occurred  against the background  of a depreciating  real 
exchange  rate, as documented  earlier.  Further,  figures  for 1984  show a 
rise  in  the  U.S. manufacturing  employment  ratio  and,  infact, a substantial 
(5.8  percent)  expansion  in the level of employment  in manufacturing  and 
mining. 
These considerations suggest that the relation between the real 
exchange rate and the sectoral allocation of resources is not a simple 
one, but depends on the nature of the disturbance  moving the real 
exchange  rate. For example,  an increase  in foreign  demand  for domestic 
manufactures  will cause a currency appreciation  and an expansion in 
the manufacturing  sector. But a restrictive  shift in domestic monetary 
policy will cause a currency  appreciation  coupled with a contraction  in 
the manufacturing  sector;  and  an increase  in domestic  spending  that  falls 
on nonmanufactures  may produce  the same result. I return  to this point 
later  on.9 
The cyclical behavior of the manufacturing  employment ratio in 
Germany  is broadly similar  to that in the United States, but there are 
some differences.  For  example,  the decline  in the ratio  following  the first 
oil shock begins and ends later  in Germany,  and is followed by a strong 
rebound  between 1976  and 1979, a period in which the deutsche mark 
appreciated  sharply  against  the dollar.  As in the United  States, the share 
of German  manufacturing  in total  employment  has declined  significantly 
9. Solomon  shows that  the ratio  of manufacturing  value  added  to GNP  did  not decline 
between 1980  and 1984  when  both are measured  at 1972  prices.  This  is not the case when 
current  dollars  are used to measure  outputs.  See Robert  Solomon, "Effects  of the Strong 
Dollar,"  Brookings  Discussion  Papers  in International  Economics  35  (Brookings,  Septem- 
ber 1985).  Arnold  Kling,  in "The  Dollar  and  the Demand  for Labor  in Manufacturing:  The 
Case of the Missing Effect" (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
September  1985),  finds  that  over 1974-84  the exchange  rate  has no explanatory  power  in 
a regression  of a manufacturing  employment  ratio index on current  and lagged gross 
national  product.  As Solomon  observes, some U.S. manufacturing  industries  have been 
hurt  by the shifts causing  the dollar's  appreciation,  but others, such as defense-related 
industries,  have  experienced  favorable  demand  shifts.  The same  conclusion  is reached  on 
the basis of disaggregated  data  in Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  Company  of New York, "The 
Bonn  Summit  and  the U.S. Trade  Deficit," World  Financial  Markets  (March-April  1985), 
pp. 1-13. 382  Brookings Papers on Economnic  Activity, 2:1985 
Table 1.  Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Real Gross National Product in Major 
Industrial Countries, 1977-84a 
Country  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
United States  5.5  5.0  2.8  -0.3  2.5  -2.1  3.7  6.8 
Japan  5.3  5.1  5.2  4.8  4.0  3.3  3.4  5.8 
Canada  2.0  3.6  3.2  1.1  3.3  -4.4  3.3  4.7 
France  3.1  3.8  3.3  1.1  0.2  2.0  0.7  1.8 
Germany  2.8  3.4  4.0  1.9  -0.2  -1.1  1.3  2.6 
Italy  1.9  2.7  4.9  3.9  0.2  - 0.5  - 0.4  2.6 
United  Kingdom  3.0  4.0  3.2  -  2.6  -  1.4  2.4  3.2  2.4 
Source:  Intemational  Monetary Fund,  World Economnic  OQtilook  1985 (Washington,  D.C.:  International Monetary 
Fund,  April 1985). 
a.  Figures are growth rates from the preceding year.  For France,  Italy, and the United  Kingdom, growth rates of 
gross  domestic  product at market prices are reported. 
in the recent recession, but the decline has occurred  in spite of the real 
depreciation  of the deutsche  mark.  In Japan  the manufacturing  employ- 
ment ratio  has been essentially flat since 1978.  As in the United States, 
however, a sharp,  permanent  decline  followed the 1973-74  price shock. 
It is noteworthy that Japanese manufacturing  employment remained 
strong  in the face of a real  effective appreciation  of the yen in 1982-84. 
RECOVERY:  A  COMPARATIVE  APPRAISAL 
It has been widely observed  that  the recoverv  from  the last recession 
has been unbalanced,  most rapid in the United States, quite slow in 
Europe. Table 1 shows annual growth rates of the major industrial 
countries'  real  gross national  products  since 1977. 
The table confirms  that GNP growth  since 1982  has been much  more 
rapid  in  the United  States, Japan,  and  Canada  than  in the major  industrial 
countries  of Europe.  In 1984  the recovery  strengthened  everywhere  save 
the United Kingdom.  But the acceleration  of growth  between 1983  and 
1984  was most dramatic  in the United States, Japan, and Italy. With 
their extensive trade linkages to the United States, Japan  and Canada 
have been the prime  beneficiaries  of the rapid  increase  in U.S. aggregate 
demand  during  the recovery. 
Mirroring  this asymmetric  output  performance  has been the behavior 
of employment.  Between 1983  and 1984,  the unemployment  rate came 
down sharply  in the United States and less dramatically  in Canada;  it 
remained unchanged (at 2.7 percent) in Japan, where the effect of Maurice Obstfeld  383 
Table  2. Current  Account  Balances  of Major  Industrial  Countries,  1977-84a 
Billions  of U.S. dollars 
Country  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
United States  -  14.5  -  15.5  -  1.0  1.9  6.3  - 9.2  -41.6  -  101.6 
Japan  10.9  16.5  - 8.8  -  10.7  4.8  6.9  20.8  35.0 
Canada  -4.1  -4.3  -4.1  -1.0  -5.1  2.2  1.4  1.5 
France  -0.4  7.0  5.2  -4.2  -4.8  -12.1  -4.5  n.a. 
Germany  4.1  9.0  -6.1  -15.8  -5.8  3.6  4.1  6.3 
Italy  2.5  6.2  5.5  - 9.7  - 8.2  - 5.5  0.8  - 3.2 
United Kingdom  0.1  2.2  -1.1  8.1  14.1  8.5  3.5  0.3 
Source:  Intemational  Monetary Fund,  World Economic  Outlook 1985. 
a.  Including official transfers. 
recession on measured unemployment  had been relatively mild. In 
Germany,  however, the unemployment  rate  dropped  only marginally  in 
1984,  while in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom  it actually rose. 
Overall  employment  levels fell in that  year  in both  France  and  Germany. 
Current  accounts have also reflected  the unbalanced  growth  among 
the industrialized  countries. The current  account surplus  is the excess 
of an economy's income over its absorption of goods and services; 
alternatively,  it may be viewed as the difference between exports of 
goods and services (plus net transfers  from  abroad)  and imports.  Table 
2 shows that in the course of the recovery, the U.S. current  account 
deficit  and  the  Japanese  current  account  surplus  have expanded  to record 
levels. Canada  and  Germany  also registered  external  surpluses  in 1984. 
The huge U.S. deficit  is the counterpart  of the surpluses  abroad.  The 
existence of external surpluses in Japan and Canada reinforces the 
impression  that  their  relatively  rapid  growth  is in part  attributable  to the 
spillover  effects of U.S. aggregate  demand.  In particular,  the large  U.S. 
deficit implies that overall American  demand  has grown more rapidly 
than  U.S. output  in the recovery. 
The demand patterns suggested by these data are important  for 
understanding  the recent behavior of exchange rates. Table 3 shows 
percentage  changes  in the seven countries'  real  effective exchange  rates 
based on wholesale price indexes between 1980  and 1982  and between 
1982  and 1984.  In the first  period  there is a real effective appreciation  of 
the U.S. dollar coupled with real depreciations  of all other currencies 
but the Canadian  dollar. In the second period the U.S.  dollar's real 
appreciation  continued,  but the behavior  of other currencies  was more 
disparate.  As noted earlier,  the yen, while depreciating  slightly in real 384  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Table 3.  Percentage Changes in Real Effective Exchange Rates,  1980-84a 
Countiy  1980-82  1982-84 
United  States  24.1  10.9 
Japan  -  1.2  9.9 
Canada  5.3  2.2 
France  -  10.1  -  5.2 
Germany  -4.0  -  3.8 
Italy  -  5.5  1.1 
United  Kingdom  -  2.6  -  9.3 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics. 
a.  Real  effective  exchange  rates  are  based  on  relative  wholesale  prices.  A  positive  number  is  an  effective 
appreciation. 
terms  against  the dollar,  appreciated  significantly  on an effective basis. 
The currencies of  France, Germany, and the United Kingdom all 
depreciated  further  in real  effective terms  between 1982  and 1984,  while 
those of Canada  and Italy appreciated  slightly. 
The policy backdrop  to recession and recovery has been a concerted 
slowdown  in monetary  growth  rates in major  industrial  countries,  fiscal 
expansion in the United States, and a net fiscal contraction abroad. 
Recent trends in OECD fiscal policies have been surveyed by Olivier 
Blanchard and Lawrence Summers.'0  The IMF's measure of fiscal 
impulse, which attempts to measure the exogenous contribution  of 
government  fiscal policy to demand, confirms  their findings.  Between 
1980  and 1985  the cumulative  expansionary  fiscal  impulse  for the United 
States was 4.2 percent of U.S.  GNP, while the fiscal impulse for the 
other six major  industrial  countries was contractionary  and amounted 
to - 3.2 percent  of their  total GNP.  I  I 
Table  4 shows average  money growth  rates over the periods 1976-79 
and 1979-84. For Japan,  Germany,  and Italy, the change  in MI growth 
10. Olivier  J. Blanchard  and Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Perspectives  on High World 
Real Interest  Rates," BPEA, 2:1984,  pp. 273-324. See also Charles  Wyplosz, "Interna- 
tional  Aspects of the Policy Mix in Six OECD  Countries,"  prepared  for the World  Bank- 
Brookings  Workshop  on the International  Consequences  of Budgetary  Deficits and the 
Monetary-Fiscal  Policy  Mix in the OECD  (September  1984). 
11. See International  Monetary  Fund, World  Economic Outlook  1985  (Washington, 
D.C.: International  Monetary  Fund,  April  1985),  table  16,  p. 221.  The  IMF's  fiscal  impulse 
measure  is not strictly  additive  over time;  the figures  given  in the text therefore  exaggerate 
the  extents  of the  cumulative  expansionary  impulse  in  the United  States  and  the  cumulative 
contractionary  impulse  abroad.  Further,  the IMF  does not  correct  for  the  effect  of inflation 
on the real  value  of nominal  government  liabilities.  Data  for 1985  are  projections. Mauirice Obstfeld  385 
Table 4.  Average MI Growth Rates of Major Industrial Countries, 1976-84a 
Percent 
Countiy  1976-79  1979-84 
United States  7.8  7.6 
Japan  9.2  3.6 
Canada  9.1  10.0 
France  11.0  10.0 
Germany  9.7  4.0 
Italy  22.1  13.1 
United Kingdom  15.1  10.6 
Source:  Author's  calculations,  based on data from International Monetary Fund,  World Economic  Ouitlook 1985. 
a.  Each year's monetary growth rate is the percentage  change  in the money  stock for that year over the previous 
year's money  stock. 
is dramatic.  The deceleration  of MI growth  in the United States appears 
to be insignificant,  but recent U.S.  money growth figures need to be 
interpreted  with caution because of changes in financial  regulations. 
Figures  for "regulation-adjusted"  M1  compiled  by Alfred  Broaddus  and 
Marvin  Goodfriend  in fact show a sharp contraction  in the growth of 
U.S. transaction  balances over 1980-81, an acceleration  over 1981-83, 
and  relatively  tight  money again  in 1983-84.  I2 Only  in Canada  is there  an 
increase  in  average  annual  Ml growth  between  the  two  periods;  however, 
data for Canadian  M2 growth show a significant  deceleration  between 
1980  and 1984. 
The moderate  slowdown  in U. S. money  growth  relative  to the sharper 
monetary  slowdowns in Japan  and Germany,  even after  adjustment  for 
U.S. financial  deregulation,  indicates  that shifts in monetary  policy can 
have been at best part of the reason for the dollar's nominal  and real 
appreciation  since 1979. The obvious inadequacy  of purely monetary 
explanations  calls for a conceptual  framework  integrating  both real and 
monetary  factors. This is developed in the next section. 
Exchange Rate Theory and International  Policy Interactions 
One argument  in the 1960s  case for exchange  rate flexibility  was that 
floating  rates  would  insulate  economies from  foreign  disturbances  while 
12. See Alfred  Broaddus  and Marvin  Goodfriend,  "Base Drift  and the Longer  Run 
Growth  of Ml: Experience  from  a Decade  of Monetary  Targeting,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of Richmond Economic Review, vol. 70 (November-December  1984), pp. 3-14. 386  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2.1985 
freeing  monetary  policy to pursue  domestic macroeconomic  goals. The 
collapse of the fixed exchange rate system occurred  at a time when the 
United States' OECD partners  seemed indeed to have lost control of 
their domestic money supplies. They hoped that floating  rates would 
sever the tie between U.S.  and domestic prices and give them better 
control  over macroeconomic  developments  at home.  13 
Experience  has shown that the insulating  properties  of floating  rates 
were exaggerated.  Table 5 compares  the matrix  of correlations  among 
U.S., Japanese,  and  German  annual  unemployment  rates  over the fixed 
rate years 1960-72  with corresponding  correlation  matrices  for periods 
after 1972.  (Unemployment  rates are residuals  from a regression  of the 
measured unemployment  rate on a constant and a time trend.) The 
coefficients are quite high in the first period, and a comparison  of the 
fixed rate period to the floating rate period as a whole suggests that 
international  synchronization  of the business cycle has remained  high. 
However, the two OPEC  price shocks, which  depressed  activity  around 
the world, are an obvious source of synchronization.  When only years 
in which OPEC  developments  were not dominant  are used, the United 
States-Japan  correlation  becomes quite small. But the United States- 
Germany  correlation  and  the  Germany-Japan  correlation  remain  positive 
and only slightly lower than during  the years of fixed exchange rates. 
Correlations  among  monthly  WPI  inflation  rates  reinforce  the impression 
that significant  interdependence  has remained  under  floating  rates. 
This section develops a framework  for analyzing  short-  and medium- 
term interdependence  under floating and fixed exchange rates. The 
results  provide  a basis  for  understanding  the experience  surveyed  above, 
and  a background  for discussion  of how different  exchange  rate  systems 
perform. The conclusions reached illustrate why early expectations 
about the functioning  of floating  rates were fulfilled  only partially.  By 
adopting  a floating  rate, a monetary  authority  regains  the control over 
its nominal money supply that it sacrifices under a fixed rate. But a 
floating  rate does not automatically  shield the economy from  the reper- 
cussions of macroeconomic  developments  abroad.  A floating  rate can 
cushion some sectors of the economy in the face of certain  shocks, but 
a change in a nominal  variable  like the exchange rate can never offset 
13. The classic academic  case for flexible  rates  during  this period  was made  by Harry 
G. Johnson  in "The Case for Flexible Exchange  Rates, 1969,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
St. Louis  Review,  vol. 51 (June  1969),  pp. 12-24. Maurice Obstfeld  387 
Table  5. Correlation  Matrix  of Annual  Unemployment  Rates:  the United  States,  Japan, 
and Germany,  1960-84a 
United 
Country  States  Japan  Germany 
1960-72 
United States  1.00  0.75  0.58 
Japan  1.00  0.93 
Germany  1.00 
1973-84 
United States  100  0.50  0.69 
Japan  1.00  0.83 
Germany  1.00 
1976-78 and 1981-84 
United States  1.00  0.15  0.49 
Japan  1.00  0.85 
Germany  1.00 
Source:  Author's  calculations,  based  on  data  from Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and Development, 
Main Economic  Indicators. 
a.  Correlations are between  the residuals from regressions  of unemployment  rates on a constant and a linear time 
trend. 
completely the effects of a real disturbance  originating  abroad. In the 
long run  a floating  rate  can shut out foreign  trend  inflation  and allow the 
central  bank  to choose its preferred  trend  inflation  rate. But in the short 
run  even monetary  shocks will be transmitted  between countries. 
EXCHANGE RATES AND PRICES IN  A GLOBAL MODEL 
The model developed here extends to a global setting  the Keynesian 
asset-market  approach  to exchange rates. That approach  emphasizes 
the rapid  adjustment  of asset markets  relative  to goods markets,  and  the 
exchange  rate's role in maintaining  continuous  portfolio  balance, given 
expectations  about  the future.  At the same time, the model emphasizes 
that these expectations are based on the exchange rate's key role in 
determining  the equilibrium  terms of trade between national outputs 
over the longer  term. Indeed, this alternative  role of the exchange rate 
is the key to understanding  the impact  of aggregate  demand  disturbances, 
including fiscal policies. Deviations between the short-run  and full- 
employment  equilibrium  of the world  economy arise from  the prenego- 
tiation of  nominal wage contracts. Full-employment  equilibrium  is 
attained over a span of time in which wage contracts can adjust to 
disturbances  that were not expected when the contracts  were written. 388  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
The model focuses on short-  and medium-term  price-output  dynamics, 
and does not explicitly incorporate  the current  account or investment, 
which  play  key roles in  determining  the long-run  equilibrium  of the world 
economy. I therefore  distinguish  between  full-employment  (or  medium- 
term)  equilibrium  and the true long-run  equilibrium  reached  once asset 
stocks have also adjusted  to steady-state  levels.  '4 
In view of the wide swings  in real  exchange  rates  documented  earlier, 
a realistic model must recognize that different economies produce 
distinct  output  baskets. For the moment  I consider  each region's  output 
to be a single composite commodity  and focus on the aggregate  impli- 
cations  of disturbances.  Sectoral  issues revolving  around  the distinction 
between  tradables  and  nontradables  turn  out to be of crucial  importance 
in assessing the performance  of floating  rates, however, and are taken 
up at the end of this section. 
Aggregate  demand  ytd  for the home region's  output  is a function  of the 
real exchange rate qt, the domestic real interest rate rt, foreign output 
yt*,  and a demand  shock gt. A similar  relationship  (in which the foreign 
counterparts  of domestic symbols are marked by asterisks) governs 
aggregate  demand  for foreign  output: 
d=  Yt _q,  -  rot  +  yy*  +  g,, 
ytd  qt  -  *r,* +  y*y,  +  g 
14. The Keynesian  asset-market  approach  is developed  in Rudiger  Dornbusch,  "Ex- 
pectations  and  Exchange  Rate  Dynamics,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 84  (Decem- 
ber 1976),  pp. 1161-76;  William  H. Branson, "Exchange  Rate Dynamics  and Monetary 
Policy,"  in Assar Lindbeck, ed., Inflation and Employment in Open Economies  (Amster- 
dam:  North-Holland,  1979),  pp. 189-224;  Jeffrey  A. Frankel,  "On  the Mark:  A Theory  of 
Floating Exchange Rates Based on Real Interest Differentials,"  American  Economic 
Review, vol. 69 (September  1979),  pp. 610-22; Michael  Mussa, "A Model of Exchange 
Rate Dynamics," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 90 (February  1982),  pp. 74-104; 
Willem  H. Buiter  and  Marcus  Miller,  "Real  Exchange  Rate  Overshooting  and  the Output 
Cost of Bringing  Down Inflation,"  European  Economic  Review, vol. 18  (May 1982),  pp. 
85-123;  Maurice  Obstfeld,  "Relative  Prices, Employment,  and the Exchange  Rate  in an 
Economy with Foresight,"  Econometrica,  vol. 50 (September  1982),  pp. 1219-42;  and 
Robert  P. Flood and  Robert  J. Hodrick,  "Optimal  Price  and  Inventory  Adjustment  in an 
Open-Economy  Model of the Business Cycle," Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  forth- 
coming.  The  global  extension  of this  approach  builds  on Robert  A. Mundell,  International 
Economics  (Macmillan,  1968),  chapter  18.  A similar  global  model  underlies  the analysis  in 
Betty C. Daniel, "The International  Transmission  of Economic Disturbances  under 
Flexible Exchange Rates," International  Economic Review, vol. 22 (October 1981), 
pp. 491-509, and Kenneth Rogoff, "Can International  Monetary  Policy Cooperation 
Be  Counterproductive?"  Journal  of International  Economics,  vol.  18 (May  1985), pp. 
199-217. Maurice Obstfeld  389 
Above, q, is the price of foreign  output  in terms  of domestic output. All 
lowercase variables  other  than  interest  rates  are natural  logarithms. 
Let e, denote  the nominal  exchange  rate,  the price  of foreign  currency 
in terms  of domestic  currency;  and  letp, (p*)  denote  the domestic-money 
(foreign-money)  price of domestic (foreign)  output. Then the real ex- 
change  rate  q, is defined  as: 
q  -= et +  p,  -  P. 
A rise in q, (e,) is called a real (nominal)  depreciation  of the domestic 
currency. If it and i* are the home and foreign nominal  interest rates, 
real  interest  rates are: 
rt =  it -  (tpt.+I  -  pt),  r,  =  -  (tp.+ I -  p 
where  the notation  t,xt  refers  to the expected value of a variable  xt based 
on information  known  at time t'. 
Aggregate  output  supplies  in the  two  regions,  yts  and y*S, depend 
negatively  on real  output  wages: 
Yts =  0 (P, -  w,),  yt*S =  0*(p,  -  w,). 
Nominal wages w, and w* are negotiated at time t -  1, and are predeter- 
mined as of time t. Wages in the two regions are set according  to the 
rules, 
w  t-tlPt,  wt* =t-* 
that  is, so as to equate  outputs  to full-employment  levels (normalized  so 
that their natural  logarithms  equal zero). Partial  ex post indexation  of 
these wages to the price  of domestic  output  can be viewed as a reduction 
in the supply  elasticities  0 and 0*. For simplicity  I assume  wages are not 
indexed directly to import  prices. This is an innocuous assumption  if 
both regions are large enough to prevent one region's exports from 
making  up a very large  share  of the other  region's  consumption  basket.15 
15. Let fl be the indexation  parameter  (0 c  Q c  1)  and  let a-  be the share  of domestic 
output  in home-region  consumption.  With  wages indexed  to the CPI rather  than to the 
price of domestic output, the home aggregate  supply function would be expressed as 
yts =  0[(l - f)  (Pt  -  w,) -  fQ(1  -  a)qt]. A similar aggregate supply function would result 
from  the assumption  that  foreign  output  is an intermediate  input  to domestic  production. 
The assumption  that  imports  are not an important  component  of the overall  price  level is 
reflected  in the definitions  of real interest  rates above and real-balance  deflators  below. 
Branson  and Rotemberg  use a two-region  model similar  in structure  to the one explored 
here to study the importance  of differential  wage-indexing  conventions  across regions. 
See William  H. Branson  and Julio  J. Rotemberg,  "International  Adjustment  with Wage 
Rigidity,"  European Economic Review, vol. 13  (May 1980),  pp. 309-32. 390  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Consider  next the asset markets.  If m, and m* denote the home and 
foreign  money supplies  (net of exogenous money-demand  shift  factors), 
the monetary  equilibrium  conditions  for the two regions  are written: 
Mt  -Pt  := (Xyt  -kit,  m,*p,  Pt  (*y,*  *, 
The  defining  feature  of a floating  rate  regime  is that  each region's  nominal 
money supply depends only on the decisions of its own monetary 
authority. Nominal interest rates are linked by the interest parity 
condition, 
it =  i*  +  te  -  e, 
so that a positive differential  between the home and foreign nominal 
interest rates requires  an offsetting expected nominal  depreciation  of 
the home currency  against the foreign currency.16 It is a direct conse- 
quence of nominal interest parity that the home-foreign  real interest 
differential  equals  the expected rise in the real exchange  rate: 
r,  -  r*  =  tqt+1  -  qt. 
When a currency  is expected to depreciate  in real terms, the domestic 
real interest  rate  exceeds the real  interest  rate  prevailing  abroad. 
Aggregate  output fluctuations  arise in the model from output price 
movements that are not fully reflected in contemporaneous  nominal 
wage changes. Real wage movements, in turn,  are the result  of changes 
in output  demands  or money supplies  that  were not foreseen at the time 
wages for the period were set. As a prelude to analyzing short-run 
international  adjustments  to such shocks, it is useful  to examine  the full- 
employment  or perfect-foresight  equilibrium  of the model. 
FULL-EMPLOYMENT  EQUILIBRIUM: 
INTERDEPENDENCE  IN  THE  MEDIUM  RUN 
Suppose initially that the aggregate demand shift parameters  are 
expected to remain constant at g and g*, while money supplies are 
expected to grow forever at the constant rates [i  and L*.  Then in the 
absence of current  expectational errors, interest rates and prices are 
given by: 
16. An exogenously  varying  risk  premium  could be appended  to this equality  without 
changing  the main results derived below. I discuss the evidence on the interest parity 
condition  in the final  section. Maurice Obstfeld  391 
r_  bg*  +  8*g  (1)  r=  r*  -  ___  __ 
8*U  +  bu*' 
Ug*  -* 
(2)  q  =  6*U  +  bo*' 
p  =m  +Ai  m  A  ,u  ^,*g +  b,g*)  (3)  p = m +  xi=  m  +  A,  +  , 
(5)  e=m+  A,u-m*-A*,u* 
+  [U*(X-X*)-  u*]g 
+ 
[6(X-X*) 
+  U]g* 
8*cr  +  8Uc* 
As explained  in the appendix,  these equations  depend  on a convergence 
condition  that  excludes self-fulfilling  speculative  bubbles. 
These formulas have a  number of  important implications about 
macroeconomic  interdependence  under  floating  rates. First,  because  the 
full-employment  real  exchange  rate  is expected  to remain  constant  under 
the present  assumptions,  home and foreign  real interest  rates coincide. 
Equation  1 states that an increase in aggregate  demand  falling  on home 
or foreign  goods increases  the world  real  interest  rate. An implication  is 
that  expansionary  fiscal  policy in either  region  will drive  up the interna- 
tional  real interest  rate. Even when all prices are flexible, floating  rates 
provide  no insulation  from  changes  in the world  real  interest  rate. 
Second, the domestic currency  appreciates  in real terms (that is, q 
falls) when demand for domestic goods increases, but it depreciates 
when demand  for foreign goods increases (equation  2). In particular, 
expansionary  fiscal  policy at home entails  a real  appreciation.  The result 
gives a theoretical  rationale  for the observed association between the 
recent evolution  of OECD fiscal policies and the dollar's  real apprecia- 
tion, as discussed later. Purchasing  power parity does not hold in the 
model in all circumstances, so real exchange rate changes provide 
another mechanism through which macroeconomic disturbances are 
propagated  internationally. 
Third,  equations  3 and  4 imply  that  global  aggregate  demand  shocks, 
and  in particular  fiscal  policies, affect price  levels throughout  the world. 
For example, fiscal expansion  in either  region  must eventually  drive up 392  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
the price level in both regions. The reason is that any increase  in global 
aggregate  demand  drives up the world real interest  rate, and, for given 
money growth rates, drives up each region's nominal interest rate, 
reducing  desired  real  balances.  A floating  exchange  rate  does not  provide 
insulation  for national  price levels in general. 
In what sense, then, do floating  rates provide insulation?  The equa- 
tions above show that floating  rates provide insulation  in the medium 
run  only against  purely  monetary  shocks originating  abroad.  Across full- 
employment  equilibriums,  changes  in  money  supplies  and  money  growth 
rates do not affect the world real interest rate or q, reflections of the 
monetary  neutrality  assumed  by the model.  A rise  in m or [L,  for  example, 
raises  p, but it does not affect  p*. A rise in e just equal  to the associated 
rise in p prevents any purely monetary disturbance  from affecting q 
(compare  equations  3 and 5). 
The nominal exchange rate does not always move so as to offset 
divergent  output  price  movements,  however:  the exchange  rate  depends 
on real  as well as monetary  factors, even at full  employment.  The reason 
is that the exchange rate plays a role in equilibrating  goods as well as 
asset markets. If the interest elasticities of money demand  are similar 
across countries, growth  in demand  for foreign  output  must depreciate 
the domestic currency in nominal terms while growth in demand for 
domestic output must appreciate it. Indeed, if A =  X*, equation 5 
becomes: 
e  =  m  +  ll -  m*  -  X*[L*  +  q. 
If there are substantial  real shocks to the system, one would expect e 
and  q to be highly  correlated  because part  of the adjustment  of q to a real 
disturbance  changing  the relative price of national outputs is accom- 
plished through  a movement in e. This observation  provides one theo- 
retical explanation  for the high correlation  between real and nominal 
exchange rate changes shown for the United States in figure 3 and 
characteristic  of all major  currencies  over the floating  rate  period. 
By relaxing  the assumptions  that  expected money growth  is constant 
and that no aggregate  demand  shifts are expected, one obtains a more 
general representation  of the model's full-employment  equilibrium.  A 
full derivation is given in the appendix. More general expectational 
assumptions  lead to an explicit account  of the key role that  expectations 
about the future play in determining  current  prices and interest rates. Maurice Obstfeld  393 
The more  general  expression  for the full-employment  real  exchange  rate 
is: 
(  q  C  +  bu  +  8  yJ=  T  UU* +  bu  +  8*  )u 
Equation  6 shows that  the real  exchange  rate  depends  not only on the 
current  state of aggregate  demand  at home and  abroad,  but on the entire 
expected path of aggregate  demand.  For example, an anticipated  tight- 
ening of fiscal policy at home (a fall in ,g,  +j for j  >  0) leads to a real 
depreciation  today, even before the policy change is implemented,  by 
raising  expected home-foreign  real  interest  differentials  and, along  with 
them, the current  real  interest  differential.  As before,  each region's  price 
level is insulated  in the medium  run from current  or expected foreign 
monetary shocks but not from current or expected foreign demand 
shocks. 
The foregoing  analysis shows that in the medium  run, a floating  rate 
insulates a country  from changes in the level or growth  rate of foreign 
money, and  thus  allows  it to choose its own trend  rate  of inflation  without 
regard  to monetary  conditions  abroad.  But while the exchange  rate can 
offset  foreign  monetary  shocks, it is powerless  to offset real  disturbances 
from abroad  when domestic goods and capital markets  are at all inte- 
grated  into the rest of the world's markets. To the extent that foreign 
monetary shifts have temporary  real effects, a floating  exchange rate 
will fail to insulate against these too in the short run. I now turn to a 
more detailed discussion of the international  transmission  of distur- 
bances under  floating  rates. 
MACROECONOMIC  ADJUSTMENT  IN  THE  SHORT  RUN 
The international  transmission  of monetary  shocks in the short  run  is 
illustrated  here by a permanent,  unanticipated  slowdown in the rate of 
home money growth  [.  As the appendix  shows in detail, a fall in [L will, 
for plausible parameter configurations, put downward pressure on 
domestic output and prices but at the same time cause foreign output 
and prices to rise relative to their trends.'7  A floating rate does not 
17. My discussion of the model's implications  assumes that domestic and foreign 
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prevent  the international  transmission  of monetary  shocks in the short 
run,  and  this transmission  is likely to be negative. 
Through what channels does  negative transmission occur? Real 
domestic currency  appreciation  (a fall in q) puts downward  pressure  on 
domestic prices, output, and the nominal interest rate, but the same 
demand  shift that causes recession at home pushes foreign  prices and 
output  upward.  The direct effect of y on the demand  for foreign  goods 
(measured by  y*) tends to depress output abroad, but this effect is 
assumed  to be dominated  by the demand  shift  induced  by the fall in q. 
The behavior  of world  real  interest  rates  is of particular  interest  in the 
likely case where foreign output does rise. Both the nominal  and real 
interest  rates  prevailing  abroad  increase  in the face of an incipient  excess 
demand  for real balances  and a fall in expected inflation.  Since the real 
exchange  rate  q is now temporarily  below its expected future  level, and 
expected to rise, real interest rate parity implies that the home real 
interest rate must rise on impact  as well. If disinflation  at home raises 
foreign  output,  it therefore  causes a rise in the domestic  real  interest  rate 
and a somewhat  smaller  rise in the foreign  real interest  rate. The rise in 
the foreign  real  rate  occurs even in the absence of any foreign  monetary 
response  to the domestic  policy spillover. 
Consider next the effects of fiscal expansion at home, formally 
represented  as a permanent,  unanticipated  rise in g. Fiscal expansion  at 
home causes a coordinated  increase in output  and prices both at home 
and  abroad.  Temporary  fiscal  expansion  has the same  qualitative  effects 
on outputs  and  price  levels in the short  run.  A detailed  derivation  is again 
provided  in the appendix. 
What  is the impact  of the disturbance  on asset prices? The domestic 
currency  appreciates  in real  and  in nominal  terms  as the expected future 
levels of e and q decline; indeed, it is the change in the real exchange 
rate that transmits  the increase in aggregate  demand  abroad. Nominal 
interest rates rise worldwide  to maintain  money-market  equilibrium  in 
the face of the activity  and  price  level increases.  The increase  in nominal 
interest rates is likely to represent  an increase in real interest rates as 
well. 
close when the two regions are of roughly  equal size. The short-run  price and output 
effects of changes  in m and  m*, whether  permanent  or transitory,  are  qualitatively  similar 
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It  was  observed  earlier  that  even across  full-employment  equilibriums, 
changes in real and in nominal exchange rates tend to be positively 
correlated  when real shocks occur. This same correlation  characterizes 
the short-run  response to both monetary  and real disturbances  when 
some prices in the economy are sticky. This is another  reason for the 
high correlation  between the real and nominal  exchange rate changes 
shown in figure  3. In the case of domestic disinflation,  nominal  appreci- 
ation reduces domestic prices and raises those abroad. But sticky 
nominal wages induce output movements that prevent output prices 
from  adjusting  completely  to their  PPP  levels. The nominal  appreciation 
is therefore  accompanied  by a temporary  real  appreciation,  even though 
the monetary shock leaves  steady-state relative prices unchanged. 
Domestic fiscal  expansion  also leads to both real  and nominal  apprecia- 
tion in the short run. Unlike monetary  policies, however, permanent 
fiscal  policies have permanent  effects on the real  exchange  rate. 
FIXED  EXCHANGE  RATES  AND  MONETARY  AUTONOMY 
The behavior  of the world economy under  fixed exchange rates can 
also be studied  within  the framework  set out above. When  central  banks 
intervene  in the foreign  exchange market,  they create or destroy high- 
powered  money. The monetary  effect of intervention  can  be sterilized- 
that  is, offset through  opposite variations  in the domestic  component  of 
the monetary  base. But the overwhelming  conclusion  of recent  research 
is that in the present international  environment,  only intervention  that 
is permitted  to affect the money supply has a significant  impact  on the 
exchange  rate.  18  A commitment  to peg the  exchange  rate  therefore  forces 
a central  bank  to devote monetary  policy to that  end. 
Linkages among national money supplies depend heavily on the 
18. This conclusion  was reached  by the Working  Group  on Exchange  Market  Inter- 
vention  in "Report  of the Working  Group  on Exchange  Market  Intervention"  (Jurgensen 
Report, U.S. Treasury,  1983).  See also Maurice  Obstfeld, "Exchange  Rates, Inflation, 
and the Sterilization  Problem:  Germany,  1975-1981,"  European Economic  Review,  vol. 
21 (March-April  1983), pp.  161-89; Kenneth Rogoff, "On the Effects of  Sterilized 
Intervention:  An Analysis of Weekly Data," Journal  of Monetary Economics,  vol. 14 
(September  1984),  pp. 133-50;  and  Bonnie  E. Loopesko,  "Relationships  among  Exchange 
Rates, Intervention,  and Interest  Rates: An Empirical  Investigation,"  Journal of Inter- 
national Money and Finance,  vol. 3 (December  1984),  pp. 257-77. Sterilized  intervention 
would  be  effective  if  capital  controls  were  imposed,  but  the  model  assumes  capital  mobility. 396  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
mechanism  through  which  central  banks  settle balances  of international 
payments. To illustrate the sense in which countries other than the 
United States sacrificed domestic monetary autonomy to peg dollar 
exchange rates before the system collapsed in 1973, I model a dollar- 
standard  system. In that system, the foreign monetary  authority  pegs 
the exchange rate at e through  open market  exchanges of its own high- 
powered money for foreign  bonds; but the home, that is, U.S., central 
bank is not obliged to vary its money supply when the foreign central 
bank  buys or sells dollar  assets. 
The most important  property  of the resulting  model  is that  by pegging 
the exchange rate, the foreign central bank relinquishes  any ability to 
influence its own money supply through its own monetary policies. 
Further,  the foreign  country  must accept the trend  inflation  rate estab- 
lished  by the U.S. central  bank,  the reserve  center, unless it can vary  its 
exchange rate or its fiscal stance continuously  over time for indefinite 
periods. 
Alternative  arrangements  for settling  official  reserve balances  would 
change the one-sidedness of the above arrangement.  If both central 
banks  held international  reserves only in the form  of an outside reserve 
asset such as gold or the IMF Special Drawing Right, intervention- 
related  monetary  growth  in one country  would  be matched  by monetary 
contraction  in the other. Alternatively,  symmetric  adjustment  would  be 
guaranteed  if, as Ronald McKinnon  has proposed, the foreign central 
bank  pegged  its rate  to the home  currency  but  held  international  reserves 
in the form  of interest-bearing  deposits at the home central  bank.  19 
I begin as before by discussing  the model's full-employment  equilib- 
rium  under  the assumption  that  all shifts  to aggregate  demand  and  home- 
country monetary growth are regarded  as permanent  by the public. 
Equilibrium  in the two goods markets  implies  that  the real  exchange  rate 
q is again given by equation 1, while real interest rates are equalized 
internationally  and given by equation 2.  The full-employment  real 
exchange rate and real interest rate are therefore independent  of the 
exchange rate regime. This point has important  policy implications 
because it tells us that adjustments  to permanent real shocks must 
eventually  be made  whether  the exchange  rate  is fixed  or  floating.  Under 
19. See Ronald  I. McKinnon,  "A New Tripartite  Monetary  Agreement  or a Limping 
Dollar Standard?"  Essays in International  Finance 106  (Princeton  University, Interna- 
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floating  rates  the adjustment  will occur  quickly  through  an  exchange  rate 
change,  while  under  fixed  rates  it will  occur  more  slowly  through  changes 
in relative  output  prices. 
The price of output in the home region is given by equation 3, and 
also is the same as that in the flexible rate model. Because the home 
central  bank  does not intervene  to influence  the exchange  rate, it can set 
its nominal  money stock m at any desired  level. Accordingly,  equation 
3 is a reduced-form  expression  for the domestic  output  price in terms  of 
its exogenous determinants. 
The foreign money stock m* is endogenous, however, and beyond 
the  control  of the  foreign  monetary  authority.  With  the nominal  exchange 
rate fixed, the real exchange rate given by equation 1, and the home- 
country  output  price given by equation  3, the foreign  output  price  p* = 
p -  e +  q is independent  of foreign  monetary  policy. It is given by: 
(u +  X6)g* -  (U*- 
p  =m-e  +  X*Ai + 
8*  +  * 
If the foreign  region  does not wish to use fiscal  policy to offset the effects 
of changes in home-region  money or inflation, its only recourse is a 
change in the exchange rate parity  e. Together  with the world nominal 
interest  rate  r + [L,  p* determines  the foreign  money stock according  to: 
m* = p*-A*  (r +  L). 
In the short run, too, foreign monetary policy is ineffective: any 
foreign attempt at monetary expansion leads to an immediate and 
completely  offsetting  capital  outflow. In contrast, monetary  expansion 
by the reserve  center  leads to a synchronized  output  expansion  as world 
interest  rates  fall and  the foreign  central  bank  is forced  to expand  its own 
money supply  through  purchases  of foreign  exchange. 
The international  transmission  of aggregate  demand  shocks is asym- 
metric  as well. A permanent  and unanticipated  fiscal expansion  by the 
reserve  center,  for example,  raises  output  at home  but  may  lower  output 
abroad.  While  the spillover  of domestic demand  onto foreign  goods has 
a stimulative  effect, there  is a rise in the worldwide  nominal  interest  rate 
that  tends to discourage  foreign  demand.  However, it can be shown  that 
fiscal  expansion  abroad  always raises  home output  in the short  run.  This 
is again a consequence of the reserve center's unique control over its 
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leads to an increase  in its output,  its price  level, its money stock, and  the 
world  interest  rate.  Because the home  money  supply  is fixed,  equilibrium 
in its money market  requires  higher  prices and  output. 
THE  ROLE  OF  THE  CURRENT  ACCOUNT  UNDER  FLOATING  RATES 
The current  account  has been conspicuously  absent  from  the preced- 
ing  discussion.  Expenditure  shifts  of the  type studied  above  will  generally 
imply current account imbalances that redistribute  wealth between 
regions and shift regional aggregate demand schedules in opposite 
directions  over time. Equation  6, which shows how the real exchange 
rate depends on expected future  demand  conditions, suggests that the 
anticipation  of these shifts will have effects on prices and interest  rates 
today. For  example,  expansionary  fiscal  policy at home  implies  a current 
account  deficit  and a long-run  real depreciation  that accommodates  the 
export surplus  needed to service an increased stock of external debt. 
The anticipation  of this eventual  depreciation  tempers,  but  is unlikely  to 
reverse, the real  appreciation  that  fiscal  ease initially  causes. In equation 
6, the expectation of a prolonged  home current  account deficit can be 
viewed as imparting  a downward  time trend  to the demand  shift  factor  g 
and  an upward  trend  to g*. 
In general, the relationship  between the current account and real 
exchange rate is  quite complicated. The pattern of  exchange rate 
adjustment  during  the transition  to external  balance  will depend  on the 
type of shock that disturbed  the external  balance  in the first  place. For 
example, a current  account deficit that finances  productive  investment 
and a deficit that finances consumption  spending  will induce different 
exchange  rate  paths. In terms  of equation  6, an investment-led  external 
deficit need not reduce future  levels of domestic wealth and spending, 
but  it will tend  to raise  q above its static-expectations  level by increasing 
future  expected levels of domestic supply.20 
The current account adjustment  process-the  predictable, gradual 
adjustment  of absorption  to income-is  likely  to be of minor  consequence 
20. A dynamic  model  of the current  account  incorporating  domestic  capital  accumu- 
lation  is analyzed  in Maurice  Obstfeld  and Alan C. Stockman,  "Exchange-Rate  Dynam- 
ics," in  Peter  B. Kenen  and  Ronald  W.  Jones,  eds., HandbookofInternationalEconomics, 
vol. 2 (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1985),  pp. 917-77. In that model, a current  account 
deficit is accompanied  by a nominally  appreciating  currency  if the investment  rate is 
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for the time series  properties  of current  account  and  exchange  rate  data. 
The correlation  patterns  characterizing  these data  are  instead  dominated 
by  continual and largely unanticipated shocks to  goods and asset 
markets.  This explains  why a currency  can, like the dollar  between 1982 
and  early 1985,  sustain  a net appreciation  in the face of growing  current 
account deficits. The same expenditure  shocks that have expanded  the 
deficit have also appreciated  the dollar, and they have swamped any 
tendency for the dollar  to fall in response to increases in U.S. external 
indebtedness. 
Any relatiohship  between exchange rate and current  account inno- 
vations is possible, with the precise outcome depending  on the source 
of the current  account  shock. As already  noted, fiscal  expansion  at home 
induces  exchange  rate  appreciation  and  an external  deficit  on impact.  In 
contrast,  a shift  in foreign  demand  from  foreign  goods toward  the goods 
produced  by the home  country  will  induce  on impact  a domestic  currency 
appreciation  and a home current  account surplus,  provided  investment 
does not  react  strongly.  Because  the demand  shift  occasions  a temporary 
rise in home income and a temporary  fall in foreign  income, capital  will 
flow from  the home to the foreign  country  as households  in both smooth 
their  expected consumption  streams. 
The current  account movements caused by various demand shifts 
reflect  changes in the level of absorption  relative  to income. But as the 
national  income identities  show, they also reflect  changes  in the level of 
imports  relative to exports. By shifting  expenditure  between domestic 
and  foreign  goods, real  exchange  rate  movements  help  produce  demand 
and production  patterns consistent with the desired current account 
balance.  For  example,  the real  appreciation  accompanying  an  expansion 
of domestic  absorption  accommodates  the required  home  import  surplus 
by simultaneously  discouraging  exports and cheapening  imports. 
DEMAND  SHIFTS  AND  RESOURCE  ALLOCATION  IN  THE 
SHORT  RUN 
The assumption  that each country produces a single homogeneous 
output  must  be dropped  before the sectoral  implications  of expenditure 
shifts can be studied. For many  purposes, it is useful to assume instead 
that  the economy  consists of two sectors, one producing  tradable  goods, 
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setting, demand  disturbances  must be viewed as shifting  the allocation 
of productive  factors between the two sectors over time. The earlier 
discussion of manufacturing  employment  in the United States, Japan, 
and  Germany  suggested  that  the relation  between the real  exchange  rate 
and  sectoral  resource  allocation  is complex.  The  point  can  be appreciated 
by considering  the contrasting  effects of the demand  shifts  just noted. 
An international  demand  shift  toward  domestic  tradables  occasions a 
nominal appreciation  of the domestic currency, a rise in the money 
prices of home-produced  tradables, and, through demand spillover 
effects, a proportionally  smaller  rise in the prices of nontradables.  There 
is likely to be a real appreciation  of the currency, but one that is 
accompanied  by an  expansion  of the share  of manufacturing  employment 
in total employment. Increased output of tradables of course helps 
accommodate the concomitant export surplus. This scenario seems 
applicable  to Japan,  where manufacturing  employment  has not suffered 
greatly despite the yen's sharp real effective appreciation  in 1982-84 
(see figure  4). 
A fiscal expansion that falls on nontradables,  in contrast, induces a 
nominal  appreciation  and a rise in the money prices of nontradables. 
The effect on the demand  for home-produced  tradables  is ambiguous, 
however. Fiscal expansion  raises income  by raising  nontradable  output, 
and  part  of the increased  domestic  spending  that  results  falls  on tradables. 
Possibly  offsetting  this  expansionary  effect is the exchange  rate-induced 
rise in the price of exports relative to imports, which shifts domestic 
demand  abroad.  The result may well be a contraction  in manufacturing 
employment  coupled with a real appreciation.  Ultimately, some labor 
and capital  must leave the tradable  sector to help satisfy the increased 
government  demand  for nontraded  goods. 
Because the tradable  and nontradable  sectors of the home economy 
use the same currency, they can be thought of as linked by a fixed 
exchange rate that floats against foreign rates. It follows that a fiscal 
expansion  falling  primarily  on one of these sectors may have a contrac- 
tionary  effect on the other sector even as it stimulates  output  abroad. 
Optimum Currency Areas and the Misalignment  Problem 
The theory of optimum  currency  areas, initiated  by Robert  Mundell 
in 1961,  places in perspective some important  elements of the cases for Maurice Obstfeld  401 
and against floating exchange rates and is a useful starting  point for 
evaluating  their  recent  performance.2'  This section begins  by discussing 
the theory's prescriptions  for a world  in which international  asset trade 
is relatively  unrestricted. 
The notion of an optimum  currency  area  arises from  the observation 
that there may be costs, as well as benefits, in expanding  the size of 
regions  within  which  exchange  rates  are  fixed. The benefits  are  basically 
those that motivate  the use of monies as media  of exchange  and  units of 
account. The possible costs are related to short-run  macroeconomic 
performance,  and  arise  from  the reduction  in monetary  autonomy  that  a 
fixed  exchange  rate  entails. 
One  way of thinking  about  the optimal  currency  area  is as a "second- 
best" policy regime. In a world without macroeconomic  stabilization 
problems  or adjustment  costs, the informational  convenience of fixed 
exchange rates, described  later, would be a decisive argument  against 
floating.  Mundell's  optimal  currency  area is a region of factor mobility 
within  which  there  is some rigidity  of nominal  wage contracts  and  hence 
a possibility  that  nominal  exchange  rate  flexibility  can offset shocks that 
lead  to employment  and  price  level fluctuations.  As Mundell  recognized, 
the stabilizing  properties  of a floating  rate might be minimal  for small 
economies in which imports  are so important  a component  of the cost of 
living that a reduction in real wages through  nominal  depreciation  is 
impossible.  But  though  the theory  might  not apply  to individual  countries 
within Europe or to Canada,  for example, it is still useful in analyzing 
the effects of flexible dollar  exchange rates on the European  Monetary 
System (EMS)  and  Japan.22 
As I emphasize  later, however, a main  drawback  in viewing Europe, 
or even the United States, as a potential  optimum  currency  area is that 
factors cannot move costlessly between sectors of the European  and 
21. See Robert  A. Mundell, "A Theory of Optimum  Currency  Areas," American 
Economic  Review,  vol. 51 (September  1961),  pp. 657-64. The  theory  is updated  in Edward 
Tower  and  Thomas  D. Willett,  "The Theory  of Optimal  Currency  Areas and Exchange- 
Rate Flexibility,"  Special Papers  in International  Economics 11 (Princeton  University, 
International  Finance  Section, 1976). 
22. The  desirability  of fixed  rates  for very  open  economies  was emphasized  by Ronald 
I. McKinnon, "Optimum Currency Areas," American Economic Review, vol. 53 (Septem- 
ber 1963),  pp. 717-25. Note that  Mundell's  notion  of factor  mobility  refers  to the ability  of 
workers  and  machines  to move  out of unemployed  regions  in the short  run,  not  necessarily 
to international  trade  in financial  assets. Economically,  optimal  currency  areas  need not 
coincide  with political  jurisdictions,  but barriers  to factor  movement  are often the result 
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American  economies. This  problem  is at the heart  of the current  concern 
about  the effects of exchange  rate misalignments  and must be balanced 
against  any aggregate  benefits  that  exchange  rate  flexibility  may confer. 
THE  INFORMATIONAL  BENEFITS  OF  LARGE  CURRENCY  AREAS 
By providing  a widely accepted medium  of exchange, money econo- 
mizes on the substantial  search costs associated with barter  exchange. 
By providing  a convenient  unit  of account,  money  also lowers  calculation 
costs, provided  the  purchasing  power  of the monetary  unit  is itself stable. 
In a world  of several  currencies,  the adoption  of a single  currency  would 
therefore  lower international  transaction  costs. The widespread  use of 
the dollar as a means of payment and unit of account in international 
trade-particularly  in trade  involving  the United  States  or  between small 
countries-illustrates this point. Even under  floating  rates, markets  will 
find it convenient to adopt a "vehicle currency" like the dollar.23  A 
further  illustration  is the growing  private  use of the European  Currency 
Unit. 
In practice, governments  are unwilling  to relinquish  their currency- 
creating  powers, so the ideal of a single world  money is unattainable,  at 
least at present.24  Fixed exchange rates can provide many of  the 
informational  benefits of a common world currency, however. The 
important  difference-one  that I discuss at greater length in the final 
section-is  that governments may elect to change the price of their 
currency  without warning.  Indeed, it is in part to preserve this option 
that governments  would be unwilling  to give up national  currencies  in 
favor  of a world  currency  issued by a supranational  central  bank.  Within 
a single political  jurisdiction,  deposit insurance  and related  guarantees 
can  ensure  a fixed  relative  price  between  currency  and  other  transactions 
23. Evidence  on the dollar's  importance  in international  transactions  is provided  by 
Peter  B. Kenen, "The  Role  of the Dollar  as an International  Currency,"  Occasional  Paper 
13  (Group  of Thirty,  1983).  A recent  discussion  of the theory  of vehicle currencies  is Paul 
Krugman,  "The International  Role of the Dollar:  Theory  and Prospect," in John F. 0. 
Bilson  and  Richard  C. Marston,  eds., Exchange  Rate Theory  and  Practice  (University  of 
Chicago  Press, 1984),  pp. 261-78. See also C. P. Kindleberger,  "The Benefits  of Interna- 
tional Money,"  Journal of International Economics,  vol. 2 (September 1972), pp. 425-42. 
24. On the problems  of creating  and  managing  a common  world  currency,  see Stanley 
Fischer, "The SDR and the IMF: Toward  a World  Central  Bank?" in George M. von 
Furstenberg,  ed.,  International  Money  and  Credit:  The Policy  Roles  (International 
Monetary  Fund, 1983),  pp. 179-99. Maurice Obstfeld  403 
media; but there are no similar  institutions  to ensure a fixed relative 
price between national  currencies  under  all circumstances.  The possi- 
bility  of exchange  rate  changes  limits  the acceptability  of national  monies 
in trade  under  fixed rates, and limits their usefulness as numeraires  by 
making  their  real  value inherently  more  variable.  Nonetheless, it can be 
argued  that  on balance  there are informational  gains  from  extending  the 
domain  over which exchange  rates are fixed. 
EXCHANGE  RATES  AND  MACROECONOMIC  STABILITY 
What  are  the  macroeconomic  costs of fixing  the  exchange  rate  between 
two regions?  Mundell  linked  his evaluation  of these costs to two factors, 
the importance  of shifts  in the relative  demand  for  the two regions'  goods 
and  the cost of interregional  migration  of unemployed  capital  and  labor. 
Macroeconomic performance  under alternative exchange rate re- 
gimes  can be studied  in terms  of the two-region  model  developed  earlier, 
although  most of the considerable  body of recent research  devoted to 
this question adopts a single-country  perspective. The basic analytical 
framework  assumes that authorities  cannot directly observe whether 
shocks to the economy originate  in goods or asset markets.  Under  these 
circumstances,  the optimal  exchange rate regime  functions  as an auto- 
matic stabilizer for the economy, yielding the best macroeconomic 
outcomes on average. Macroeconomic performance  is evaluated in 
terms of the variability  of output  and the general  price level relative  to 
their  trends. Each country's  general  price level is defined  as a weighted 
average  of the prices of its own output  and  imports.25 
Assume first  that the exchange rate is fixed, and suppose there is an 
increase  in  the relative  demand  for  the home  region's  output.  This  shock, 
as we have seen, puts upward  pressure on the home region's interest 
25. An exchange  rate regime  optimal  in the foregoing  sense would  generally  involve 
neither fixed nor freely floating  rates but something  in between-a  managed  float. In 
practice, however, the information  necessary to determine the optimal intervention 
strategy  is unavailable  to the authorities.  For surveys of the theoretical  literature  on 
optimal  intervention  and  exchange  rate  regime  choice, see Dale  W.  Henderson,  "Exchange 
Market  Intervention  Operations:  Their Role in Financial  Policy and Their Effects," in 
Bilson and Marston, eds., Exchange Rate Theory and Practice,  pp. 359-406; and Richard 
C. Marston, "Stabilization  Policies in Open Economies," in Kenen and Jones, eds., 
Handbook of International Economics,  vol. 2, pp. 859-916.  The Henderson and Marston 
reviews  both  go beyond  the small-country  paradigm.  In the analysis  below I abstract  from 
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rate, causing  an incipient  appreciation  of its currency,  a reduction  in the 
foreign  region's money supply, and an indeterminate  change in foreign 
output. If the balance of payments adjustment  mechanism operates 
symmetrically,  as when the home region is not a reserve center, its 
money supply is increased by the inflow of private capital. Under a 
flexible  exchange  rate,  the  home  currency  would  appreciate,  thus  shifting 
some of the demand  shock to the foreign  region  and softening  its effect 
on domestic employment, output, and prices. If demand shocks are 
important  for both areas, a floating  exchange  rate may promote  a better 
allocation  of risks than a fixed rate would, in that each area  will be able 
to export  some of its macroeconomic  variability  abroad.  In practice,  the 
benefits  of a flexible  rate  will be greatest  when aggregate  demand  shocks 
are negatively correlated across regions, as when most shocks are 
absolute demand shifts between their outputs. In this situation-the 
situation Mundell assumed in his analysis-the  gains from trading 
macroeconomic  risk  through  a floating  exchange  rate  are  greatest.  When 
aggregate  demand shocks are dominant,  therefore, floating  exchange 
rates may well be preferred.26 
The analysis of money-market  shocks yields different  conclusions. 
Consider the effect of an upward shift in the foreign money demand 
function. If the exchange rate is fixed and the home region  is a reserve 
center, there is a transfer  of reserves from the foreign central bank to 
the foreign public that restores foreign monetary  equilibrium  with no 
change in either region's output or price level. If reserve settlement  is 
symmetric,  however, the fall in foreign  velocity causes a fall in the home 
money supply  and a decline in activity in both regions:  in effect, part  of 
the velocity shock is exported abroad. Shocks to money demand or 
supply in a reserve center do have effects abroad,  however, and these 
reinforce,  rather  than dilute, the shocks' domestic impact.  A decline in 
velocity in a reserve center raises world interest  rates in the short  run, 
causing a decline in foreign output and money. But no corresponding 
increase  in the domestic money supply  automatically  softens the fall in 
home output.  It follows that  macroeconomic  performance  under  a fixed 
exchange  rate  depends  crucially  on the degree  to which  foreign  exchange 
intervention  affects the two regions' money supplies. A setup in which 
26. When  flexible  rates are preferable  on macroeconomic  grounds,  the informational 
benefits  of fixing  the rate are reduced  by the incentives central  banks have to alter the 
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the foreign  central  bank  always intervenes  and only its money supply  is 
affected  by intervention  is clearly  beneficial  only when home monetary 
shocks are relatively insignificant.  In general, the burden  of adjusting 
the money supply  to payments  imbalances  should  fall more heavily on 
the region  with the less stable  monetary  conditions. 
Under a floating  exchange rate, purely monetary  shocks may cause 
output variability  greater than that which could be achieved under a 
fixed rate. An exogenous increase in foreign money demand  now puts 
upward  pressure  on the interest  rate, causing  an incipient  capital  inflow 
and  an appreciation  of the foreign  currency.  Because the exchange  rate 
change shifts demand  toward  home-region  goods, output  and the price 
level in the foreign region fall by more than they would under a fixed 
rate, and  are  likely to rise in the home  region.  The risk-sharing  argument 
suggests  that the two regions  will prefer  a fixed exchange  rate, together 
with  appropriate  international  settlement  arrangements,  when monetary 
shocks  are  dominant,  and  especially  when  they are  negatively  correlated 
across regions, but will prefer a floating  rate when aggregate  demand 
shocks are the main  concern.27 
The analysis sketched above assumes a structure  of nominal  wage 
contracting  and a distribution  of shocks that are invariant  with respect 
to the exchange  rate  regime.  With  respect  to wage-setting  arrangements, 
I present  preliminary  evidence  later  that  there  have been some structural 
changes outside the United States under flexible rates. However, the 
evidence is quite  weak at this stage, and  it is not at all clear  that  the shift 
to floating,  per se, caused the changes. With  respect to the structure  of 
disturbances,  McKinnon  and others have argued  that  flexible  exchange 
rates encourage  instability  in national  money demands, although  there 
is little solid evidence in support  of this proposition.28 
It is also noteworthy that there may be international  disagreement 
about the appropriate  exchange rate regime. Suppose that the home 
region  is buiffeted  by substantial  real shocks, while the primary  cause of 
27. Optimal  risk  pooling  could be accomplished  through  full international  diversifica- 
tion in all assets, including  human  capital.  But this idealized  situation  cannot  be attained 
in practice.  For a model of a perfectly  pooled international  equilibrium,  see Robert  E. 
Lucas, Jr., "Interest  Rates and Currency  Prices in a Two-Country  World,"  Journal  of 
Monetary Economics,  vol.  10 (November  1982), pp. 335-60. 
28.  See Ronald I. McKinnon, An International Standardfor  Monetary Stabilization, 
Policy Analyses in International  Economics 8 (Institute  for International  Economics, 
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disturbance  abroad  is monetary  instability.  The foreign  central  bank  will 
then desire  to peg to the home currency,  but  this will make  it impossible 
for the home region to export any of its short-run  demand  variability 
abroad  through  exchange  rate  changes. In this situation  the home  region 
may resort to trade restrictions as a means of accomplishing  what it 
cannot do through  the foreign  exchange market.  This type of disagree- 
ment  helped  cause the "Nixon shock" of August 1971.  Frustrated  by its 
inability  to devalue  against  foreign  currencies  in response  to a perceived 
decline in U.S. competitiveness,  the Nixon administration  put pressure 
on foreign governments to revalue by imposing a 10 percent import 
surcharge.  The resulting  exchange rate realignments  formed the sub- 
stance of the Smithsonian  agreement  reached  later  that  year. 
AGGREGATE  BENEFITS  VERSUS  SECTORAL  COSTS: 
THE  MISALIGNMENT  PROBLEM 
The main implication of the foregoing discussion  is that in spite of the 
advantages  of a fixed rate system in terms of transaction  costs, there 
may be substantial  benefits  to exchange  rate flexibility  between regions 
subject to differential  aggregate demand shocks. The pattern of the 
recent recovery illustrates the potential benefits. Since 1982, dollar 
appreciation  has moderated  the effect of rising aggregate  demand on 
U.S.  output and prices by shifting that demand abroad. As already 
noted, Japan  and Canada,  with their  extensive U.S. trading  links, have 
been the main  beneficiaries  of this exported recovery, but Europe has 
benefited  as well. Under  fixed  rates, the recovery  would  have been even 
more unbalanced  than it has been, given existing macroeconomic  poli- 
cies. 
Recent U.S.  experience also illustrates an important  drawback  in 
applying  the optimal  currency  area idea to actual currency  areas. The 
dollar's  appreciation  has distributed  demand  unevenly  among  sectors of 
the U.S. economy, hurting  agriculture  and some manufacturing  indus- 
tries. As long as shocks fall differentially  on sectors between which 
productive  factors are temporarily  immobile,  there can be no presump- 
tion that the United States, the EMS, or Japan  is an optimal  currency 
area. When the demand for one sector's output rises, other sectors 
linked to it by a common currency  may suffer as a result of the same 
currency  appreciation  that  stabilizes  aggregate  employment  at home  and 
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costs are far from trivial and must be weighed against any aggregate 
benefits  in evaluating  the desirability  of floating  rates. 
These costs underlie  the recent focus on the cost of exchange rate 
misalignments.  Real  exchange  rate  cycles of long  and  uncertain  duration, 
such as those evident in figure 1, can cause the economy to incur 
unemployment  and relocation costs repeatedly, as productive  factors 
migrate out of the sectors that are depressed at the time. Further, 
sustained appreciation  inevitably gives rise to increased demands  for 
protection  in the tradable-goods  sector. Capitulation  to these demands 
invites foreign retaliation,  and so leads to a structure  of trade barriers 
that  is difficult  to remove  later  without  extensive multilateral  negotiation. 
Current  congressional  moves to protect import-competing  U.S. indus- 
tries illustrate  the dangers  of protracted  swings in competitiveness. 
To be effective, a policy response to a known goods-market  shock 
must  consider  adjustment  costs and  the dangers  of protectionism.  But it 
must  also take into account  the shock's permanence-which is likely to 
be unknown. The case for a monetary rather than an exchange rate 
response to a goods-market  shock is quite weak when the shock is 
permanent.  In this case, as was shown by the model in the previous 
section, monetary  policy can only slow a necessary real exchange rate 
adjustment  that  will eventually  be brought  about  by price-level  changes 
if the nominal  exchange rate is pegged. Only when it is known that a 
particular  goods-market  shock will be reversed within several years is 
there a case for resisting  its real exchange  rate effect through  monetary 
policy so that excessive relocation costs are avoided. Discussions of 
misalignment  therefore  presuppose a divergence of the real exchange 
rate from some "fundamental"  equilibrium  level that is in some sense 
sustainable  in the long run. 
John Williamson  has defined this "fundamental"  level of the real 
exchange  rate as "that which is expected to generate  a current  account 
surplus  or deficit equal to the underlying  capital flow over the cycle, 
given that the country is pursuing  'internal  balance' as best it can and 
not restricting  trade  for balance  of payments  reasons.  "29  An important 
addendum  to this  definition  concerns  the composition  of national  saving. 
The situation  described  above is not one of "fundamental  equilibrium" 
unless the government  budget  is also balanced  over the cycle. 
Misalignments  such as the dollar overvaluation  of the early 1970s 
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certainly  arose under  fixed rates. But with flexible rates the frequency 
of real exchange rate cycles has increased, as has the frequency with 
which  the costs of misalignment  have been incurred.  Recent  suggestions 
that central  banks limit the permissible  range  of exchange rate fluctua- 
tions over the medium term are motivated in part by the hope that 
increased  official  intervention  will reduce the amplitude  and frequency 
of misalignments. 
The diagnosis  of exchange  rate  misalignment  raises problems  familar 
from  the discussion  of automatic  stabilizers  in  open  economies. Misalign- 
ments may be difficult  to identify in practice because of uncertainty 
regarding  private  expenditure  patterns  and the size of the "underlying 
capital  flow.  "30  There  is no necessity  for  these  factors  to change  gradually 
over time, and  if they do not, there  is a case for allowing  a misalignment 
to emerge  rather  than  pegging  the exchange rate. The reasoning  comes 
from  the discussion  of optimum  currency  areas:  in the face of substantial 
but unobservable  goods-market  disturbances,  there may be a trade-off 
between intersectoral  distress and the attainment  of output and price 
stability for the economy as  a whole.  If a goods-market shock is 
transitory,  there is a case for pegging  the rate, but the permanence  of a 
given shock is generally  unknown.  Only  when a disturbance  is known  to 
originate  in asset markets  is it clearly  correct  to peg. 
The same point may be looked at another way. In the absence of 
capital  controls, the central  bank  can target  the real  exchange  rate  in the 
short  run  only  by devoting  monetary  policy to that  end. This  may  prevent 
short-run  misalignment,  but it will not guarantee  that the policy mix is 
always appropriate  for attaining the goals of  internal and external 
balance. The reason for this is that there are many policy settings 
consistent with a given "fundamental"  exchange rate. It makes little 
sense to choose a real  exchange  rate  target  on the basis of its consistency 
with internal and external balance while pursuing a policy mix that 
attains  neither  of these objectives. 
In figure  5, the II schedule shows levels of fiscal and monetary  ease 
consistent  with  internal  balance  in  the short  term;  it is downward  sloping, 
and its slope depends on policymakers'  preferences regarding  future 
inflation.  The EE or external  balance schedule shows policy combina- 
30. Empirical  methodologies  for measuring  misalignments  are proposed  and imple- 
mented  in Williamson,  The  Exchange  Rate System,  and  in Artus  and  Knight,  "Issues." Maurice Obstfeld  409 
Figure 5.  Internal and External Balance 
Fiscal expansion 
Monetary expansion  -- 
tions  that  hold  the  current  account  constant  at  the  level of the "underlying 
capital  flow" determined  by saving  propensities  and investment  oppor- 
tunities.  It is upward  sloping  because  easy money is assumed  to improve 
the current  account through  an export-led  expansion while fiscal ease 
crowds out net export demand. If the current  account is an increasing 
function  of the  real  exchange  rate  Q  and  a decreasing  function  of domestic 
expenditure  Z, then Q must  rise, spurring  net exports, as policy  becomes 
more expansionary  along EE and Z rises. It follows that the upward- 
sloping locus FF  along which the exchange rate is constant at its 
"fundamental"  level is steeper  than  the external  balance  schedule  EE. 410  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
For an economy initially  at point  B, near  internal  balance  but with an 
external  deficit,  there  are  many  combinations  of policy change  that  attain 
FF and  eliminate  the misalignment  in the short  run.  But  the desir  ed point 
A is reached  only through  a mild monetary  expansion  and a substantial 
fiscal contraction. Bringing  the exchange rate down entirely through 
monetary  expansion-which is what  would  occur with an exchange  rate 
target-moves  the economy closer to external  balance  (point  C) but has 
inflationary  consequences  that  will, over the longer  term,  erode  any real 
depreciation  so achieved. 
Attempts to prevent misalignments  through  monetary  policy alone 
may therefore  encounter  serious  pitfalls.  But a fiscal-monetary  mix that 
attains  point A in the diagram  will also be problematic  if it results in a 
structural  fiscal  imbalance.  Even when  it is known  that  a particular  shock 
originates  in the goods market,  it will sometimes be preferable  from a 
longer  run  perspective  to let the exchange  rate, rather  than  fiscal  policy, 
adjust.  As the current  U.S. situation  shows, a fiscal stance may be hard 
to reverse once it has been legislated  into existence. A further  compli- 
cation is that one country's attempt to achieve internal  and external 
balance  may  exacerbate  the misalignments  perceived  by foreign  author- 
ities. The effective elimination of international  imbalances requires 
international  coordination  of both monetary  and  fiscal  policies. 
Recent Exchange Rate Movements: Disturbances  and Policies 
A conclusion of the preceding  section was that any case for flexible 
exchange rates is stronger when goods-market  disturbances  tend to 
outweigh  asset-market  disturbances  in importance.  Unfortunately,  the 
cause of a particular  exchange rate movement is  often difficult to 
determine empirically, even long after the fact. Standard  empirical 
exchange  rate  equations,  which correlate  rate  movements  with contem- 
poraneous  movements  in money supplies, incomes, interest  rates, and 
other variables,  are of little help in this regard  because their  right-hand 
side variables  are generally  endogenous.  In addition,  the instability  and 
poor  out-of-sample  fit  of these equations  are  notorious.3'  I therefore  turn 
31. See Richard  A. Meese  and  Kenneth  S. Rogoff,  "Empirical  Exchange  Rate  Models 
of the Seventies:  Do They Fit Out-of-Sample?" Journal of International Economics,  vol. 
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in this section to some informal  methods  of assessing the roles of goods- 
market  and asset-market  disturbances  in recent exchange rate experi- 
ence. The evidence I review suggests that goods-market  shocks have 
played  an  important  role, particularly  since the  early 1980s.  The  evidence 
also suggests  that U.S. macroeconomic  policy contributed  significantly 
to both the dollar's  depreciation  between 1976  and 1979  and its appreci- 
ation since. 
THE  ROLE  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
Dramatic  shifts in monetary  policies both in the United States and 
abroad  have characterized  the years since 1979. The effects of these 
shifts on exchange  rates are difficult  to quantify,  but it seems likely that 
perceptions  about future  U.S. monetary  policy have played a key role 
since the mid-1970s,  particularly  in contributing  to the dollar's  appreci- 
ation  in 1979-82  and  its earlier  sharp  depreciation  in 1977-79. 
In the fall of 1979, the dollar, having depreciated  in real terms by 
roughly 10 percent relative to its 1976 peak, was widely regarded  as 
undervalued.  In  retrospect,  monetary  factors  appear  to have  been  critical 
in causing the dollar's nominal  depreciation  over this period. Despite 
accelerating  domestic inflation,  the Federal Reserve exceeded its an- 
nounced  MI growth  targets  in 1977,  1978,  and 1979.  As Robert  Solomon 
observes, by the second  half  of 1979,  "There  was some question  whether 
the Federal Reserve was losing control.'  '32  One piece of evidence in 
favor of assigning  money a large role in the 1977-79  events is that the 
dollar's nominal depreciation  exceeded its real depreciation. On this 
view, the real  depreciation  that did occur was primarily  temporary,  the 
result  of sluggishness  in domestic  prices. From  January  1977  to Septem- 
ber 1978, U.S. nominal  interest rates rose sharply, while German  and 
Japanese  rates  declined,  another  indication  that  the dollar's  depreciation 
over that  period  was being  fueled by inflationary  expectations. Restric- 
tive measures  taken  by the United  States in October  1978  raised  nominal 
dollar  interest  rates further,  but also affected expectations and tempo- 
rarily  arrested  the dollar's  slide. 
Monetary  growth  abroad,  notably  in Germany  and  Japan,  accelerated 
sharply between 1977 and 1978. But the acceleration was largely a 
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response  to the dollar's  depreciation  and  occurred  against  a background 
of falling  consumer  price inflation.  In those two years, foreign central 
banks acquired  a massive $70.4 billion in claims on the United States 
through  foreign  exchange  intervention.  Attempts  were made  to sterilize 
these dollar purchases, but their net effect on foreign money supplies 
was still expansionary.33 
At the time, the emergence  of record  current  account  imbalances-a 
U.S. deficit,  German  and  Japanese  surpluses-was  viewed as an impor- 
tant factor in explaining  the dollar's precipitous  fall (see table 2). The 
significance  that was then attached to current account developments 
appears  now to have  been excessive. Sharp  increases  in U.S. investment 
in 1977 and 1978  more than offset the current  account's influence on 
U.S. wealth. Moreover, purchases of dollar assets by foreign central 
banks may have offset any portfolio-balance  effects of the U.S. deficit 
on the dollar's  value. It has been suggested that the primary  exchange 
rate effect of the 1977-78 current  account imbalances  was a "news" 
effect. According to this view, the market interpreted  the changed 
configuration  of external  balances as evidence of a demand  shift away 
from  U.S. goods requiring  a real  depreciation  of the dollar.34 
The October 1979  change in Federal Reserve operating  procedures, 
which increased  the central  bank's emphasis  on monetary  targets  at the 
expense of interest  rate  targets,  appears  to have signaled  a turning  point 
in market  expectations  about  the future  course of U.S. monetary  policy. 
33. For a detailed  discussion  of German  and  Japanese  intervention  in this period,  see 
Victor  Argy, "Exchange  Rate Management  in Theory  and  Practice,"  Studies  in Interna- 
tional  Finance  50 (Princeton  University,  International  Finance  Section, October  1982).  In 
Obstfeld,  "Exchange  Rates," I estimate  that  the Bundesbank  sterilized  86 percent  of its 
foreign  exchange  intervention  in the period  from  February  1975  to March  1979. 
34. See  Michael Mussa, "The Role of  the Current  Account in Exchange Rate 
Dynamics"  (University  of Chicago,  Graduate  School of Business, June 1980);  and  Peter 
Hooper and John Morton, "Fluctuations  in the Dollar:  A Model of Nominal  and Real 
Exchange Rate Determination,"  Journal  of International  Money  and  Finance,  vol.  1 
(April 1982),  pp. 39-56. Empirical  tests supporting  the proposition  that current  account 
news  is important  are  reported  in  Rudiger  Dornbusch,  "Exchange  Rate  Economics:  Where 
Do We Stand?"  BPEA,  1:1980, pp. 143-85. For further  results, see Stephen  S. Golub, 
"Testing  for the Effect of Current-Account  'News' on Exchange  Rates: A Critique," 
Economnics  Letters, vol. 7, no. 3 (1981),  pp. 273-79. As always,  there  are  stories  other  than 
the one told in the text that might explain a positive correlation  between unexpected 
current  account deficits and currency  depreciation.  One possibility  is based on a fiscal 
reaction  function:  the expectation  of a future  fiscal  contraction  to restore  current  account 
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The dollar's  real depreciation  from  its 1976  level came to an end during 
1980. A sharp slowdown in U.S.  monetary growth from the fourth 
quarter  of 1980  to the fourth  quarter  of 1981,  together  with the election 
of a Republican  administration  believed to be committed  to disinflation, 
lent credibility  to the announced  new course for monetary  policy.35  In 
late 1980 the dollar entered its recent phase of appreciation  as U.S. 
interest  rates surged  above interest  rates  in Germany  and  Japan. 
As was noted earlier  in the review of recent macroeconomic  devel- 
opments, the reduction  in average  annual  U.S. monetary  growth since 
1979  has not been large.  However, it is not only current  money, but also 
anticipated  money, that influences  today's exchange rate. The October 
1979  changes may well have led to an extreme downward  revision of 
money growth expected to occur in the future. Evidence on the link 
between monetary announcements  and subsequent changes in asset 
prices is consistent with the hypothesis  that Federal  Reserve monetary 
targets gained credibility as a result of the October 1979 change in 
operating  procedures.36 
Against the backdrop  of a weakening dollar, the Federal Reserve 
announced in July 1985, after two quarters  of surprisingly  rapid MI 
growth,  an upward  revision  and rebasing  of the monetary  targets  it had 
set in February.  A previous  midyear  change  had occurred  in July 1983, 
but had no dramatic  effect on the dollar's value. At this writing it is 
unclear  whether  the Federal  Reserve's recent  change  will lead  to further 
depreciation. 
AGGREGATE  DEMAND  AND  THE  DOLLAR  S  APPRECIATION  IN 
THE  1980S 
As already  noted  earlier,  the recovery  from  the 1980-82  recession has 
been characterized  by widely differing growth rates among OECD 
35. The Broaddus-Goodfriend  effective  MI measure  grew  at a rate  of only 2.4 percent 
over this period, compared  with a regulation-adjusted  target growth range of 3.5 to 6 
percent.  See Broaddus  and  Goodfriend,  "Base Drift." 
36. For  recent  evidence,  see John  Huizinga  and  Leonardo  Leiderman,  "Interest  Rates, 
Money Supply Announcements  and Monetary  Base Announcements"  (University of 
Chicago,  Graduate  School  of Business,  August  1985).  For  an earlier  review  and  extension 
of the literature  on monetary  announcements,  see Bradford  Cornell,  "The  Money  Supply 
Announcements  Puzzle:  Review and Interpretation,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 
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countries. Further,  there have been significant  differences in national 
fiscal stances. These discrepancies  provide  a possible clue to the extent 
of the dollar's real and nominal appreciation  in the 1980s. As was 
observed  earlier,  shifting  demands  for national  outputs  call for changes 
in real exchange  rates, changes that are accommodated  in turn  through 
changes in nominal  exchange rates and national  output prices. Is the 
influence  of aggregate  demand  movements  of any empirical  importance 
in determining  real  exchange  rates?  The theoretical  model  set out earlier 
suggests  that  goods-market  disturbances  have made  a significant  contri- 
bution  to the dollar's  recent real  appreciation. 
Equation 2,  reproduced below,  shows the relation between real 
appreciation  in the medium  term and permanent  growth  in the autono- 
mous component  of aggregate  demand: 
Ug* -  *g 
q  a*u +  6u*. 
If it is assumed for simplicity  that a  =  (*,  the impacts  of g and g* on 
long-run  q depend  only on the sum 8 + 8* of aggregate  demand  elastic- 
ities  with  respect to  the  real exchange rate.  In  that case,  q  = 
(g* -  g)l(6  +  6*). 
The elasticities  8 and 6* depend  in part  on price elasticities  of import 
and export demand,  which may be derived  from empirical  trade  equa- 
tions. Let  fd be the level (rather  than the logarithm)  of real aggregate 
demand for domestic output, A domestic absorption,  X the level of 
exports, M the level of imports, and Q the level of the real exchange 
rate. Then  Yd is given by: 
yd =A  +X-  QM, 
and 8  equals  (Q/Yd)aYd/aQ.  If EX  is  the  price  elasticity  of  export  de- 
mand (Q/X)aX/aQ, Xx the export share XIYd, EM  the import elasticity 
-  (Q/M)aM/aQ, and  XM  the import  share  QM/Yd,  then  8 is given by: 
(7)  6 =  XXEX  +  XM(EM  -  1), 
under  the (admittedly  arbitrary)  assumption  that the real exchange rate 
Q does not directly  affect overall  absorption.  Expression  7 is essentially 
the well-known Marshall-Lerner-Hirschman  condition governing the 
effect of an exchange  rate  change  on the trade  balance. 
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the United States are XX  =  XM  =  0.1. Several estimates  of Ex and  EM for 
U.S. manufactures  are available, and the long-run  elasticities of 1.67 
and 1.06  used in the International  Monetary  Fund's World  Trade  Model 
are fairly typical.37  This calibration  leads to an elasticity 8  =  0.173. 
Because aggregate  demand  for foreign  output can be written  as y*d  = 
A* +  M -  (X/Q) in a two-region world, the demand elasticity 6* can be 
written  as: 
(8)  8* =  p(6  +  XM -  XX),  p  =  (Yd/QY*d) 
Here I take the "rest of the world" to be the six other major  industrial 
countries.  This assumption  makes  p  1, and, together  with  the assump- 
tions already  rnade,  implies  a value of 6* = 0. 173.  The result  is the long- 
run  relationship: 
(9)  q =  (1/0.346) (g* -  g)  =  2.89 (g* -  g). 
Equation  9 yields a quantitative  estimate of the medium-term  effect 
of divergent  aggregate  demand  movements  on q. For  example,  it predicts 
that if the demand for home output rises permanently  by 10 percent 
relative to the demand  for foreign output, the real exchange rate will 
ultimately  appreciate  by 28.9 percent. The slope coefficient  is high  both 
because of the small share of trade in U.S.  GNP and because of the 
moderate  price elasticities  characteristic  of estimated  trade  equations. 
The main drawback  to applying relation 9 to actual events is the 
absence of any reliable empirical  data on the autonomous aggregate 
demand  disturbance  factors g and g*. Changes  in the exogenous com- 
ponents  of fiscal  deficits-as  measured,  perhaps,  by cyclically adjusted 
deficits-provide a part of the story. The cumulative  IMF measure  of 
fiscal impulse discussed in the first section implies a net government 
demand shift to the United States from other members of the "Big 
Seven" of 0.042 -  (-  0.032) = 0.074, or 7.4 percent, between 1980  and 
1985.  On the basis of equation  9, this fiscal change  could be responsible 
for at most a 21.4 percent real dollar appreciation  (that is, 2.89 x  7.4 
percent).  But, as was noted  earlier,  the IMF  measure  is not additive  over 
time, so this figure  probably  exaggerates  the role of fiscal policy. Peter 
Hooper  obtains  a somewhat  smaller  figure  in a simulation  of the Federal 
Reserve  Board's  Multicountry  Model.  He finds  that  U.S. fiscal  measures 
37. See Artus  and  Knight,  "Issues," p. 26. 416  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
undertaken  in 1981-84 would have caused the dollar to appreciate  by 
about 8 percent in real terms had there been no change  in foreign  fiscal 
or monetary  policies.38 
It should be remembered,  though, that equation  9 is based on long- 
run elasticities and does not characterize  the economy's equilibrium 
during  the transition  to full employment. Short-run  values of 8 and 6* 
are likely to be significantly  smaller  than their long-run  counterparts, 
and  this  may  result  in  real  exchange  rate  overshooting.  Possibly  offsetting 
any overshooting  effect is the influence  of differences  between actual 
outputs and deviations from the trend values assumed in equation 9. 
These have probably  worked  in the direction  of dampening  the dollar's 
real  appreciation. 
As equation 6 shows, not only current, but also anticipated,  fiscal 
actions move the real exchange rate. If fiscal stimulus in the United 
States were expected to rise over time relative  to fiscal  stimulus  abroad, 
calculations based on observed fiscal positions would understate  the 
fraction  of the exchange  rate  change  due to fiscal  policy. Blanchard  and 
Summers  report  1984  Data  Resources,  Inc., forecasts  of the consolidated 
U.S. government  budget  that show declining  deficits  through  1989.39  To 
the extent that these forecasts represent  widely held expectations,  they 
suggest that expected increases in U.S. fiscal stimulus  can have played 
no significant  role in exchange  rate  determination  in any recent year. 
Aggregate demand developments unconnected with fiscal policies 
may have been an additional  cause of the dollar's rise, however. The 
high  relative  growth  rate  of U.S. real  GNP in 1983-84  is difficult  to credit 
in its entirety  to fiscal  actions taken  in the United States since 1981.  For 
example, Hooper finds  that fiscal policy contributed  a maximum  of 2.2 
percentage  points to GNP growth (in 1983, not 1984),  while causing a 
current  account deficit  of $27.9 billion,  just a little over a quarter  of the 
actual deficit of $101.6 billion, in 1984.40  And the dollar  appreciated  in 
real effective terms by 9.2 percent between 1983:4  and 1984:4  on the 
38. Peter Hooper, "International  Repercussions  of the U.S. Budget  Deficit," Inter- 
national Finance Discussion Paper 246 (Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve 
System,  September  1984).  Similar  results  are  reported  by Paul  Masson  and  Adrian  Blundell- 
Wignall,  "Fiscal Policy and the Exchange  Rate in the Big Seven: Transmission  of U.S. 
Government  Spending  Shocks," European  Economic  Review, vol. 28 (June-July  1985), 
pp. 1  1-42. 
39. Blanchard  and  Summers,  "Perspectives." 
40. Hooper,  "International  Repercussions." Maurice Obstfeld  417 
basis of relative WPIs. It seems likely, therefore, that autonomous 
increases in other components of aggregate  demand, for example in 
investment,  have played  a role in appreciating  the dollar.4'  Tables 1 and 
3 show that those industrialized  countries  that, with the United States, 
have  grown  most rapidly  in the recovery-Japan and  Canada-have also 
experienced  the most marked  real currency  appreciations.  In contrast, 
all other  industrialized  countries  but Italy suffered  real currency  depre- 
ciations over 1982-84. As the U.S. growth  slowdown  became apparent 
in the first  half  of 1985,  the dollar  depreciated. 
The above reasoning suggests that fiscal policies and aggregate 
demand  shifts have played  a significant  role in appreciating  the dollar  in 
recent years. However, such arguments  cannot decisively establish 
whether the dollar's appreciation  has been "justified":  at best, they 
show that the effects of the demand shifts that have occurred are 
potentially important. Aside from the obvious estimation and data 
problems,  relation  9, as has already  been noted, assumes static expec- 
tations. With  rational  expectations, as in equation  6, the future  paths  of 
g and  g* are  also important  in  judging  the appropriateness  of today's real 
exchange  rate. One  factor  causing  the demand  for U.S. goods to decline 
over time relative to foreign demand is the wealth effect of the U.S. 
current  account deficit. Once again, however, this factor is difficult  to 
quantify.42 
REAL  AND  NOMINAL  SHOCKS:  EVIDENCE  FROM  STOCK  MARKETS 
AND  ANNOUNCEMENTS 
One way of getting some idea of the relative importance  of goods- 
market  and money-market  shocks is to study the correlation  between 
41. Incentives  included  in the 1981-82  tax changes  could have caused  the investment 
boom, but Bosworth  presents  evidence against  this hypothesis.  See Barry  P. Bosworth, 
"Taxes  and  the Investment  Recovery,"  BPEA, 1:1985,  pp. 1-38. 
42. Krugman  presents  an empirical  argument  that  the dollar's  real  value in the spring 
of 1985  did not reflect  reasonable  expectations  concerning  future  U.S. current  account 
deficits.  See Paul  R. Krugman,  "Is the Strong  Dollar  Sustainable?"  Working  Paper  1644 
(National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  June 1985).  Similar  conclusions  are reached  by 
Stephen  N. Marris,  "The Decline and Fall of the Dollar:  Some Policy Issues," BPEA, 
1:1985,  pp. 237-44,  and  by Arnold  S. Kling,  "Anticipatory  Capital  Flows  and  the Behavior 
of the Dollar," International  Finance  Discussion Paper  261 (Board  of Governors  of the 
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changes in nominal exchange rates and in nominal stock prices. If 
domestic  money-market  shocks are  the dominant  source  of disturbance, 
the nominal  prices of domestic shares and of foreign exchange should 
be  highly positively correlated. Monetary expansion, for example, 
causes the nominal prices of  stocks and foreign currencies to rise 
simultaneously.  If shocks to aggregate  demand  or supply  are important, 
however, any positive correlation  betweern  stock prices and  the price of 
foreign  exchange  is likely to be attenuated;  the correlation  may even be 
negative. 
A positive movement  in aggregate  demand  for domestic goods has a 
theoretically ambiguous effect on the stock market, but it generally 
causes the currency  to appreciate.  The response of stock prices in this 
case depends  on the type of spending  disturbance  that  occurs. A shift  in 
world demand from foreign to domestic goods unambiguously  raises 
domestic stock prices if it is not accompanied  by a decline in world 
saving. An increase in investment  demand  falling  on domestic goods is 
also likely to be associated with a rise in the stock market.  For reasons 
discussed in detail  by Blanchard  and Summers,  an increase  in domestic 
aggregate  demand  fueled by a decline in private  or public  saving  has an 
ambiguous,  but probably  negative, effect on stock prices.43  Increases  in 
domestic aggregate  supply have ambiguous  exchange rate effects but 
tend to be associated with rises in stock prices. The likely results of a 
decline in foreign saving unaccompanied  by a shift in tastes toward 
domestic  goods are a depreciation  of the home currency  and  a fall in the 
home stock market. 
Table 6 shows correlations  between monthly  percentage  changes in 
nominal  effective exchange rate and stock price indexes for the United 
States, Japan, and Germany.  Since a rise in one of the exchange rate 
indexes is a currency  appreciation,  a negative entry indicates that the 
domestic currency tends to weaken in the foreign exchange markets 
when domestic stock prices rise. Over the entire  period February  1976 
to February  1985,  the correlation  is negative  but  rather  small  in absolute 
value for the United States, positive for Japan, and insignificantly 
negative  for Germany.  This pattern  of correlations  suggests that mone- 
tary shocks have been most important  in the United States, but it 
indicates substantial  goods-market  disturbances  in the Japanese case. 
43. See Blanchard  and  Summers,  "Perspectives." Mauirice Obstfeld  419 
Table 6.  Correlation between Monthly Percentage Changes in Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate and Nominal Stock Market Price Index,  1976-85 
February  1976-  February  1976-  January  1982- 
Country  February  1985  December 1981  February  1985 
United States  -0.18  - 0.26  -0.14 
Japan  0.25  0.14  0.48 
Germany  - 0.07  -0.15  0.17 
Source: Author's  calculations,  based  on exchange  rate  data  from  Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  Company  of New York, 
World Financial  Markets,  and on stock price indexes  from OECD, Main Economic  Indicators.  A rise in an effective 
exchange  rate  is an appreciation. 
Even so, one would expect a more negative correlation  coefficient for 
the United States if most important  disturbances  had originated  in the 
domestic  money market."4 
The correlation  coefficients turn out to be somewhat unstable over 
time, however. The discussion above suggested that monetary  factors 
dominated  the behavior  of the dollar  between 1976  and the end of 1981, 
and that goods-market  developments  have gained  in importance  since. 
Table 6 contains evidence consistent with this proposition. Over the 
period ending in December 1981, the correlation  between percentage 
increases in the dollar's external value and percentage stock price 
increases  is - 0.26, lower  than  over the entire  sample;  but  the correlation 
is - 0.14 thereafter.  For Japan  and Germany  also, the correlations  rise 
after the end of 1981. The correlation  pattern  reported  for the second 
subsample  is inconsistent  with a dominant  role for monetary  shocks. 
An alternative  explanation  of a lower correlation  between changes  in 
stock and foreign  currency  prices is a greater  incidence  of international 
portfolio  shifts  in the second period.  For example,  political  instability  in 
Europe  could  cause a shift  out of German  and  into U.S. assets that  might 
simultaneously  appreciate  the dollar  and  push  U. S. stock  prices  upward. 
However, the correlations  between real U.S. and foreign stock prices 
(that is, nominal stock prices deflated by WPIs) are positive in both 
subsamples,  and more strongly  positive in the second. From February 
1976  to December 1981  the correlation  between percentage  changes in 
44. Foreign  monetary  shocks  may  also  weaken  any  tendency  for  the  domestic  currency 
to depreciate  when  the domestic  stock market  rises. If a monetary  contraction  abroad,  for 
example,  causes a home-currency  depreciation,  a rise in home output,  and a rise in the 
home  real  interest  rate,  domestic  stock prices  may  well increase,  but  need not. If all three 
countries  in  table  6 were  buffeted  only  by domestic  and  foreign  monetary  shocks,  however, 
one would  expect to find  a highly  negative  correlation  coefficient  for at least one of them. 420  Br-ookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
U.S. and Japanese  real stock prices is 0.20; in the period beginning  in 
January  1982  it is 0.32. The corresponding  correlations  for Germany  are 
0.34 and 0.46. These correlations  give little support  to explanations  of 
U.S. asset price movements  based on "safe haven" considerations. 
Evidence on correlations  between macroeconomic  announcements 
and subsequent  changes in the dollar's foreign exchange value is also 
consistent with the view that goods-market shocks have played an 
important  role in the recent  behavior  of exchange  rates. Using a multiple 
regression  framework,  Gikas  Hardouvelis  has shown  that  since October 
1979 the dollar has, on average, appreciated after Federal Reserve 
announcements  of unanticipated  increases in industrial  production,  the 
employment  rate, manufacturers'  orders  for durables,  retail sales, and 
housing  starts.  (Anticipated  values are median  forecasts  of the variables 
from the Money Market  Services, Inc., survey.)45  Quite surprisingly  in 
view of PPP  theory, Hardouvelis  also finds  that the dollar  has tended  to 
appreciate  after unanticipated  increases in the consumer  and producer 
price indexes. 
One interpretation  of these results is that  goods-market  shocks have 
been dominant  in the period  surveyed  by Hardouvelis.  For example, in 
the model set forth above, a positive shock to U.S. aggregate  demand 
causes the price level, output, and the dollar's  foreign  exchange value 
to rise simultaneously.  A positive monetary  shock, in contrast, would 
cause a rise in output  and  prices coupled  with a currency  depreciation. 
The evidence on announcements  is also consistent with a story in 
which  anticipated  future  monetary  policy plays an important  role. These 
two explanations-real  shocks and anticipated  monetary policy-are 
not mutually  exclusive. If markets  take unanticipated  output  and price- 
level  increases as a signal that monetary policy will become more 
restrictive  in the future, the correlation  patterns  found by Hardouvelis 
can emerge. 
Would Fixed Rates Have Been Better? 
The apparent  importance  of goods-market  disturbances  in explaining 
recent exchange rate movements suggests that, given the same fiscal 
45. Gikas Hardouvelis, "Economic News,  Exchange Rates, and Interest Rates" 
(Columbia  University, Barnard  College, Department  of Economics, February 1985). 
Personal  income  is the only activity  variable  considered  whose innovations  are  associated 
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policies, fixed rates might  have exacerbated  macroeconomic  instability 
at times. The evidence reviewed in the previous section also suggests 
that swings in the dollar's  real exchange rate since 1976  have been due 
at  least in  part  to divergent  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  within  the OECD. 
Such a view raises the question of whether macroeconomic  policies 
would have been less divergent  under  fixed dollar  exchange rates. This 
section attempts  to answer  that question. 
POLICY  CHOICE  AND  THE  EXCHANGE  RATE  REGIME 
One classic argument  against  floating  rates is the "discipline" argu- 
ment, which holds that governments, once relieved of the external 
constraint  imposed by a fixed exchange rate, inevitably  adopt overex- 
pansionary  policies damaging  to their neighbors  as well as themselves. 
On  a broader  reading,  the discipline  criterion  can  be interpreted  as asking 
which type of exchange  rate  regime  better  promotes  policies conducive 
to international  stability.  Much  of the case for floating  rates is based on 
the principle  of monetary  autonomy, and while such autonomy is not 
inconsistent  with  some degree  of discipline,  there  is a trade-off.  A similar 
tension between individual  liberties and the rights  of society underlies 
any legal system. 
While the first  half of the floating  rate period  did see an acceleration 
of inflation  in some industrial  countries  beyond what  could  be explained 
by OPEC  I and  the worldwide  reserve explosion of 1971-73,  inflation  in 
the industrial  countries  has dropped  dramatically  since 1979.  Further,  a 
rapidly  depreciating  currency has, in a number  of instances, forced a 
dramatic  shift in policy; it did so, for example, in the United Kingdom 
in 1976  and in the United States in 1978-79. On the surface, therefore, 
the empirical  basis for an assertion  that  floating  rates cannot  discourage 
monetary  overexpansion  appears  weak. 
In assessing the theoretical  relevance  of the discipline  argument,  it is 
useful to distinguish  between monetary  discipline  and fiscal discipline. 
On the monetary  side, the discipline  argument  is really  an argument  for 
a commodity standard, such as a gold standard.  No system of fixed 
exchange rates based on a fiat reserve currency imposes automatic 
discipline on the country whose liabilities are held as international 
reserves. A system with symmetric  balance  of payments  adjustment  can 
discourage  monetary  expansion  by individual  countries,  but  it places no 
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system of fixed rates is to impose automatic  constraints  on worldwide 
inflation,  the world  stock of money  must  be beyond  human  control.  Such 
a system certainly  does impose  harsh  discipline  on worldwide  monetary 
growth,  but it represents  an extreme  sacrifice  of monetary  autonomy.46 
It is much less clear how a fixed exchange rate imposes automatic 
discipline  on fiscal  policy. Under  a fixed  rate  a higher  government  deficit 
that is not monetized leads to capital inflow and, at least for a time, a 
gain in foreign reserves. Reserve movements therefore impose no 
discipline  on bond-financed  fiscal  deficits  in the short  term. If the deficit 
expands  at too rapid  a pace for too long, there  is a confidence  crisis and 
foreign  lending  dries up. But this threat  is no greater  under  fixed rates 
than under  floating  rates. Floating  rates may encourage  bond-financed 
fiscal deficits if policymakers  believe they can devalue their nominal 
debt  later  through  a surprise  monetary  expansion.  A fixed  exchange  rate 
precludes  this strategy  only if surprise  devaluations  of the currency  are 
impossible. 
When  the exchange  rate  is flexible,  a growing  deficit  induces  a sharply 
appreciating  currency.  Injured  sectors  of the economy  will  then  generate 
at least some political  pressure  for fiscal contraction.  Under  fixed rates 
the  real  appreciation  is more  gradual,  and  lender  confidence  may  collapse 
before internal  pressure to moderate the fiscal ease has built up. As 
current events show, however, the great danger of relying on a real 
appreciation  to moderate fiscal policy is that those hurt are likely to 
press for protection  rather  than  deficit  reduction-particularly  if protec- 
tion appears  to be the political  path of least resistance. It is sometimes 
argued  that  fixed exchange  rates would  give a government  more  time to 
reduce  a fiscal  deficit  before  protectionist  pressures  became  irresistible. 
But since the government  created  the deficit  in the first  place, one must 
ask which of its short-term  consequences  under  fixed  rates  will induce  a 
change  of course. 
Bond-financed  fiscal  expansion  raises  interest  rates  and  inflation  more 
in the short  run  under  fixed than under  floating  rates. Are these factors 
powerful  incentives in favor of budget  cutting?  The U.S. experience of 
46. For a recent discussion of the drawbacks  of a gold standard,  see Richard  N. 
Cooper,  "The  Gold  Standard:  Historical  Facts  and  Future  Prospects,"  BPEA,  1:1982,  pp. 
1-45. With  the  establishment  of the two-tier  gold  market  in March  1968,  the  dollar  in effect 
became  a fiat  currency.  From  the perspective  of the United  States, the threat  that  foreign 
official  dollar  holders  would  redeem  their  dollars  for  gold  remained  as an  external  constraint 
on dollar  creation  (until  August 15, 1971).  But from the perspective  of the system as a 
whole, the automatic  limit  to money  creation  by central  banks  had  been abolished. Mautrice  Obstfeld  423 
the  late 1960s  does not  favor  this  view. The  budget  submitted  by President 
Johnson in January 1966 failed to raise taxes to balance increases in 
military  spending.  Not until  June 1968  was a tax surcharge  approved  by 
Congress.  Monetary  and fiscal contraction  helped drive the U.S. econ- 
omy into recession by the end of 1969,  but the previous  expansion had 
already built considerable inflationary  momentum into U.S.  prices. 
Arguably, the failure of the exchange rate system to impose prompt 
discipline on U.S.  fiscal expansion after January 1966 helped set the 
stage for the unraveling  of the system, beginning  in early 1971. The 
breakdown  was accompanied by a major protectionist measure, the 
temporary  10  percent  import  surcharge  imposed  by the United States to 
induce  foreign  agreement  to an exchange  rate  realignment. 
In summary, fixed exchange rate regimes based on fiat reserve 
currencies  can exert automatic  monetary  discipline  on individual  coun- 
tries, but, like floating  rates, place no limits on global  monetary  expan- 
sion. And even for individual  countries,  a depreciating  floating  rate  may 
discourage  excessive money growth. With respect to excessive bond- 
financed  fiscal deficits, there appears  to be no presumption  that fixed 
rates have an advantage  over floating  rates in promoting  restraint. 
A broader  application  of the discipline  criterion  must focus not just 
on which exchange rate regime is at an advantage in discouraging 
overexpansionary  policies, but on which can better  cope with overcon- 
tractionary  policies as well. As the fixed  rate  system gives countries  with 
balance  of payments  surpluses  no strong  incentive to expand, it cannot 
be argued  that  fixed  rates dominate  flexible  rates on this ground. 
The problem  of noncooperative  international  policymaking  reflects 
another aspect of the tension between individual optimization and 
society's welfare. Concern  about noncooperative  behavior  is not new; 
the  phenomenon  of " competitive  devaluation"  has  long  been  recognized 
as a problem of the international  economic system between the two 
world wars. Recently, however, attention  has focused on the broader 
problem  of macroeconomic  policy formulation  among interdependent 
economies. 
The example  of a unilateral  disinflation  illustrates  the possibility  of an 
inefficient noncooperative outcome.47  When a country disinflates, it 
exports part of its inflation abroad by causing foreign currencies to 
47. McKinnon's  criticism  of U.S. monetary  policy  between 1980  and  mid-1982  can be 
interpreted  as an argument  that noncooperative  policymaking  in the OECD made the 
recent  recession  more  costly than  necessary.  See McKinnon,  An International  Standard. 424  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
depreciate. If foreign authorities  resist by a competitive reduction in 
their  own money  growth  rates, exchange  rates  do not change,  but  output 
falls everywhere. International  policy coordination  may achieve a path 
of inflation  and output  that  all countries'  policymakers  prefer.48 
If complete policy coordination  is impossible, fixed exchange rates 
could  be a desirable  second-best  solution.  Gilles  Oudiz  and  Jeffrey  Sachs 
have argued  that the potential  gains from coordination  are empirically 
small.49  The  payoff  of fixed  rates  in  terms  of improved  policy  coordination 
can be no higher  than  the payoff  to optimal  policy coordination. 
OECD  POLICIES  AND  THE  EXCHANGE  RATE 
Another way of assessing the incentives embedded in the two ex- 
change rate regimes  is to ask if fixed dollar  exchange rates would have 
led to better OECD  macroeconomic  policies over the last decade. This 
is a highly speculative  enterprise,  but plausible  hypothetical  scenarios 
seem to point to a negative answer. Given the dollar's status as the 
principal  reserve currency, it is likely that policies and performance 
since the mid-1970s  would  have been worse under  fixed  rates. 
Imagine  first how the history of the late 1970s unfolds under fixed 
rates. Foreign  central  banks that peg their exchange rates to the dollar 
in 1977-78  acquire  even more international  reserves than  they actually 
did  in those years. The  resulting  acceleration  in monetary  growth  abroad 
fuels inflation and possibly encourages stringent controls on capital 
inflow.50  In the short  run, however, fixed dollar  rates hold hypothetical 
U.S.  inflation  below its actual path while simultaneously  worsening 
Japanese and European inflation. If anything, the export of inflation 
abroad  in the short term  causes U.S. money to grow more rapidly  than 
it would under  a depreciating  floating  rate. By the time OPEC II hits, 
inflationary  pressures  throughout  the OECD  are intensifying. 
48. See, for example, Matthew  B. Canzoneri  and Jo Anna Gray, "Monetary  Policy 
Games and the Consequences  of Non-Cooperative  Behavior,"  International  Economic 
Review, forthcoming;  Rogoff, "Can International  Monetary Policy Cooperation  Be 
Counterproductive?";  Gilles Oudiz  and Jeffrey  Sachs, "Macroeconomic  Policy Coordi- 
nation  among  the Industrial  Countries,"  BPEA,  1:1  984,  pp. 1-64;  and  Francesco  Giavazzi 
and  Alberto  Giovannini,  "Monetary  Policy  Interactions  under  Managed  Exchange  Rates" 
(Columbia  University,  Graduate  School of Business,  June 1985). 
49. Oudiz  and  Sachs, "International  Policy  Coordination." 
50. In fact, Germany  and  Japan,  which  intervened  heavily  to support  the dollar  at the 
time, did  tighten  capital  controls  somewhat.  See Argy,  Exchange-Rate  Management,  and 
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There are no automatic  incentives for the United States to pursue  a 
more  contractionary  monetary  course  underafixed  exchange  rate  system 
that  insulates  the U.S. money supply  from  balance  of payments  consid- 
erations.  Nor is the United  States  forced  to slow its money  growth  under 
a scheme, like McKinnon's, in which the United States remains the 
reserve currency center but must contract its money supply by an 
amount  equal to foreign  official  dollar  purchases.51  But under  the latter 
type of system, foreign  central  banks,  acting  in concert,  can successfully 
slow world  money growth  through  contractionary  domestic  credit  poli- 
cies of their  own. 
A hypothetical  replay  of more  recent  events suggests  that  fixed  dollar 
rates  may  also fail to prevent  a sustained  U.S. fiscal  expansion.  With  the 
rest of the OECD pegging to the dollar, a rising U.S.  fiscal deficit 
necessitates dollar  reserve sales by foreign  central  banks and causes a 
continuing  fall in money supplies abroad.  Foreign  GNP growth slows, 
and a fall in price  levels abroad  relative  to the U.S. price  level sets off a 
gradual  real appreciation  of the dollar. Slower growth could prompt  a 
more expansionary  fiscal stance elsewhere in the OECD, but a move to 
control capital outflow is the more likely response. If enacted, capital 
account restrictions  push U.S. interest rates up even further.  Even in 
the absence of capital controls abroad, U.S.  interest rates rise more 
under a fixed rate than they would under a floating  rate. Higher U.S. 
interest  rates  may, but  need not, discourage  government  borrowing,  and 
might simply swell the deficit. Their most likely result is increased 
political  pressure  for the Federal  Reserve to monetize. 
Fiscal expansion  in the United States exerts upward  pressure  on the 
domestic  price level, pressure  that is greater  if the U.S. monetary  base 
automatically  expands  as foreign  central  banks  lose reserves because a 
U.S. fiscal deficit then pushes the U.S.  money supply upward. This 
inflationary  pressure  could  lead to a fiscal  reversal,  but  it could also lead 
to a monetary  contraction.  Tighter  money might  force a fiscal reversal 
51. See McKinnon,  "A New Tripartite  Monetary  Agreement."  The only additional 
automatic  constraint  imposed  by the McKinnon  scheme would  be the need for the U.S. 
government  to raise taxes eventually  to pay interest  on the Federal  Reserve's growing 
obligations  to foreign central banks. In a sense, therefore, the problem  of excessive 
monetary  expansion  under  fixed  rates  can be the problem  of excessive fiscal  expansion  in 
disguise.  Foradetailed  discussion  of the  connection  betweenforeign  exchange  intervention 
and the government  budget  constraint,  see Maurice  Obstfeld,  "Speculative  Attack  and 
the External  Constraint  in a Maximizing  Model  of the Balance  of Payments,"  Canadian 
Journal of Economics,  forthcoming. 426  Brookings Papers on Econsomic  Activity, 2:1985 
by driving  interest rates up even higher. But unless capital flows are 
restricted,  an obstinate  U.S. refusal  to bring  down the deficit-perhaps 
accompanied  by official  denials that government  deficits affect interest 
rates-would  ultimately  induce foreign countries to devalue their cur- 
rencies against  the dollar. 
WAGE  SETTING  AND  THE  EXCHANGE  RATE  REGIME 
The  process by which  wages are set may  also depend  on the exchange 
rate  regime.  As changes  in import  prices become more  frequent,  unions 
may become more aggressive  in pressing  wage demands,  or the pattern 
of wage indexation may change. In either of these cases, wages can 
respond  to inflation  more quickly  under  floating  rates than under  fixed 
rates. The possible endogeneity  of wage-setting  arrangements  must be 
taken  into  account  in  comparisons  of macroeconomic  performance  under 
different  exchange rate regimes. In particular,  arguments  based on the 
exchange  rate's  role  as an  automatic  stabilizer  become  more  complicated 
once the response  of labor  market  institutions  to the policy environment 
is recognized. 
Policymakers'  responses to the increased  scope for money creation 
under  a float  could also affect the wage process. If floating  rates  free the 
authorities  to engineer  surprise  inflations,  and  their  propensity  to do this 
is recognized,  wage inflation  is likely to accelerate.52  Alternatively,  the 
scope for accommodating  wage demands under floating rates may 
encourage wage inflation if the government's commitment to price 
stability  is in doubt. 
But it is not obvious that policymakers' preferences will always 
encourage  more aggressive  wage-setting  behavior  under  floating  rates. 
Kenneth  Rogoff  provides  an example  in which wage demands  are more 
moderate  under floating  rates than under a fixed rate regime in which 
national  central  banks cooperate."3  In his model, authorities  fearful  of 
the real depreciation  caused by unilateral  inflation  under  a floating  rate 
52. Barro  and  Gordon  have  described  the  noncooperative  inflationary  equilibrium  that 
can result  from  the strategic  interaction  of wage setters and the monetary  authority.  See 
Robert  J. Barro  and  David  B. Gordon,  "A Positive  Theory  of Monetary  Policy  in  a Natural 
Rate  Model,"  Journal of Political Economy,  vol. 91 (August  1983),  pp. 589-610. 
53. Rogoff,  "Can  International  Monetary  Policy  Cooperation  Be Counterproductive?" Maurice Obstfeld  427 
are less inhibited  about  causing  inflation  when they know other  govern- 
ments will follow suit. Wage demands therefore rise in all countries 
when a fixed rate regime is adopted, and the authorities  must accom- 
modate  these demands  to avoid unemployment.  Further,  even under  a 
fixed rate a central bank can accommodate  excessive wage increases 
through  devaluation.S4 
As a first  step in investigating  the stability  of the wage process across 
exchange rate regimes, I have estimated reduced-form  equations that 
express wage inflation  as a function of lagged wage inflation, lagged 
unemployment,  and lagged inflation  in import prices. Table 7 shows 
estimates for the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom  over fixed and floating  rate periods. The equation  estimated 
is: 
(10)  AWt =  3  +  1 AWt1  +  02Ut-I  +  3 API-t-1, 
where w once again is the logarithm  of the nominal wage, U is the 
unemployment  rate, and  p' is the logarithm  of the import  price index. 
The results are quite imprecise,  particularly  for the period  ending  in 
1972,  and most of the equations  suffer  from some residual  autocorrela- 
tion.55  But a few tentative conclusions can be drawn. For the United 
States, there  is essentially no evidence of instability  in the wage-setting 
process. For Germany  the importance  of lagged import  price changes 
becomes greater  in the floating  rate period, but there is no indication  of 
an accelerated  response  of wages to inflation. 
For both  Japan  and the United Kingdom,  however, the coefficient  of 
the lagged  wage drops dramatically,  while the coefficient  of the unem- 
ployment  rate rises in absolute value. This is consistent with an accel- 
erated response of wages to inflation, but the results are not highly 
significant  and can only be suggestive  at this stage. 
The main  implication  of the regressions  is that further  work must be 
done. In addition  to improving  the specification  of the wage equations 
54. For a formal  analysis, see Henrik  Horn and Torsten Persson, "Exchange  Rate 
Policy, Wage  Formation,  and Credibility"  (University  of Stockholm,  Institute  for Inter- 
national  Economic  Studies,  December  1984). 
55. Recall  that  the Durbin-Watson  statistics  reported  here  are  biased  toward  the value 
of 2.00. Given  the few degrees  of freedom  allowed  by these annual  data, it did not seem 
that  sophisticated  corrections  would  produce  substantially  more  reliable  results. 428  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Table 7.  Wages, Unemployment, and Import Price Inflation, 1962-84a 
Country  Lagged  Lagged  Summary  statistic 
and  Lagged  unemploy-  import  Durbin- 
period  wage  ment rate  price  K2  Watson 
United States 
1962-72  0.152  -  1.296  -0.117  0.52  2.54 
(0.295)  (0.527)  (0.196) 
1973-84  0.156  -  2.404  0.090  0.63  2.15 
(0.252)  (0.931)  (0.109) 
Germany 
1964-72  -0.145  -3.371  0.039  -0.10  1.61 
(0.560)  (2.739)  (0.520) 
1973-84  -0.361  -2.212  0.216  0.72  1.78 
(0.229)  (0.494)  (0.108) 
Japan 
1962-72  0.224  -2.548  0.374  -0.13  1.65 
(0.356)  (6.338)  (0.589) 
1973-84  0.015  - 30.005  0.039  0.62  2.26 
(0.235)  (8.719)  (0.105) 
United Kingdom 
1965-72  0.396  - 0.930  0.523  -0.06  1.79 
(0.661)  (7.848)  (0.657) 
1973-84  0.022  - 2.225  0.268  0.64  1.67 
(0.230)  (0.886)  (0.159) 
Source:  Author's calculations.  Wages (unit labor costs)  and unemployment  rates are from OECD,  Main Econonmic 
Indicators.  Import prices are import unit values  from United  Nations,  Yearbook of Initernational Trade Statistics, 
1982, vol.  I (U.N.,  1983), and United  Nations,  Monthly Btulletin of Statistics,  several  issues. 
a.  Annual data. The dependent variable is the percentage rate of change in unit labor costs.  Numbers in parentheses 
are standard errors. Unemployment  rates are the residuals from a regression  on a constant  and a linear time trend. 
and  studying  quarterly  data,  future  research  should  aim  to develop  more 
discriminating  tests. A finding  that  the wage process changes  after 1972 
is not in itself conclusive evidence that the adoption of floating  rates 
caused the change. Observed  changes in wage arrangements  are likely 
to have been related  also to structural  shocks such as the 1973  and 1979 
oil crises and  to macroeconomic  policy choices that  were  facilitated,  but 
not forced, by floating  rates. 
Indeed, the recent shift toward  a less expansionary  macroeconomic 
posture in Europe has been accompanied  by a partial  deindexation  of 
wages in some countries. Deindexation  may in part  be due to growing 
confidence  in  the permanence  of the EMS  . It is an  open  question  whether 
policy changes alone, unaided by any EMS obligations, could have 
induced  similar  modifications  in the wage-setting  process. Maurice Obstfeld  429 
Volatility and Credibility 
Since the short-term  volatility  of exchange rates, both in real and in 
nominal  terms, has been one of the most striking  features of the float, 
any  general  assessment  of floating  rates  must  evaluate  the costs imposed 
by volatility. Volatility,  which refers  to the variability  of exchange rate 
changes  over relatively  short  periods, is to be distinguished  from  longer 
term misalignments  that develop over several years. Although  recent 
empirical  work has found little direct evidence that volatility has ad- 
versely affected economic performance,  the possibility  remains  that it 
has imposed  informational  costs that  are difficult  to measure. 
Turbulence  in international  asset markets  can occur under  both fixed 
and  floating  rates, as the events of the early 1970s  show. The analysis  of 
optimal currency areas suggests that in response to certain shocks, 
authorities  will have incentives to attempt surprise changes in fixed 
parities.  But fixed exchange  rates that are not credibly  fixed can lead to 
disruptions  in international  and  domestic  financial  markets.  Speculative 
capital  movements  under  unconvincingly  fixed  rates  would  push  national 
authorities  toward  the imposition  of costly capital  controls. Many  of the 
benefits of credibly fixed exchange rates would be unattainable  in 
practice. 
VOLATILITY  AND  BUBBLES 
It is now well understood  that short-term  volatility  is to be expected 
in  a floating  rate  system, in  view of the exchange  rate's  role  as the relative 
price of two assets. When  private  international  asset trade  is unimpor- 
tant,  as was true  in the 1950s,  a floating  exchange  rate  ensures  a balanced 
current  account, and  its variability  is limited  by the variability  in import 
and export demands.  Since the return  to currency  convertibility  in late 
1958,  however, there has been a phenomenal  increase in the volume of 
international  asset trade  and  in the integration  of world  capital  markets.56 
56. For evidence on international  financial  integration,  see Ralph  C. Bryant,  "Inter- 
national  Financial  Intermediation:  Underlying  Trends  and Implications  for Government 
Policies," prepared  for the Second International  Conference,  Institute  for Monetary  and 
Economic  Studies, Bank of Japan,  Tokyo, May 1985;  and Maurice  Obstfeld, "Capital 
Mobility  in the World  Economy:  Theory  and Measurement,"  Carnegie-Rochester  Con- 
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Transactions  on capital  account now dominate  exchange rate determi- 
nation  in the short  run,  and  news concerning  current  or future  economic 
conditions  may cause exchange rates to jump by a percentage  point or 
more  within  a trading  day. 
In table 8, the standard  deviations of month-to-month  percentage 
changes in some nominal  effective exchange rates between 1976 and 
1985 are compared with corresponding  numbers for wholesale price 
indexes and indexes of nominal stock market prices. In the United 
States, Japan,  and Germany,  effective exchange rates have been about 
three  times as volatile as wholesale price indexes. The greater  volatility 
in exchange  rates  reflects  the fact that  currency  prices, unlike  the prices 
of many  goods  entering  the WPI,  are  closely linked  to expectations  about 
the future  as well as to current  market  conditions. Sluggish  adjustment 
in goods markets relative to asset markets is another cause of the 
relatively low variability  in goods prices. But it should be noted that 
even when prices and wages are flexible, nominal  exchange rate varia- 
bility can exceed output price variability  when goods-market  distur- 
bances predominate.57 
Comparison  of the floating  and fixed rate periods reveals a striking 
increase in real exchange rate volatility for the industrial  countries 
starting  in 1973.58  Because the post-1973  period  has been characterized 
by a number  of major  structural  shocks as well as the change  to floating 
rates, this observation  alone does not prove that nominal  exchange  rate 
flexibility  inevitably  entails  increased  variability  of real  exchange  rates. 
But the fact of relatively slow price adjustment  in goods and labor 
markets  supports  this interpretation  of the data. 
Table 8 also reveals that exchange  rates have been no more variable 
than stock market  prices. Since 1976, the U.S. stock market  has been 
57. See Obstfeld  and Stockman, "Exchange-Rate  Dynamics." The relatively low 
variability  of Germany's  rate is related to its participation  in the EMS and the earlier 
"snake"  arrangements.  The yen's value  has been almost  three  times  as variable  as that  of 
the deutsche  mark,  while the dollar  occupies  an intermediate  position  between  these two 
currencies. 
58. See Robert E. Cumby  and Maurice  Obstfeld, "International  Interest  Rate and 
Price  Level Linkages  under  Flexible  Exchange  Rates:  A Review  of Recent  Evidence," in 
Bilson  and  Marston,  eds., Exchange  Rate Theory  andPractice,  pp. 121-51;  Hans  Genberg, 
"Purchasing  Power Parity under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates," Journal of 
International  Economics, vol. 8 (May 1978),  pp. 247-76; and Dornbusch,  "Purchasing 
Power  Parity." Maurice Obstfeld  431 
Table 8.  Standard Deviations of Monthly Percentage Changes in Wholesale Price 
Indexes, Nominal Effective Exchange Rates, and Nominal Stock Market Price Indexes, 
February 1976-February  1985 
Wholesale  Stock 
price  Exchange  market 
Country  index  rate  price 
United States  0.5  1.6  3.5 
Japan  0.7  2.4  2.4 
Germany  0.3  0.9  2.7 
Source:  Author's calculations.  For the United States and Japan, wholesale  price index data are from International 
Monetary  Fund,  Internatiotial  Financial  Statistics,  line  63.  For  Germany,  wholesale  price  index  is  the  index  of 
producer prices  of  industrial products  in home  market sales,  from Motnthly Report  of  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank, 
table V111.7. Exchange  rate data are from Morgan Guaranty,  World Financial  Markets; stock price indexes  are from 
OECD,  Main Economic  Indicators. 
more  than  twice as variable  as the exchange  rate, while in Germany  the 
standard  deviation of stock price movements is three times that of 
exchange rate movements. In Japan, which has a highly variable  ex- 
change  rate, the standard  deviations  are equal. The relative  variabilities 
of exchange rates and share prices show that exchange rate volatility 
has not been excessive when measured  against the behavior of other 
asset prices.59 
Has exchange rate volatility been excessive in any absolute sense? 
There  are at least two ways of approaching  this question. The first  is to 
search  for evidence that volatility has harmed  economies with floating 
rates,  in  terms  of either  microeconomic  or  macroeconomic  performance. 
The second approach  asks whether  exchange  rates  are  moved in part  by 
economically  extraneous  information,  so that their  usefulness in trans- 
mitting  allocative  signals  is compromised. 
Opponents  of floating rates argued before 1973 that the increased 
uncertainty  they entailed  would  prove harmful  to international  trade.  In 
59. Similar  calculations  reaching  the same conclusion are reported  by William  D. 
Nordhaus,  "Statement,"  in The Decline of the Dollar, Hearings  before  the Subcommittee 
on Foreign  Economic  Policy of the Committee  on Foreign  Relations,  95 Cong. 2 sess. 
(Government  Printing  Office, 1978),  pp. 46-50; Jacob  A. Frenkel  and  Michael  L. Mussa, 
"The Efficiency  of Foreign  Exchange  Markets  and Measures  of Turbulence,"  American 
Economic Review, vol. 70 (May 1980,  Papers and Proceedings,  1979), pp. 374-81;  Jeffrey 
H. Bergstrand,  "Is Exchange Rate Volatility 'Excessive'?" Federal  Reserve  Bank of 
Boston, New England Economic Review (September-October  1983),  pp.  5-14; and  Bonnie 
E. Loopesko, "Notes on Exchange  Rate  Variability"  (Board  of Governors  of the Federal 
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a recent survey and extension of the empirical  work on this question, 
Peter  Kenen  and  Dani  Rodrik  find  little  evidence that  short-run  volatility 
in real exchange rates has hampered international  trade-hardly  a 
surprising  finding,  in view of the slim  theoretical  case for the proposition 
tested/.  60 Proponents  of floating  had  argued  that  forward  exchange  trading 
would enable importers  and exporters  to hedge their risks, and indeed 
the use of hedging  facilities has expanded  over the floating  rate period. 
New financial  instruments  have also been introduced. One such, the 
foreign exchange option, enables traders  to avoid exchange risk even 
when the timing  of their  foreign  exchange  receipts is uncertain. 
At the macroeconomic  level, concern in the early 1970s  focused on 
the possibility that exchange rate volatility might  worsen price perfor- 
mance through asymmetric "ratchet" effects on wages or through 
"vicious circles" of depreciation  and inflation.  The ratchet  hypothesis 
holds that nominal  wages increase when a currency  depreciates  but do 
not fall as readily in response to appreciation.  Under these circum- 
stances, increased exchange rate volatility is inflationary,  since even 
temporary depreciations of  the currency are built solidly into the 
structure  of wages and prices. In a thorough  survey of the evidence, 
Morris  Goldstein  finds  support  neither  for  the asymmetric  wage  behavior 
posited by the ratchet argument  nor for any effect of exchange rate 
variability  on inflation.61  The vicious circle  hypothesis  is less susceptible 
to formal  empirical  testing, but in retrospect  it is hard  to find a recent 
example of an industrial  country  in which currency  depreciation  unre- 
lated  to domestic  monetary  actions  set off a prolonged  inflationary  spiral. 
Although  a  distinction  has  been  drawn  between  volatility  and  misalign- 
ment, it is sometimes  argued  that volatility  may contribute  to misalign- 
ment  over the long  run.62  An alternative  hypothesis  is that  exchange  rate 
volatility increases when goods-market  disturbances  occur, because 
markets  have more  difficulty  forecasting  the long-run  real  exchange  rate 
after a goods-market  shock, which may change that rate, than after a 
money-market  shock, which  does not. Increased  volatility  accompanies 
the process through which the market attempts to learn the nature, 
60. See Peter B. Kenen and Dani Rodrik,  "Measuring  and Analyzing  the Effects of 
Short-Term  Volatility  in Real  Exchange  Rates," Working  Paper  in International  Econom- 
ics G-84-01  (International  Finance  Section, Princeton  University,  March  1984). 
61. See Goldstein,  "The Exchange  Rate  System." 
62. See, for  example,  Jeffrey  R. Shafer  and  Bonnie  E. Loopesko,  "Floating  Exchange 
Rates  after  Ten Years,"  BPEA,  1:1983,  pp. 1-70. Maurice Obstfeld  433 
magnitude, and persistence of the disturbance to foreign exchange 
market  equilibrium. 
In sum, there  is little direct  evidence that  exchange  rate  volatility  per 
se  has had a  harmful effect on the allocation of  resources or on 
macroeconomic  performance.  This is not to deny that exchange rate 
flexibility has altered both the channels through  which domestic and 
foreign  disturbances  affect the economy and  the speed with  which  those 
disturbances  spread. 
It is much more difficult  to assess whether  extraneous  factors have 
had an important  effect on exchange rates.63  Studies of stock price and 
interest  rate volatility  come to the conclusion that price fluctuations  in 
those asset markets have been "excessive."M4  In view of the close 
linkages among asset markets, excessive volatility in stock and bond 
markets  is likely to imply  excessive exchange  rate volatility. Studies of 
volatility in domestic asset markets are, however, based on a rather 
stringent  set of maintained  hypotheses, including  the absence of risk 
premiums.  It is therefore  difficult  to draw  unqualified  normative  conclu- 
sions from  their  results. 
Nonetheless, it is remarkable  how  little  success econometricians  have 
had  in  explaining  observed  short-term  exchange  rate  movements  through 
news about  the economic factors believed on theoretical  grounds  to be 
fundamental  determinants  of exchange  rates. For example, Hardouvel- 
is's regressions linking  one-day exchange rate changes to an array  of 
economic announcements  made on the previous day have extremely 
low explanatory  power (his adjusted  R2s are almost always well below 
10  percent).65  While  it is of course possible that the residual  variance  is 
explained by unobservable fundamentals  like preferences, or that a 
continuously  changing  economic environment  precludes the detection 
of stable economic relationships,  the possibility that irrelevant  factors 
influence  short-term  exchange  rate movements  cannot  be dismissed. In 
63. Dornbusch,  among  others,  has suggested  this  possibility.  See Rudiger  Dornbusch, 
"Flexible Exchange  Rates and Interdependence,"  International  Monetary  Fund  Staff 
Papers, vol. 30 (March  1983),  pp. 3-30. 
64. See, for example, Robert  J. Shiller, "Do Stock Prices Move Too Much To Be 
Justified  by Subsequent  Changes  in Dividends?"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 71 
(June 1981),  pp. 421-36; and Stephen F. LeRoy and Richard  D. Porter,  "The Present- 
Value  Relation:  Tests Based  on Implied  Variance  Bounds,"  Econometrica,  vol. 49 (May 
1981), pp. 555-74. 
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fact, there  is no  foolproof  method  of testing  for  the existence of stationary 
or convergent bubbles, which induce inexplicable fluctuations  of ex- 
change  rates around  the levels justified  in terms  of fundamentals. 
It may, however, be possible to identify divergent or explosive 
bubbles.  These bubbles  involve self-fulfilling  destabilizing  speculations, 
in which an explosive exchange rate path is  supported entirely by 
expectations of accelerating  exchange rate change. Several empirical 
studies claim to  provide evidence of  exploding bubbles in foreign 
exchange  and  other  asset markets.  f6 
The methodology  for detecting  bubbles  can be illustrated  through  the 
model developed above.67  Equation 6, which gives the long-run  real 
exchange rate as a function of market "fundamentals"  alone, is only 
one possible solution of the model's full-employment  equilibrium  con- 
ditions. As the appendix shows, there are infinitely  many alternative 
solutions,  for example: 
q  c(T*  +  8U*  +  8*uJ'=?  UUf* +  8U*  +  8  a) 
()k  cTcT*  +  8_*  +  (*g  -gt 
where k is any nonzero constant. When k is nonzero, contrary  to what 
is assumed in the fundamentals  solution 6, the evolution of the real 
exchange  rate  is influenced,  and  eventually  dominated,  by the explosive 
"bubble" term [(uu*  +  8u* +  *u)/1uu*]t. A test that k differs from 0 is 
a test for the presence of a bubble. 
The validity  of the test hinges  on the validity  of the model  it assumes. 
66. See, for example,  Richard  A. Meese, "Testing  for Bubbles  in Exchange  Markets: 
A Case of Sparkling  Rates?"  Journal of Political  Economy,  forthcoming;  Wing  T. Woo, 
"Speculative  Bubbles  in the Foreign  Exchange  Markets,"  Brookings  Discussion  Papers 
in International  Economics 13  (Brookings,  March  1984);  Olivier  J. Blanchard  and Mark 
W. Watson,  "Bubbles,  Rational  Expectations,  and Financial  Markets,"  in Paul  Wachtel, 
ed.,  Crises  in  the  Economic  and  Financial  Structure  (Lexington Books,  1982), pp. 
295-3 15. 
67. This methodology  was developed by Robert P. Flood and Peter M. Garber, 
"Market  Fundamentals  versus  Price-Level  Bubbles:  The  First  Tests,"  Journal ofPolitical 
Economy,  vol. 88 (August 1980),  pp. 745-70. Flood and Garber  mention  the point made 
below, that  bubbles  and  certain  omitted  variables  are  observationally  equivalent.  See also 
James D. Hamilton  and Charles  M. Whiteman,  "The Observable  Implications  of Self- 
Fulfilling  Expectations,"  Journal of Monetary Economics,  forthcoming. Maurice  Obstfeld  435 
And even when the model is correct, interpretation  of the test requires 
additional  identifying  assumptions  about  the nature  of market  expecta- 
tions, which are inherently  unobservable.  To see why, consider  how an 
econometrician  might  test whether  k = 0 in equation 11. 
Write the autonomous demand shift variable g, as the sum of an 
observed component  d, (for example, the full-employment  deficit), and 
an  uncorrelated  component  u1  that  the econometrician  does not observe. 
Similarly,  let g* = d,*  + u.  Assume for simplicity  that  the economy is 
always  at full  employment,  and  that  the random  variables  d, and  d* have 
constant conditional means d and d* that the econometrician  knows 
from  past observation.  Then equation  11  may be written  in the form: 
(  \  (9*  0  tud*  -  u*d 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~1O 
(12  qt-W*  +  8u*  +  8*u)  4u*  +  8*u 
+  c  + 
I 
+  (ud*  -  u*dt) 
Iuu*  +  6u*  +  6*u 
+  k  +  vtg 
where v1  depends on current  and expected future values of u1  and u>t 
Now  add the crucial stipulation that 1u1+j  =  tu* j =  0 forj  >  0. Under 
this identifying assumption,  v, =  [1/(uu*  +  8u*  +  u6*)](uu*  -  u*u,) 
and nonlinear  least squares, applied to equation 12, yields consistent 
estimates  of u, u*,&  r*  + 6*u, and  k. 
Suppose  that  there  are no bubbles  (k = 0), but that  within  the sample 
period,  the public  expected the mean  of the unobservable  component  of 
domestic  aggregate  demand,  ut, to rise permanently  from zero to c at a 
time T beyond the end of the sample. This might be the result of an 
expected  shift  in the investment  function  that  the econometrician  cannot 
detect by fitting  vector autoregressions,  say, to the available  data. The 
expected upward  shift in aggregate  demand  implies a violation of the 
identifying  assumption  concerning  the composition  of v. But an econo- 
metrician  who is unaware  of this violation  will see q, follow a path that 
looks like a divergent  bubble  and  will falsely conclude  that  a bubble  has 
occurred. 
The expectation  of an increase  in demand  for domestic  goods lowers 
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increase in demand  has yet to materialize,  there must be a real appreci- 
ation  of the domestic  currency  (a fall in q) today to maintain  equilibrium 
in  goods markets.  From  the  real  interest  rate  parity  condition,  a relatively 
lower  domestic  real  interest  rate  implies  that  people expect a further  real 
appreciation  of the domestic currency. As q falls over time until T, 
increasingly  crowding  out aggregate  demand  at home, the real  domestic 
interest  rate must  also fall to offset its effects and maintain  equilibrium. 
The appreciation  of the currency will therefore accelerate as time T 
approaches,  just as it does along  a divergent  bubble  path.68 
Theoretical  studies based on optimizing  models yield a strong case 
for ruling  out divergent  exchange  rate bubbles.  These studies show that 
while divergent  bubbles  may occur in economies with fiat  monies  where 
government  intervention  in money markets is unthinkable,  the mere 
possibility  that  the central  bank  will intervene  to prevent  the currency's 
price from exploding suffices to preclude them.69  How then is one to 
interpret  empirical  studies purporting  to demonstrate  the existence of 
asset-market  bubbles? My own view is that economic theory should 
inform the interpretation  of econometric results. For this reason, an 
econometrician  who sets out to estimate  a demand  curve and finds  that 
quantity  depends  positively on price  is rightly  suspected  of having  made 
an invalid identifying  assumption. Similarly,  econometric results pur- 
porting  to detect divergent  bubbles may be viewed more plausibly as 
reflecting  some model misspecification. 
THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  FORWARD  EXCHANGE  RATES 
Assessments of floating  exchange rates often focus on the behavior 
of forward exchange rates as predictors of future spot rates. In the 
68. More  formally,  when  the public  expects the unobservable  component  of aggregate 
demand  to increase to c at time T, the fundamentals  solution, equation  6, is given by 
equation 12, with V,  =  [1/((J*  +  86*  +  8*ur)](uu*  -  u*u,) and 
k =  [-*cl(8u*  +  *+  ?  *  +  8*f)]T 
Thus, bubble-ridden  and  bubble-free  specifications  based  on different  assumptions  about 
the public's  expectations  can be observationally  equivalent.  An econometric  finding  that 
k in equation 12 differs from zero may be evidence only that the econometrician  has 
adopted  an overly simple  view of how expectations  were  formed  over the sample  period. 
69. See Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, "Speculative Hyperinflations  in 
Maximizing  Models: Can We Rule Them Out?" Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 91 
(August 1983), pp. 675-87; and Maurice  Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, "Ruling Out 
Divergent Speculative  Bubbles,"  Journal of Monetary Economics,  forthcoming. Maurice Obstfeld  437 
Table  9. Nominal  Interest  Differentials  as Predictors  of Future  Exchange  Rate Change, 
1975-85a 
Bilateral  Summary  statistic 
U.S. dollar  Interest  Durbin- 
exchange rate  Constant  differential  R2  Watson 
February  1975-January  1985 
Japan  0.113  - 2.188  0.03  1.97 
(0.056)  (0.985) 
France  - 0.092  - 0.483  - 0.01  2.27 
(0.039)  (0.773) 
Germany  0.040  -  1.778  0.00  2.23 
(0.071)  (1.573) 
United Kingdom  -0.102  -  1.477  0.02  1.93 
(0.037)  (0.875) 
February  1975-December  1979 
Japan  0.122  - 2.033  0.02  1.91 
(0.072)  (1.366) 
France  0.005  - 0.422  - 0.02  2.75 
(0.057)  (1.575) 
Germany  0.038  0.747  - 0.02  2.68 
(0.090)  (2.387) 
United Kingdom  0.024  0.976  -0.01  1.87 
(0.072)  (1.388) 
Source:  Author's calculations.  Exchange rate data are end-of-month rates from OECD, Main Ecotzonoic  Indicators. 
Interest rates are end-of-month one-month  Eurocurrency rates from Morgan Guaranty,  World Financial  Markets. 
a.  Monthly data. The dependent variable is the percentage change in the bilateral exchange  rate expressed  as U.S. 
dollars  per  units  of  foreign  currency  and is  regressed  against  the  previous  month's  interest  differential  between 
Eurodollar deposits  and Euro-deposits  of the foreign currency.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Eurocurrency  markets  forward  exchange premiums  equal nominal  in- 
terest differentials,  so a test of the forward  premium's  predictive effi- 
ciency is a test of the interest  parity  condition,  a building  block of many 
exchange  rate  models  . As is also the case in U.S. bond  markets,  forward 
premiums  have been biased predictors  of future exchange rate move- 
ments.70  This is illustrated in table 9, where one-month percentage 
depreciation  rates of the dollar  against  the yen, deutsche mark,  franc, 
and pound are regressed against the previous month's differential 
between  the one-month  Eurodollar  deposit rate and the one-month  rate 
on the corresponding  foreign  Eurocurrency.  Over  the entire  period  from 
70. See Robert  J. Shiller,  John  Y. Campbell,  and Kermit  L. Schoenholtz,  "Forward 
Rates and Future  Policy: Interpreting  the Term Structure  of Interest Rates," BPEA, 
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February 1975 to January 1985, forward  premiums  mispredicted  the 
subsequent  direction  of change  of all the exchange  rates  examined.71 
These results  do not necessarily  imply  that  foreign  exchange  markets 
have  in some sense performed  poorly.  In  a world  of risk-averse  investors, 
time-varying  risk premiums  may drive a wedge between forward  pre- 
miums  and the corresponding  expected exchange  rate changes. Empir- 
ical attempts  to explain  foreign-exchange  risk premiums  have not been 
very successful, however.72 
Another problem in interpreting  results like those in table 9 is the 
"peso problem,"  first  noted in studies of the biased forecasting  perfor- 
mance of Mexican  peso futures  prior  to the August 1976  devaluation  of 
the peso.73  The problem  is quite  similar  to the one that  arises in attempts 
to detect bubbles. Suppose the market  expected some major  event that 
failed  to materialize  in the sample.  Then  econometric  tests based on the 
sample  will lead to rejection  of interest  parity  unless the sample  contains 
many  similar  episodes in which the public  was on average  correct. 
The most likely explanation  of the results in table 9 is that the dollar 
was swept upward  after 1979  by a succession of shocks that the public 
did not expect and then regarded as partially temporary  after they 
occurred. Estimates over 1975-79, also reported  in table 9, show that 
the one-month forward premium  did not mispredict  the direction of 
subsequent  movements in the dollar-deutsche mark  and dollar-pound 
rates.  However,  the  high  Durbin-Watson  statistic  for  the  dollar-deutsche 
mark  regression  is evidence against  the interest  parity  hypothesis. 
71. Similar  results  are reported  by Cumby  and  Obstfeld,  "International  Interest  Rate 
and  Price  Level Linkages";  Robert  J. Hodrick  and Sanjay  Srivastava,  "The Covariance 
of Risk  Premiums  and  Expected  Future  Spot  Exchange  Rates"  (Northwestern  University, 
Kellogg Graduate  School of Management,  March 1984);  and Paul Boothe and David 
Longworth,  "Foreign  Exchange  Market  Efficiency  Tests: Implications  of Recent Empir- 
ical Findings"  (University  of Alberta,  Department  of Economics,  June 1985). 
72. See, for example, Lars Peter Hansen and Robert J. Hodrick, "Risk Averse 
Speculation  in  the  Forward  Foreign  Exchange  Market:  An  Econometric  Analysis  of Linear 
Models,"  in Jacob A. Frenkel, ed., Exchange Rates and International Macroeconomics 
(University  of Chicago  Press, 1983),  pp. 113-42;  Jeffrey  A. Frankel,  "In Search  of the 
Exchange  Risk  Premium:  A Six-Currency  Test Assuming  Mean-Variance  Optimization," 
Journal of International  Money  and Finance,  vol.  1 (December  1982), pp. 255-74;  and 
Robert  E. Cumby,  "Is it Risk?  Explaining  Deviations  from  Interest  Parity"  (New York 
University,  Graduate  School  of Business  Administration,  October  1985). 
73. See Kenneth  Rogoff, "Essays on Expectations  and Exchange-Rate  Volatility" 
(Ph.D.  dissertation,  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology,  1979);  and  William  S. Krasker, 
"The 'Peso Problem'  in Testing  the Efficiency  of Forward  Exchange  Markets,"  Journal 
of Monetary Economics,  vol. 6 (April 1980), pp. 269-76. Maurice Obstfeld  439 
One finding  that is beyond dispute is the low explanatory  power of 
the regressions  in table 9. To a first  approximation,  forward  premiums 
provide  no information  useful  for predicting  future  exchange  rate  move- 
ments. This is consistent with the view that most variation  in floating 
exchange  rates has been caused by unanticipated  events. 
LIMITING  EXCHANGE  RATE  FLEXIBILITY:  THE  ROLE  OF 
CREDIBILITY 
Several plans to reform the exchange rate system have been put 
forward  in the hope of limiting  volatility  and improving  the functioning 
of the system in general.  At one extreme, McKinnon  has suggested  that 
the United States, Japan,  and  Germany  enter  into a tripartite  agreement 
to peg their mutual exchange rates and regulate the growth of their 
combined  money supplies. In contrast, Williamson  has suggested that 
authorities  direct  monetary  policy to "discourage"  exchange  rate  move- 
ments  beyond  announced  but  adjustable  target  zones.74  A major  problem 
with these proposals, emphasized above, is that the use of monetary 
policy to manage the exchange rate is the appropriate  response to a 
disturbance  only in special circumstances. Attempts to use monetary 
policy  to counteract  real  shocks  can  significantly  worsen  macroeconomic 
performance,  particularly  when those shocks are permanent.75 
Most proponents  of reform  recognize that goods-market  shocks will 
sometimes require adjustments  of fixed rates or alterations of target 
zones. Such changes, however, call into question the credibility  of the 
authorities'  commitment  to stabilize the exchange rate; the resulting 
market  skepticism  may  reduce  many  of the benefits  promised  by heavier 
management  of exchange rates. Realistic discussions of exchange rate 
reform  therefore  should  compare  flexible  rates to a system of exchange 
rate  targets  that  are not fully credible. 
When  exchange  rates  are fixed  but devaluations  are possible, private 
international  capital flows become more volatile than they would be 
were it possible for the authorities  to commit to an unalterable  rate. 
Typically, parity changes will not occur until some time after they 
become necessary. And they will usually be forced by massive sales of 
74.  See McKinnon, An International Standard, and Williamson,  The Exchange  Rate 
System. 
75. The discussion  in McKinnon,  An International  Standard,  focuses exclusively on 
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the weak currency  in the foreign  exchange market.  The circumstances 
leading  to the 1973  breakup  of the fixed rate system-a  decline in U.S. 
competitiveness, followed by a series of violent speculative attacks- 
illustrate  the type of problem  that  would in all likelihood  recur. 
Consider  the example of a sudden  and permanent  fall in demand  for 
U.S. exports. A floating  dollar  would depreciate  to partially  offset the 
effect of the demand shift on the exporting sector. But a fixed dollar 
would afford no such offset to the fall in export demand, and severe 
excess capacity  in the export sector would persist until  nominal  export 
prices had fallen sufficiently  to restore competitiveness. Once it had 
become evident that a permanent  deterioration  in export demand  had 
occurred,  the United States would  have a strong  incentive  to hasten  the 
adjustment  process by devaluing,  as in 1971.  Since the permanence  of a 
given shock may be impossible to ascertain ex ante, unusually large 
trade deficits could trigger speculative capital flows even when such 
deficits  were caused by purely  transitory  shifts in expenditure  patterns. 
Speculative  attacks  are not a necessary  feature  of fixed  rate systems, 
and they would not occur if authorities  could credibly  renounce  parity 
changes and commit  themselves to macroeconomic  policies consistent 
with their promise. But these idealized conditions can never be met in 
practice. Situations  will inevitably  arise in which the central  bank has 
an incentive  to break  the rules "just  once," but individual  asset holders 
will be able to guard  against this contingency at low personal cost. In 
this  environment  speculative  attacks  will sometimes  occur. If the market 
believes that  the policy response  to an attack  will be an immediate  parity 
change, then balance  of payments  crises take on the character  of bank 
runs. Purely self-fulfilling  attacks therefore  become possible, and they 
provide an example of an asset-market  bubble that may occur under 
(unconvincingly)  fixed  rates.76 
Under  a target  zone arrangement  the potential  for crisis  is less severe. 
But if the notion of a target zone is to have any content, there will be 
some occasions  on which  the central  bank  takes  a stand  against  exchange 
76. The argument  leading  to this conclusion  is given in Maurice  Obstfeld,  "Rational 
and Self-fulfilling  Balance-of-Payments  Crises,"  American  Economic  Review,  forthcom- 
ing. Rational  speculative  attacks  were first  analyzed  in Stephen  W. Salant  and Dale W. 
Henderson, "Market  Anticipations  of Government  Policies and the Price of Gold," 
Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 86 (August  1978),  pp. 627-48. The idea was applied  to 
the foreign  exchange  market  by Paul  R. Krugman  in "A Model  of Balance-of-Payments 
Crises," Journal of Money,  Credit and Banking, vol.  11  (August 1979), pp. 311-25. Maurice Obstfeld  441 
rate movements it views as unwarranted.  Disagreement  between the 
markets  and  the authorities  in these circumstances  would  entail  massive 
reserve movements  harmful  to financial  stability. 
Recurring  crises of this type might lead to the widespread use of 
capital controls, as in the years before 1973. Within  the EMS, France 
and  Italy have maintained  strict  controls  to reduce  the scope for sudden 
reserve losses.77  Capital  controls are extremely costly to enforce, and, 
like  trade  restrictions,  they lower  private  welfare  by preventing  mutually 
beneficial trades, in this case intertemporal  consumption trades and 
trades of risks between countries. Further,  capital controls may lead 
firms  to distort  production  decisions  so as to exploit  trade  credit  facilities. 
It is sometimes argued that capital flows behave perversely under a 
floating  rate because monetary  contraction  may cause both a current 
account deficit (that  is, foreign  borrowing)  and a fall in the profitability 
of domestic  investment.  However, this point is not entirely  convincing. 
Monetary  contraction  leads also to a temporary  fall in national  income, 
and it makes sense for individuals  to smooth their consumption  levels 
through  borrowing. 
Extreme  illustrations  of the credibility  problem  come from  the expe- 
riences of Argentina,  Chile, and  Uruguay,  which pegged  their  exchange 
rates  to the  dollar  in  the  late 1970s  as part  of broad  programs  of disinflation 
and liberalization.  These programs  coincided with massive currency 
misalignments,  and it is likely that expectations  of devaluation,  feeding 
into  wage settlements,  contributed  to the real  currency  appreciation  that 
occurred,  particularly  in Argentina.78  None of these countries  has been 
able to maintain  its preannounced  exchange  rate targets. 
77. Evidence  of capital  controls  within  the EMS is presented  in Francesco  Giavazzi 
and  Marco  Pagano,  "Capital  Controls  and  the European  Monetary  System" (University 
of Venice, Department  of Economics, November 1984);  and in Kenneth  Rogoff, "Can 
Exchange  Rate Predictability  Be Achieved without Monetary  Convergence?  Evidence 
from the EMS," European Economic Review, vol. 28 (June-July  1985), pp. 93-115. 
78. See, for example, Guillermo  A. Calvo, "Trying  to Stabilize:  Some Theoretical 
Reflections  Based  on the Case  of Argentina,  " in Pedro  Aspe Armella,  Rudiger  Dornbusch, 
and Maurice Obstfeld, eds., FinancialPolicies  and the World  Capital Market: The  Problem 
of Latin  American  Countries  (University  of Chicago  Press, 1983),  pp. 199-216;  Robert  E. 
Cumby  and  Sweder  van Wijnbergen,  "Fiscal Policy  and Speculative  Runs  on the Central 
Bank  under  a Crawling  Peg Exchange  Rate Regime:  Argentina,  1979-1981  " (New York 
University,  Graduate  School of Business  Administration,  1983);  Marianne  Baxter, "The 
Role of Expectations  in Stabilization  Policy," Journal  of Monetary  Economics, vol. 15 
(May 1985),  pp. 343-62; and Vittorio  Corbo,  Jaime  de Melo, and James  Tybout, "What 
Went  Wrong  with the Recent Reforms  in the Southern  Cone," Discussion  Paper  (World 
Bank, July 1985), forthcoming in Economic Development  and Cultural Change. 442  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
An evaluation  of alternatives  to floating  rates must consider market 
confidence  in the durability  of the alternatives.  Given the comparative 
disadvantage of fixed rates in the face of certain disturbances, the 
credibility  problem is likely to arise under any arrangements  limiting 
exchange rate flexibility.  It is therefore  an open question  whether  such 
arrangements  would be  stable in the absence of  pervasive capital 
controls. 
Conclusions 
A review of the experience with floating  rates reveals an exchange 
rate  system with a number  of weaknesses, including  a high  sensitivity  of 
real exchange  rates to purely  nominal  shocks, an absence of automatic 
constraints  on international  liquidity  creation, substantial  unexplained 
volatility of exchange rates in the short run, and a tendency to allow 
protracted  swings in competitiveness over the medium  term. Yet it is 
unclear  that the alternative  systems that have been proposed, such as a 
return  to fixed rates, would be better. Fixed rates would certainly  limit 
exchange  rate volatility  and probably  reduce  the frequency  of misalign- 
ments,  but  would  require  periodic  discrete  adjustment  in the  face of large 
persistent  shocks to goods markets.  The need for periodic  readjustment 
would call into question  the credibility  of existing  parities,  and possibly 
result  in speculative  attacks  and  substantial  volatility  in nominal  and  real 
rates of interest. Further,  the system would not have the advantage  of 
limiting  worldwide  liquidity unless reserve-currency  centers were re- 
quired  to peg the price  of some commodity,  such as gold. Under  a dollar 
standard,  for example, speculative  capital  movements  could lead to an 
explosion in the world money supply, as occurred in 1971-73, or to a 
sharp  contraction.  Widespread  capital  controls, difficult  to enforce and 
costly in welfare terms, would be the most likely response to capital 
account  instability. 
In light  of these drawbacks  of a fixed  rate  regime,  the strengths  of the 
present system deserve emphasis. While the current  arrangements  do 
not impose automatic  monetary  discipline or insulate economies from 
most external shocks, governments  can manage  domestic money sup- 
plies without resort to capital controls, and they can choose trend 
inflation  rates. Floating  rates are also at an advantage  relative to fixed Maurice Obstfeld  443 
rates in promoting  rapid  adjustment  to goods-market  disturbances  re- 
quiring  real exchange  rate realignment.  Of course, this is not seen as a 
benefit by sectors of the economy that are hurt by an exchange rate 
change, and  adjustment  assistance may be in order  in some cases. 
Macroeconomic  policies have certainly  been inappropriate  at times, 
but in these cases it is the policies rather  than  the exchange  rate that is 
to blame. If a  successful exchange rate system is one that would 
invariably  induce  national  authorities  to follow responsible  and  mutually 
consistent  policies, then  the present  system is a failure.  But it is difficult 
to think  of a system that would succeed when  judged by that criterion. 
In particular,  a system of fixed exchange  rates would  probably  not have 
prevented  the emergence  of the international  fiscal imbalances  that are 
in significant  measure  responsible  for the dollar's  real appreciation  and 
that  may  threaten  international  financial  stability  further  down the road. 
Recent  protectionist  pressures,  which  are  widely  ascribed  to the dollar's 
strength  in the foreign exchange market, would in all likelihood have 
emerged  eventually  under  fixed  rates  in the absence of a reduction  in the 
U.S. government  deficit. 
There is no doubt that the current  system's performance  would be 
improved  by more extensive consultation  and coordination  of policies 
within the OECD. Current  attempts to institutionalize  a multilateral 
approach  to policy formation should therefore be pursued. But it is 
difficult  to make a strong case that greater  fixity of exchange rates is 
either  feasible  or desirable. 
APPENDIX 
Two-Region Exchange Rate Model 
THIS  APPENDIX  provides further details on the theoretical two-region 
exchange  rate  model  used in  the second section  above. First,  the model's 
full-employment  equilibrium  under  floating  exchange rates is derived. 
Second, a diagram  showing the model's short-run  equilibrium  under 
floating  rates is developed and used to establish some of the assertions 
made  in the text. Similar  techniques  may be used to solve the fixed rate 
version  of the model, so a discussion  of the fixed rate  case is omitted. 444  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Full-Employment  Equilibrium  with Rational Expectations 
To solve for the model's full-employment  equilibrium,  note first  that 
yS =  y*S =  0 at  full  employment,  by  assumption.  The  equilibrium 
conditions  in the domestic and  foreign  goods markets  may therefore  be 
written: 
(13)  O = 6qt  - ur,  + gt, 
0 =  -8*qt-  -q*(r,-q+1  +  qt) +  g,*. 
Eliminating  the domestic real interest rate r, from the above equations 
leads to the stochastic  difference  equation: 
(tqt  f*  +  8U*  +  8*U 
qt +  9t  g* 
UU*  /  U* 
This  equation  says that  an  exogenous  increase  in  the  demand  for  domestic 
products  results in a higher  relative  domestic real interest  rate  given q,, 
and so, in a higher  expected value for q,+  1. A general  solution  is: 
-(  E  +  8*  +  uo  *+  +  * 
Icrcr*  +  8(y* +  8*(y  t 
+  x,  V  + 
where  {.  .  .,  x1,_, x1, x1+1,  . . .}  is any sequence  of random variables 
with the martingale  property: 
txt+I  =  Xt. 
The "fundamentals"  solution, equation  6, assumes that this sequence 
of random  variables  is the trivial process x,  =  0, for all t, so that q, 
depends only on the expected future  paths of aggregate  demands. It is 
the assumption  of this "transversality"  condition that yields a unique 
solution  for the model.79  Equation  2 in the text follows from  equation  6 
if it is assumed  that  g and  g* are expected to be constant. 
79. For  theoretical  arguments  for  imposing  transversality  conditions,  see Obstfeld  and 
Rogoff,  "Speculative  Hyperinflations"  and  "Ruling  Out  Divergent  Speculative  Bubbles.  " 
For a discussion  of solutions  to stochastic  difference  equations,  see Thomas  J. Sargent, 
Macroeconomic  Theory (Academic  Press, 1979).  Stochastic  bubble  solutions  were pro- 
posed in Olivier  J. Blanchard,  "Speculative  Bubbles, Crashes, and Rational  Expecta- 
tions," Economics  Letters, vol. 3, no. 4 (1979),  pp. 387-89. Maurice Obstfeld  445 
To find the full-employment  equilibrium  value of pt, use the home- 
region  money market  equilibrium  to solve for the nominal  interest  rate  it 
(:=  r, +  tpt+ I -  pt). When this solution is substituted into the first goods- 
market  equilibrium  condition  in equation  13, the result  is the difference 
equation: 
t1+ AA  t8  ,mt 
tPt+i  =  (  JP  -  (It -  -- 
Define w =  (1 +  X)/X.  A transversality  condition similar  to the one 
imposed in deriving  equation 6 implies that the solution of the above 
difference  equation  is: 
(14)  p  (( j)  ,  ([)t)q+j4  (  +  + 
u  +  6u*  +  &8o9  Define  =  *  Evaluation of equation 14 requires 
simplification  of the double  sum: 
OC 
E  (w1-itqt = 
j=0 
00  0 
E=0  + 624*  +  8*U >  h  (tgt+h  h-j 
(recall  equation  6). To simplify  the foregoing  equation,  rewrite  it as: 
~  w  =(1)  [  ]~/u 
(t  *+  - 
)_  j=O  j=O  h=O  f  f 
=  (  E)J~O  (u-i-l  -T  i)  (g*  -  ) 
\Jj=o  ,1_^-1JVc*  c 
Substitute  this  into  equation  14  to obtain  the  full-employment  equilibrium 
price  of the home region's  output, 
(15)  (;)  j=0  A  + 
8/u  ___  __ 
+  E  (Wj1  -  -j-1)  -tg  __ tgt+j 
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Let w* =  . A similar derivation leads to the full-employment 
equilibrium foreign price, 
Pt  =  Lt) 
(16)  j=  ( 
n  E(@-i  -  --l)  (tgt+j  tgt+ 
-  =0 
The equilibrium nominal exchange  rate, e,  =  qt + p1 -  p*, is given by 
equations  6, 15, and 16. 
Equations  3, 4, and 5 in the text follow from equations 15, 16, and 6 
under  the assumptions  that no changes in g or g*  are expected and that 
money supplies  are  expected  to grow  forever  at rates  pt  and  p*. Equation 
1 can then be derived  from  the money demand  functions, the definition 
of the real  interest  rate, and  the observation  that  p and  p* rise at rates p. 
and [.* in full-employment  equilibrium  when no changes in monetary 
growth  rates  are expected. 
Analyzing Short-Run Macroeconomic  Interactions 
A diagrammatic  depiction  of the world  economy's short-run  equilib- 
rium  is given  in figure  6.  80 For  given  domestic  and  foreign  nominal  wages, 
the locus labeled  HH shows the combinations  of domestic and foreign 
price levels that clear the domestic goods market when world asset 
markets  are  in equilibrium.  An increase  inp works  through  both  relative- 
price and interest rate effects to cause an excess supply of domestic 
goods, while an increase  inp* restores  goods-market  balance  by switch- 
ing  world  demand  toward  domestic  goods and  increasing  foreign  output. 
HH therefore  slopes upward,  as drawn.  The FF locus, along  which the 
foreign  goods market  clears  when  world  asset markets  are  in  equilibrium, 
has a positive slope for the same reason. 
More formally, the HH  schedule is obtained  by equating  aggregate 
demand  and  supply  in  the  domestic  goods market,  eliminating  the current 
80. The diagram  will be recognized  as a direct descendant  of the one developed in 
Romney  Robinson,  "A Graphical  Analysis  of the Foreign  Trade  Multiplier,"  Economic 
Journal, vol. 62 (September 1952), pp. 546-64. Maurice Obstfeld  447 
Figure 6.  World Economy's Short-Run Equilibrium 
exchange rate through use of the nominal interest parity condition, 
eliminating  the domestic and foreign  nominal  interest  rates through  use 
of the corresponding  money-market  equilibrium  conditions, and elimi- 
nating  national  outputs through  use of the aggregate  supply functions. 
The resulting  equilibrium  condition  is: 
HH:  0  +(  A  p 
0+  ~  ~  O  (O)) 
-8  +  /yo* +  8 (  *  +  Pt*  = 
+  XUtPt+ +  A  1+ 
+ 
-  0(Y  +  + gt 
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An analogous  procedure  leads to the FF schedule: 
FF:  0  +  (*  +  *)(1 +  *  +**)  * 
-  (8*  +  -,*O +  -8  +  a*e 
+  UJ*P*  +  O*  I  +(*  +*)*  -  oQ*  +  a*4) 
(u* +  8*)m,*  8*mt 
Expectations as of time t-  1 are predetermined,  while the effect of 
shocks on currently expected future values of e,  p,  and p* can be 
determined  from  equations  6, 15, and 16. 
Under the assumption that the structural  coefficients in the two 
countries are similar,  FF  is steeper than HH. The intersection of the 
schedules determines short-run equilibrium  output prices, and, by 
implication,  output  levels, the exchange  rate, and  interest  rates. 
Consider  next the two policy actions discussed in the text, a deceler- 
ation  of home monetary  growth  and  a home fiscal expansion. 
A permanent, unanticipated  reduction in 1L operates through two 
separate  channels  to shift  the HH locus. Equation  3 implies  that  the full- 
employment  price level, which is expected to prevail  once wages have 
adjusted  to the shock in the following  period, falls. Equation  5 implies 
that the expected future  exchange rate also falls. The first  effect raises 
the real interest rate at any point on HH by lowering the expected 
inflation  rate, while the second effect causes the spot exchange rate to 
fall at any point on HH. As both effects lower aggregate  demand, the 
new goods-market  equilibrium  locus lies below HH, at H'H', as shown 
in figure  7. 
FF is also affected  by the fall in Vt.  Because the expected future  value 
of the exchange rate e falls, the spot value of e also falls at any point 
along FF,  shifting  world demand  toward  foreign goods and generating 
excess demand  along  that schedule. It follows that the new equilibrium 
locus for the foreign  goods market  lies below FF, at F'F'.  The intersec- Maurice Obstfeld  449 
Figure 7.  Permanent Fall in Home Money Growtlt 
tion of H'H' and  F'F' indicates  a lower domestic  price  level, but shows 
that the effect of domestic disinflation  on the foreign price level is 
theoretically  ambiguous.  The condition  forp* to rise is -y*  < 8*/(u + 8). 
Since -y*  is likely to be quite small, a domestic monetary  crunch, while 
causing  a recession at home, is presumed  to stimulate  output  abroad  in 
the short  run. 
A permanent,  unanticipated  fiscal expansion at home is represented 
by a rise in g. At any point along HH there is now excess demand  for 
domestic output, so HH must shift upward  to H'H', as shown in figure 
8. There is also an effect on the foreign  goods market.  At any point on 
FF, the real  interest  rate  is now lower because the expected future  price 450  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Figure 8.  Permanent Home Fiscal Expansion 
level is higher,  and the terms of trade  have deteriorated.  Both develop- 
ments point to excess  demand for foreign output, so FF must shift 
downward  to F'F'.  The result of fiscal expansion at home is thus a 
simultaneous  rise in output  and prices in both regions. Comments 
and Discussion 
Richard  N. Cooper: Maurice  Obstfeld  has given us a superb  survey  and 
synthesis, and in some respects an extension, of the current state of 
exchange rate theory and of open economy macroeconomics under 
flexible  rates. I predict  that  it will end up on many  graduate  reading  lists. 
I want  first  to make  four somewhat  technical  comments  on the paper, 
then  comment  on Obstfeld's  remarks  on intervention,  and  then  conclude 
with two observations  on the more general  policy issues that he raises 
at the end of his paper. 
First, I have deep reservations  about the standard  money demand 
equation  that  Obstfeld,  following  most  macroeconomists,  uses. The  only 
point I would make  here is that the argument  in the equation  is income 
and output, not expenditure.  The model deals with small  changes, and 
it is interesting  to note that in the United States, which has not been 
thought  of as an open economy, while income rose 13 percent in real 
terms over the last ten quarters,  expenditures  rose 17 percent in real 
terms.  That  is a consequential  difference.  With  expenditure  rather  than 
income in the U.S.  money demand equation, there would be higher 
pressure on interest rates, greater appreciation  of the currency, and 
more downward  pressure on the price level than the argument  in the 
equation  implies. The change would probably  have only quantitative, 
not qualitative,  results. But theoretically  it could alter the signs of the 
impact  of a given  exogenous  disturbance,  as Kenneth  Weiller,  a graduate 
student  at Harvard,  has shown. For instance, tax reduction  could lead 
to a decline  in  domestic  output  and  prices  if  imports  are  greatly  stimulated 
and  demand  for money  depends  on expenditure.  Weiller  has also shown 
that  output  performs  less well in money  demand  equations  (as measured 
by the stability  of velocity and by the standard  error of estimate) for 
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most major  industrial  countries than does either consumption  or total 
expenditure.  So I urge  all those who are  dealing  with  empirical  questions 
involving  the demand  for money to think  more  seriously  about  what the 
equation  really  means  in an open economy, and  how we justify it. 
My second point has to do with the influence  of expectations about 
future  budget  deficits  on the current  exchange  rates. That  is captured  in 
Obstfeld's  equation  6, which implies  a stability  over time of the under- 
lying  structural  coefficients,  certainty  of view about  the stability  of those 
coefficients,  and  certainty  about  the future  path  of budget  deficits. 
While the influence  of the distant  future  diminishes  in this equation 
because  a coefficient  less than  unity  gets compounded  over time, its rate 
of fading  is determined  entirely by the structural  coefficients. I would 
think  that, in reality, confidence  about  the future  of the economy fades 
quite rapidly  as "the future"  becomes a more distant  time. There is an 
increasing cone of uncertainty about structural coefficients as  one 
projects  events further  into the future, so that a subjective  uncertainty 
discount  should  be applied  to this equation  and, indeed, to any forward- 
looking equation. I would suggest further  that uncertainty  about the 
future is so great that expected events as far ahead as, say, five years 
have negligible  influence  on the current  exchange rate, which is what 
equation  6 determines. 
Third,  the portfolio  balance  framework  that is used here, along  with 
the assumption  of high  asset substitutability,  which  is now a very widely 
used framework  for analyzing  open economy macroeconomics,  leads to 
the a priori  finding  that  an  increase  in  either  present  or  future  government 
spending,  holding  money constant, necessarily  leads to an appreciation 
of the currency; and under rational expectations the currency will 
appreciate  at once. Increase  your  expectation  about  any future  govern- 
ment spending,  and immediately  the value of the currency  goes up. 
It is always nice when a theoretical  model gets a well-defined  result; 
we have so many ambiguous  results these days. But we have to ask 
whether  this result is really a verity, or whether  it is merely an artifact 
of this particular  model  construction.  It is noteworthy  that  the Japanese 
Economic Planning  Agency (EPA) model of the world economy gets 
this  result  for the United  States and  Canada,  but  not for  the other  leading 
industrial  countries,  where  an  increase  in either  actual  or  expected  future 
government  spending  leads to a depreciation  rather  than  an appreciation 
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spending  in these countries has a much smaller impact on domestic 
interest rates than is the case for the United States or Canada. It is 
difficult  in these complex, several-hundred-equation  models to know 
exactly what is going on, but I do not think  that the EPA result should 
be rejected on a priori grounds. On the contrary, it corresponds to 
experience  as best EPA has been able to estimate  it. 
Similarly,  I would ask whether  we should  be certain  that a reduction 
in either  the actual  or  future  U.S. budget  deficit  would  weaken  the dollar 
the next day. I am not certain.  If the executive branch  and  the Congress 
struck  a consequential  deal to reduce  budget  deficits  a year or two from 
now, I would not be at all surprised  to see an immediate  appreciation  of 
the dollar rather than a depreciation. Yet that could not happen in 
Obstfeld's model, or indeed in most of the models of exchange rate 
determination  that  are used these days. 
Fourth,  in comparing  a flexible exchange rate with a fixed exchange 
rate system, Obstfeld  suggests  that Europe  has been better  off in recent 
years  because  of the stimulus  provided  to its exports  by the appreciation 
of the dollar,  which putatively  came from the expansionary  U.S. fiscal 
policy. It might  be so, and I have similarly  argued  that the Europeans 
are  better  off than  they think  they are, on these grounds. 
But  the  comparison  Obstfeld  makes  in  this  regard  is with  a  hypothetical 
world of fixed exchange rates. One of the troubling  features  of Europe 
today  is the weakness  of investment  in plant  and  equipment,  even in the 
presence of a vigorous export growth. As empirical  social scientists, 
economists should ask why that is so. One possible explanation  is that 
European  businessmen  do not believe that the current  exchange rates 
are  sufficiently  enduring  to warrant  investment  on the basis of the strong 
orders  that  they are currently  getting  from  overseas. 
That  possibility  raises the hypothesis that real exchange rate uncer- 
tainty may have a strongly  inhibitory  effect on investment, not only in 
countries  that  now have strong  export  orders, such as Europe,  but even 
in  countries  where  the export  orders  are  weak, such  as the United  States, 
where businessmen hesitate to  invest on the prospect of  a future 
depreciation  in the dollar. 
So it could be that real exchange rate uncertainty  arising  from the 
fluctuations that we  have seen in recent years inhibits investment 
everywhere. Certainly  American  businessmen say now that they face 
agonizing decisions about whether to locate their next major plant 454  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
expansion  here or in some other  country,  and  many  of them  are stymied 
on that  decision. Obstfeld's  model  does not capture  even the possibility 
of an effect of uncertainty  on investment  decisions. 
On the matter of intervention, Obstfeld asserts that all evidence 
suggests that sterilized  exchange rate intervention  does not work. I do 
not think  that such a strong  statement  is warranted.  The evidence is, in 
fact, quite ambiguous;  the tests are weak; they apply mainly to the 
influence  of asset composition  on the exchange  risk  premium  rather  than 
to sterilized  intervention  as such; and  they often assume  rational  expec- 
tations, which may be what the tests are really  rejecting.  I mention  this 
point because the "noneffectiveness  of sterilized  intervention"  seems 
to have become the conventional  wisdom  among  monetary  economists. 
Now I turn  to two more general  questions that are raised in the lat- 
ter part  of Obstfeld's  paper.  One is the contention  that  policy actions to 
restrict  free movements  of capital  would reduce  efficiency  and welfare. 
Some economists  have gone so far as to draw  a parallel  between capital 
restrictions  and restrictions  on trade, suggesting  that both are equally 
undesirable.  I cannot  think  of an  area  in  which  the unqualified  application 
of general  theoretical  propositions  is more  misleading  to policy decisions 
than  this one. 
It is a very complicated  issue, and  on this occasion I can only suggest 
a few reservations. First, it is well known that overseas investments 
undertaken  in order to get behind a tariff  wall are in general welfare- 
reducing  from a world point of view. It is a general proposition  from 
second-best theory that an impediment  at one place in the system, 
combined with freedom in another, can reduce welfare rather than 
increase it. 
Second, at the much  more  empirical  level, it is well known  that  many 
capital  movements  by or on behalf  of households,  especially in Europe, 
arejust tax evasions, nothing  more,  nothing  less. Investors  are  attracted 
to overseas investments  in order  to evade domestic  taxes. 
Tax evasion raises a complicated  question. Is it welfare-reducing  or 
not? That depends on precisely how we  specify the social welfare 
function,  and  in particular,  on how we put public  goods into the welfare 
function,  and  hence the financing  of those public  goods. 
When  Mexico borrowed  heavily abroad  in 1980-82,  with freedom  of 
capital  movements and an overvalued  currency  that encouraged  much 
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determining  Mexican  policy, was that  welfare-enhancing  or not? When 
a democratically  elected government  of France in 1981  did, mistakenly 
in my view, exactly what it said it was going to do during  the campaign 
despite  the objections  of the wealthy  minority,  there  was a large  outflow 
of capital from France. In what sense was that a welfare-enhancing 
movement  of capital? 
To come closer to home, the United States now has an unprecedent- 
edly large net inflow of capital, over two and a half percent of GNP. 
Does this reflect a sudden increase in time preference on the part of 
Americans?  On  revealed  preference  grounds,  yes. Relative  to the recent 
past, Americans  apparently  want to consume now, pay later. The large 
inflow  from  abroad  helps satisfy that  desire. 
On close inspection, however, the consumption  is public  rather  than 
private,  for the most part. And we are having  a great  public  debate  over 
both the size and the character  of the public sector, and in particular 
over the mix between nondefense and defense spending. While the 
debate is taking place, we are borrowing  in order to avoid making  a 
decision. On still closer inspection, I would suggest that what we are 
seeing is not a reasoned  debate at all, but a game of chicken, a contest 
over who will back down first-the  president  or the Democrats in the 
House of Representatives. 
In the meantime, the United States last year drew in $100 billion 
worth  of capital  from  the rest of the world;  it will probably  be $120  billion 
this year, and on plausible  projections  perhaps  $150 billion next year. 
Now is this what we mean by an efficient allocation of the world's 
capital?  I would modestly suggest that economists should  take another 
look at this question of whether impediments  to capital  flows, as they 
actually  take place in the world, in fact are welfare-reducing. 
So as not to leave a misleading  impression,  I will say explicitly  that I 
do not favor the imposition  of capital controls; but my reasons do not 
stem from  the fact that I think  they would be directly  welfare-reducing. 
Rather,  it would be administratively  extremely complicated  to control 
capital  movements  effectively, and to do so for longer  than a few years 
would  probably  require  controls  over certain  forms  of trade  as well. My 
point  is that  we should  avoid  uncritical  application  of general  theoretical 
principles  to the actual  state of affairs. 
Finally, on the nature  of the exchange rate regime, Obstfeld  reaches 
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stances a fixed exchange rate regime would be superior  to a flexible 
exchange  rate  regime,  that  is not generally  the case. 
Furthermore,  he argues  that in order to get most of its benefits, the 
rates in a fixed exchange rate regime  have to be credibly  fixed;  but that 
is not possible because there will always be a suspicion that sooner or 
later  the  exchange  rate  will  be moved.  One  way  to deal  with  this  credibility 
problem  is to eliminate exchange rates, and the way to eliminate the 
exchange rates is to eliminate different currencies and move to one 
currency.  I will  not  develop  that  thought  at  length  here. But  I put  forward 
what  many  will regard  as a quixotic  proposal  in Foreign Affairs last fall, 
set far enough in the future, the year 2010, so as not to be immediately 
alarming,  for the creation  of a single  currency-not one world  currency, 
which  I think  is neither  attainable  nor  desirable,  but  one currency  among 
the industrialized  democracies. 
That proposal  deals explicitly with a politically  vital point on which 
Obstfeld  touches; namely the balance to be struck between discipline 
and autonomy.  I will not argue  the case here, but what leads me in this 
direction  is the  judgment  that  large  changes  in real  exchange  rates  of the 
type that we  have seen in recent years, driven mainly by  capital 
movements, will become intolerable  to the business community.  The 
consequence in the absence of some constructive  thought  about where 
we want to go will be greater  restrictions,  both on trade  and on capital 
movements, in order  to reduce the exchange rate uncertainties,  which 
from  the point of view of any individual  economic agent  are completely 
arbitrary.  If we want to avoid that outcome, we need to think more 
boldly about  the future  of the monetary  system. 
Paul R.  Krugman: A dozen years after the abandonment  of fixed 
exchange rates, it is clear that the system of flexible rates is a big 
disappointment.  But life since 1973  has in general been nothing  but a 
series of disappointments.  In his paper Maurice Obstfeld argues that 
while floating  rates have not fulfilled any of the expectations of their 
advocates, fixed rates would have been even worse. His argument  is 
clear and well conceived, and I almost believe it. What  I want to do in 
my comment is to offer a brief summary of his argument, offer an 
additional argument  in support of floating rates, then present some 
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After  reviewing  the macroeconomic  and  exchange  rate  developments 
of recent years, the paper  sets out a theoretical  model within  which to 
interpret  these developments.  The model is constructed  with consum- 
mate craftsmanship.  As a practitioner  myself, I was delighted  with the 
way that  Obstfeld  finessed  his  way  past  awkward  technical  issues (though 
I would dearly love to know how long a "period" is). Despite the 
sophistication  of the framework,  however, the model still works pretty 
much like the old Mundell-Fleming  model. The key result remains  the 
same: a move from fixed to floating  rates affects monetary  and fiscal 
policy in opposite  ways. Shifts in demand  that  originate  in the IS curve, 
which  Obstfeld  somewhat  misleadingly  calls shifts  in aggregate  demand, 
affect domestic  output  less under  flexible  rates  than  they do under  fixed 
rates. Shifts  in demand  that  originate  in the  LM curve, by contrast,  affect 
domestic  output  more  under  flexible  than  under  fixed rates. 
Obstfeld  points  out  that  this  result  can  be used  to analyze  the  stabilizing 
properties  of alternative  exchange rate regimes, along the lines of the 
familiar  Poole analysis of interest  rate versus money targets. If shocks 
originate  largely  in the IS curve, flexible rates will be more stabilizing 
than  will fixed  rates. If they originate  largely  in the LM curve, fixed  rates 
will be more  stabilizing  than  flexible  rates. 
Finally, Obstfeld  presents evidence that, at least over the past few 
years, IS-type shocks have been important  and perhaps dominant  in 
exchange  rate  movements.  The evidence is partly  the direct  observation 
of divergent  fiscal trends, partly the demonstration  that stock market 
prices and exchange  rates have not moved together  the way one would 
expect if the shocks were monetary  in origin.  The conclusion  is that we 
seem to be living  in the kind  of world  where  flexible  rates  are  better  than 
fixed  rates. 
The first  comment  I would  like to add  is that  there  is another  powerful 
argument  for exchange  rate  flexibility  that  is apparent  in Obstfeld's  data, 
though not in his text. This is the fact that even with internationally 
coordinated  monetary and fiscal policies, equilibrium  real exchange 
rates will not be constant over time, because of structural  change. 
Consider  Obstfeld's figure 1. The real appreciation  of the dollar since 
1979  has  only  brought  it back  to roughly  its 1970  level; yet a real  exchange 
rate that in 1970  was associated with a current  account surplus  is now 
associated  with  a massive  current  account  deficit.  The  natural  conclusion 
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account has been depreciating steadily over this period. Structural 
change of this kind appears to occur even faster if we consider the 
converse case of Japan,  which has moved into massive current  account 
surplus  despite a real  currency  appreciation  since 1980. 
These developments are not all that puzzling; it is  not hard to 
rationalize  them on the basis of a model in which the United States is a 
technological leader being overtaken by competitors. The point is, 
however, that if structural  change requires  substantial  changes in real 
exchange rates, it will be easier to manage  these if there are no fixed 
nominal  parities  to defend. I would argue  that structural  change rather 
than divergent monetary policies was the fundamental  cause of the 
collapse  of fixed  rates  at the beginning  of the 1970s,  and  that  any attempt 
to restore fixed rates would again face substantial stress from this 
direction. 
Having introduced  this argument  in support  of floating  rates, I now 
offer an argument  against  them that I do not feel gets enough attention 
in Obstfeld's  paper. This is the old view that floating  rates expose the 
international  system to the effects of destabilizing  speculation.  With  the 
rise of efficient  markets  theory most economists came to discount this 
possibility, believing  instead  that asset prices would reflect  current  and 
expected future fundamentals.  As Obstfeld documents, however, ac- 
cumulating  evidence has not supported  this sanguine  view. While it is 
always possible to rationalize  the negative  results by positing  large  and 
shifting  risk premiums,  there is in fact not a shred  of positive evidence 
for the assumption  that exchange markets,  or for that matter,  bond and 
stock  markets,  efficiently  use information  the  way  that  theoretical  models 
suppose. 
The key and dramatic  piece of evidence is that interest differentials 
have consistently mispredicted  the direction  of exchange rate change 
since 1980. This could represent a "peso problem," but as Jeffrey 
Frankel  has shown (BPEA, 1:1985), the errors  have been too large  and 
persistent  to be explained  in this way. (Frankel  actually  set out to test 
for the possibility  of a "rational  bubble," but, as Obstfeld  notes, such 
bubbles  and  peso problems  are  observationally  equivalent,  so Frankel's 
test allows us to reject both.) The market  has been purely and simply 
getting  it wrong. 
My complaint  is that Obstfeld's paper does not take this evidence 
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to the  possibility  of "rational"  bubbles,  which  is already  a more  favorable 
assumption about the market than the data allow. And the whole 
discussion is confined to the issue of volatility, reflecting  an implicit 
assumption  that  large  and  sustained  exchange  rate  misalignments  cannot 
be explained  by malfunctioning  financial  markets.  This need not be the 
case; various people, including  myself, have argued  that an important 
part  of the dollar's  current  strength  reflects  an  expectational  error  on the 
part  of the exchange  market.  Whatever  one thinks  of this view, the point 
is that autonomous exchange speculation, like LM shocks, is more 
destabilizing under flexible than under fixed rates. If destabilizing 
speculation  is at all important-and the evidence does not allow us to 
dismiss this possibility-then  this is an argument  against the current 
system. 
Finally, I turn  to the crucial  issue: would greater  fixity of rates have 
helped avoid the current  mess in the international  economy? Like all 
good men, Obstfeld  attributes  the mess essentially to the divergence  in 
fiscal policy between the United States and other industrial  countries. 
He argues  convincingly  that  the consequences  of that  divergence  would 
have been no better and probably worse under fixed rates. He also 
argues,  less convincingly,  that  fixed  rates  would  not have disciplined  the 
U.S. government.  I am not so sure. If rates had been fixed, the fiscal 
deficit would have presented the Federal Reserve with an agonizing 
choice: accommodate  the deficit  and risk reigniting  inflation,  or tighten 
money and provoke a worldwide reserve crisis. Perhaps so stark an 
alternative  would have forced the Reagan administration  to be more 
responsible. 
The fact is that the script we have actually  followed is beginning  to 
look more  and  more  like a tragedy.  The long  awaited  wave of protection- 
ism generated  by the strong  dollar  is now breaking  over our heads, and 
the international  trading  system may not have much  time left. It is hard 
not to wish that  we had tried  something  different. 
General Discussion 
Several  participants  commented  on whether  domestic  fiscal  expansion 
necessarily  leads to domestic  currency  appreciation  under  a floating  rate 
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should. In his formal comments, Richard  Cooper had noted that the 
Japanese Economic Planning  Agency's (EPA) macroeconomic  model 
implied  the reverse  for Japan  and  several  other  industrialized  countries. 
Lawrence Krause  mentioned  recent work by Jeffrey Sachs that traced 
the result for Japan to the weak linkages in the Japanese economy 
between fiscal expansion and interest rates and between interest rates 
and investment inflows from abroad. Sachs attributed these weak 
linkages to the historical  presence of capital controls in Japan;  since 
these capital controls have now been abandoned, the relationship 
between fiscal policy and the value of the yen against  other currencies 
would very likely look different  today. William  Branson  suggested  that 
the EPA result for Japan  in part reflects the maintained  assumption  of 
low substitutability  between assets,  so that foreigners' demand for 
Japanese  debt is insensitive  to Japanese  interest  rates. In contrast  to the 
Japanese  model, the Canadian  RDX-2  model yields a neutral  prediction 
concerning  the effect of domestic fiscal expansion on the value of the 
domestic currency, and U.S.  models typically yield predictions like 
those in Obstfeld's  analysis. Paul Krugman  questioned  whether it was 
meaningful  to ask about the effect of a change in fiscal policy on the 
exchange rate assuming monetary policy fixed. In his view, a more 
meaningful  thought experiment would ask what a shift in the fiscal- 
monetary  policy mix that  left GNP unchanged  would  do to the exchange 
rate; the conclusion that expansionary fiscal policy leads to a real 
appreciation  is much more robust  if one imagines  it to be accompanied 
by a "leaning  against  the wind" change  in monetary  policy. 
Branson  pointed  to Obstfeld's  equation  9, noting  its implication  that 
the changes in U.S. fiscal policy over the past few years should have 
produced  a much smaller  appreciation  of the dollar than has actually 
occurred. However, that equation is based on long-run  elasticities of 
demand with respect to the real exchange rate. Taking a short-run 
perspective, if each 1 percent increase in the real exchange rate adds 
roughly $2.5 billion to the current account deficit, as work by both 
Robert  Lawrence  and Stephen  Marris  suggests, one would need some- 
thing like a 50 percent real appreciation  to finance $125 billion of the 
budget  deficit  by running  a current  account deficit. Branson  suggested 
that  the appreciation  of the dollar  over the past  few years  is perhaps  less 
surprising  when viewed in this light. 
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fared better under  floating  rates than it would have under  fixed rates. 
One relevant issue is whether the source of shocks to the system has 
been  primarily  the  goods  market  or  the  asset market.  Lawrence  criticized 
Obstfeld's  interpretation  of the positive correlation  between stock price 
changes and exchange rate changes as evidence for the dominance  of 
goods-market  shocks rather  than asset-market  shocks, noting  that this 
interpretation  follows only in the case of purely  domestic  disturbances. 
If, for example, foreigners decided to switch into U.S.  assets, there 
would be both an increase in U.S. stock prices and an appreciation  of 
the U.S. dollar. Obstfeld  replied  that the positive correlation  between 
European  and  U.S. stock price  changes  documented  in the paper  weighs 
against  the view that  shifts  from  European  to American  assets have been 
the dominant  sort of shock in recent years. Marris  stressed the impor- 
tance of exogenous shifts in investment-savings  behavior  in the private 
sector. The weakness of investment relative to the supply of private 
savings  outside the United States was probably  as important  to the rise 
in the dollar  as the reduction  in high-employment  budget  deficits  was. 
Marris  argued that it is misleading  to compare flexible rates with 
rigidly  fixed  rates. "Fixed" rates  would  always have to be changed,  the 
only question being when and how. Thus the real choice is between 
unmanaged  flexible  rates  and  some  form  of rnanaged  flexible  or  adjustable 
rates.  The right  question  to ask, Marris  continued,  is the extent to which 
the actual  operation  of any particular  exchange  rate regime  provides  an 
anchor  for exchange  rate  expectations.  Noting  that  the United  Kingdom 
has  floating  rates,  while  France  is part  of the European  Monetary  System 
(EMS),  he reasoned  that  it is likely that the United Kingdom  has had  to 
deviate more from its domestic monetary  objectives than has France, 
because the market  does not have a good sense of the British  govern- 
ment's  intention  with regard  to exchange  rates. Based on his reading  of 
experience, Marris  concluded that a credible managed  floating  or ad- 
justable fixed rate involves less subordination  of monetary policy to 
exchange  rate  objectives  than  does the sort  of wildly fluctuating  flexible 
rate  regime  we have  experienced.  John  Williamson  was  also  disappointed 
that  the paper's  comparison  of alternative  regimes  was limited  to floating 
rates versus Bretton Woods fixed rates. He pointed to a target range 
system as an alternative  worth  discussing. 
Several  participants  disagreed  with  Obstfeld's  conclusion  that  a fixed 
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United States than has the existing floating rate system. Lawrence 
echoed Krugman's  view, expressed  in his formal  comments,  that  a fixed 
rate system would at least have made the choices facing the United 
States much starker. Price levels would have had to rise roughly 40 
percent  more  in the United States than  abroad  to achieve the real result 
produced  under  the floating  rate system; Lawrence  believes this would 
not have been politically  feasible, so that a fixed rate system could not 
have accommodated  fiscal policy of the sort the United States has 
actually pursued. Marris reasoned that the U.S.  demand expansion 
would have been much more bottled up inside the United States with 
fixed rates than it was with flexible rates, and that this would have 
created  greater  pressures  for change  in both U.S. and European  policy. 
Krugman  argued  that even a verbal commitment  by policymakers  to 
fixed exchange rates could be helpful, insofar as such a commitment 
would make  it harder  for them to deny that their  actions were linked  to 
what  happened  in  foreign  exchange  markets.  Franco  Modigliani  stressed 
that  it was not correct  to think  of the United  States  as simply  being  above 
the law under  a fixed rate system. In the early 1960s,  U.S. fiscal policy 
was to a significant  extent dictated  by the notion  that U.S. interest  rates 
could not be below those in the rest of the world. Lawrence suggested 
that fixed rates would more effectively impose discipline  on the United 
States if the dollar were not the reserve currency. Williamson  agreed 
that a reserve currency system was not an optimal system, in that it 
imposed  no discipline  on the  reserve  currency  country.  Obstfeld  doubted 
that  a fixed exchange  rate  would  have promoted  a more  restrictive  U.S. 
fiscal policy through  its eventual price level effects; given outflows of 
reserves,  the Europeans  might  well  have  devalued.  The  whole  discussion 
of whether fixed rates would be more effective than flexible rates in 
imposing  discipline  on the United States puzzled  Branson;  if the United 
States were unhappy with outcomes under a particular  regime, he 
reasoned,  it could push  for the regime  to be altered. 
Lawrence  argued  that  any assessment  of the relative  merits  of flexible 
and fixed exchange rates needs to look at investment  flows as well as 
trade flows. If domestic monetary  disturbances  were large, a flexible 
exchange rate system could produce larger swings in the demand  for 
domestic manufacturing  output than would occur under a fixed rate 
system; a monetary  contraction  would cause the domestic currency  to 
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cutbacks.  It is thus plausible,  Lawrence  concluded,  that  manufacturing 
investment  could  be relatively  less attractive  under  a flexible  rate  regime 
than  under  a fixed rate  regime. 
Martin Baily expressed concern about the potential destabilizing 
consequences of a flexible rate regime. Under a fixed rate system, 
structural  changes  could be accommodated  by differential  growth  rates 
in prices or wages that would occur relatively slowly and not require 
massive dislocation.  Under  a flexible  rate system, strange  policy mixes 
or speculation  can cause large  short-term  movements  in exchange  rates, 
which then translate  into large changes in resource allocation. No one 
would advise a manager  of a business to base investment  decisions on 
day-to-day  changes in his or her firm's  stock prices, Baily reasoned;  in 
the same way, it does not make sense for resources to be allocated  on 
the basis of day-to-day  changes in exchange rates. Yet, to some extent 
this will occur; in a competitive world market, exchange rate signals 
cannot  be ignored.  Lawrence  Summers  amplified  this point, noting  that 
a large  part  of the variance  in exchange  rates  cannot  be explained  by any 
of the factors econometricians  have included  in their models and thus 
appears  to be random  variation  relative to economic fundamentals;  he 
observed that it would not be efficient  for firms'  decisions to be driven 
by these seemingly  random  variations. 
Robert Solomon questioned Cooper's idea that uncertainty  about 
future exchange rates under the flexible rate regime has inhibited 
European investment. Tight fiscal policy in Europe has dampened 
investment there; moreover, European trade with the United States 
amounts  to only a small share  of total European  output, so that a better 
competitive  position  vis-a-vis U.S. producers  should  not necessarily  be 
expected to translate  into a large increase in investment. Cooper re- 
sponded that the volume of European  trade in competition  with U.S. 
produced  goods, not European  trade with the United States directly, 
was the relevant  thing  to look at in this context. Jeffrey  Frankel  reported 
that he knew of at least three studies providing  evidence that exchange 
rate uncertainty  affects trade  flows. One reply to such concerns is that 
exchange rate uncertainty  can always be hedged on forward  exchange 
markets.  But, Frankel  noted, although  the forward  exchange  market  has 
grown  substantially  since  fixed  rates  were  abandoned,  the  cost of hedging 
as measured  by the bid-ask  spread  has widened. 
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and  fixed exchange  rates  on theoretical  grounds.  First, the nature  of the 
shocks to the system may change over time. Second, asset market 
behavior  is very poorly understood,  which makes it difficult  to predict 
the consequences of different  sorts of shocks under  different  regimes. 
Third, Robert Lucas's critique that changes in regime may lead to 
changes  in behavior  rules seems particularly  applicable  to the choice of 
exchange rate regime. Nordhaus suggested that a more pragmatic 
assessment might be made by studying real-world  experiments with 
alternative regimes, in particular  the experience under the EMS. A 
careful study by Ken Rogoff suggests that the EMS did reduce the 
month-to-month  volatility  in nominal  exchange rates, but not the mag- 
nitude  of longer  term  swings  in real  exchange  rates. Nordhaus's  inspec- 
tion of performance  under  the EMS did not lead him to believe that the 
United States should  emulate  the EMS model. 
Ralph  Bryant  expressed his concern  that too much may be expected 
from  the choice of exchange  rate  regime.  Given  that  national  economies 
are interdependent  and national  governments  operate autonomously, 
there is bound  to be trouble  at times no matter  what the exchange rate 
regime. 